Commentary on Romans

Saint Thomas Aquinas
Commentary on RomansChapter 7: The Law and Sin

Lecture 2: The law makes sin beyond measure

7:7 What shall we say, then? Is the law sin? [n. 532] God forbid! But I would not have known sin, except through the law. For I would not have known concupiscence, if the law did not say: you shall not covet. [n. 534]
7:8 But sin, taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence. [n. 540] For without the law sin was dead. [n. 544]
7:9 And I lived some time without the law. But when the commandment came, sin revived, [n. 546]
7:10 And I died. And the commandment that was ordained to life, the same was found to be unto death to me. [n. 549]
7:11 For sin, taking occasion by the commandment, seduced me: and by it killed me. [n. 550]
7:12 Wherefore the law indeed is holy: and the commandment holy and just and good. [n. 551]
7:13 Did that then which is good bring death unto me? God forbid! But sin, that it may appear sin, through good, wrought death in me: that sin, by the commandment, might become sinful above measure. [n. 552]

532. After showing that through Christ’s grace we are freed from the slavery of the law, and that this liberation is useful, the Apostle now answers an objection which arises from the foregoing, namely, that the old law seems not to be good.

In regard to this he does two things.

First, he solves the objection through which it seems that the old law is not good;

second, he shows that the law is good, at for we know (Rom 7:14).

In regard to the first he does two things.

First, he sets out the objection with regard to the law;

second, he solves it, at wherefore the law indeed.

533. First, therefore, he says: I have said that sinful passions existed by means of the law and that it is a law of death. What shall we say, then follows from such statements? Shall we say that the law is sin?

This can be taken in two ways. In one way, that the law teaches sin: the laws of the people are vain (Jer 10:3), namely because they teach vanity. In another way, that the law is called sin, because the one who gave the law sinned by decreeing such a law. These two follow one from the other, because if the law teaches sin, the lawgiver sins by decreeing the law: woe to them that make wicked laws (Isa 10:1). Now it seems that the law does teach sin, if the sinful passions come through the law, and if the law leads to death.

534. Then when he says, God forbid, he solves the aforesaid objection.

Concerning this it should be noted that if the law per se and directly caused sinful passions or death, it would follow that the law is sin in either of the two ways mentioned; but not if the law were the occasion of sinful passions and death.

In regard to this he does two things.

First, he shows what the law does per se;

second, what follows from it as from an occasion, at but sin, taking occasion.

535. Concerning the first he does three things.

First, he answers the question, saying, God forbid, namely that the law be sin.

For it does not teach sin: the law of the Lord is perfect (Ps 19:7). Nor has the lawgiver sinned as though decreeing an unjust law: by me kings reign and lawgivers decree just things (Prov 8:15).

536. Second, at but I would not have known sin, he indicates what pertains per se to the law, namely, to make sin known and not to remove it.

And that is what he says: but I would not have known sin, except through the law: through the law comes knowledge of sin (Rom 3:20). This is clear if it is understood of the natural law, because man distinguishes between good and evil through the natural law: he filled their heart with wisdom and showed them both good and evil (Sir 17:6). But here the Apostle seems to be speaking of the old law, which he signified above when he said the oldness of the letter (Rom 7:6).

One should say therefore that without the law sin could be known insofar as it has the character of ignobility, i.e., as something contrary to reason, but not inasmuch as it is an offense against God, because through the laws divinely decreed, man learns that human sins displease God, since he forbids them and commands that they be punished.

537. Third, at for I would not have known concupiscence, he proves what he had said, saying, for I would not have known concupiscence, if the law did not say: you shall not covet.

In regard to this it should be noted that his statement, I would not have known sin, except through the law, could be interpreted as referring to the sinful act which the law brings to man’s attention, when it forbids it. This, of course, is true in some cases, for it is said, a woman shall not lie down with a beast (Lev 18:23). But that this is not the Apostle’s meaning is clear from what he says here. For no one is unaware of the act of concupiscence, since all experience it.

Therefore, it must be interpreted as saying that, as was stated above, it is only through the law that sin is recognized as something subject to punishment and an offense against God. He uses concupiscence to prove this, because corrupt concupiscence is common to all sins. Hence a Gloss says, with Augustine, here the Apostle chose a general sin, i.e., concupiscence. Therefore the law is good, because when it forbids concupiscence, it forbids all evils.

538. It might be supposed that concupiscence is a general sin according as it is taken for the desire for something illicit, which is of the essence of any sin. This is not the way Augustine called concupiscence a general sin, but because the root and cause of every sin is some special concupiscence. Hence a Gloss says that concupiscence is a general sin from which all sins come.

For the Apostle quotes a precept from Exodus: you shall not covet your neighbor’s property (Exod 20:17). This is the concupiscence involved in avarice, about which it is said: the love of money is the root of all evils (1 Tim 6:10), because all things obey money (Eccl 10:19). Therefore, the concupiscence about which he is now speaking is a general evil, not with the commonness of a genus or species but with the commonness of causality.

Nor is this contrary to what is stated in Sirach, that pride is the beginning of all sin (Sir 10:15). For pride is the beginning of sin on the side of turning away; but covetousness is the beginning of sins on the side of turning toward a changeable good.

539. But it can be said that the Apostle takes covetousness to clarify his proposition, because he wants to show that without the law sin was not known, i.e., its aspect as offense against God. This is particularly clear from the fact that the law forbids covetousness, which is not forbidden by man. For God alone considers man guilty for coveting with the heart: man sees those things that appear, but the Lord beholds the heart (1 Sam 16:17). But the reason God’s law forbade coveting another’s property, which is taken by stealing, and another’s wife, who is violated by adultery, and not the coveting involved in other sins is that the former sins involve a pleasure in the very coveting, which does not happen in other sins.

540. Then he shows what follows from the law by way of opportunity, when he says, but sin, taking the occasion.

First, he states his intention;

second, he clarifies it, at for without the law.

541. First, therefore, he says that sin, taking occasion by the commandment of the law forbidding sin, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence.

By sin can be understood the devil, because he is the beginning of sin; and according to this he works all kinds of covetousness in man: he who commits sin is of the devil, for the devil has sinned from the beginning (1 John 3:8).

But because the Apostle had not mentioned the devil here, it can be said that each actual sin, as apprehended in thought, works in man a desire for it, as it says in James: each one is tempted by his own desire. Then desire when it has conceived gives birth to sin (Jas 1:14).

542. But it is better to say that this refers to the sin he described above as entering this world through one man (Rom 5:12), namely, original sin, which before the grace of Christ is in men according to guilt and punishment. But with the coming of grace its liability to punishment passes, although it abides with respect to inclination or habitual covetousness, which works in man every act of covetousness, whether it be the kinds of covetousness involved in various sins (for the covetousness involved in stealing is not the same as that in adultery) or the various degrees of covetousness as found in thought, pleasure, consent, and deed.

But to work this effect in man sin finds opportunity in the law. And that is what he says: taking occasion. Or because with the coming of the precept the aspect of transgression is added, for where there is no law there is no transgression (Rom 4:15); or because desire for the forbidden sin increases, for the reasons given above.

543. It should be noted that he does not say that the law gave the opportunity for sin, but that sin itself found opportunity by reason of the law.

For one who gives an opportunity scandalizes and, as a consequence, sins. This happens when someone commits an unrighteous act by which his neighbor is offended or takes scandal; for example, if someone frequents places of evil even with no evil intention. Hence he says below: but decide never to put a stumbling block or hindrance in the way of a brother (Rom 14:13). But if someone does a just act, for example, if he gives alms, by which someone else is scandalized, he is not giving an opportunity for scandal; hence he neither gives scandal nor sins, but the one scandalized finds the act an opportunity for taking scandal and sins. Thus, therefore, the law did what is right, because it forbade sin; hence it gave no opportunity for sinning, but man takes opportunity from the law. For this reason it follows that the law is not sin, but rather that sin is on the part of man.

Consequently, sinful passions, which pertain to the covetousness involved in sin, do not exist in virtue of the law as though the law wrought them, but sin causes them, taking occasion from the law. And for the same reason it is called a law of death, not because the law begets death, but because sin begets death by finding occasion in the law.

Now in the same sense the words can be arranged another way to say that sin worked all concupiscence through the command of the law, and this by taking occasion from the command; but the first exposition is simpler and better.

544. Then when he says, for without the law, he clarifies what he had said; and this through experience of the effect:

first, he mentions the effect;

second, he repeats the cause, at for sin.

In regard to the first he does three things:

first, he describes conditions before the law;

second, under the law, at but when the commandment came;

third, from a comparison of the two conditions he concludes to the outcome of the law, at and the commandment that was ordained to life.

545. First, therefore, he says, but sin, taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence. This is obvious from the fact that for without the law sin was dead, not as though sin did not exist, because through one man sin entered this world before the law (Rom 5:12), but in the sense that it was dead either with respect to man’s knowledge, which did not know that certain things forbidden by the law were sins, for example, covetousness; or because it was dead as compared to what it was later. For it did not have as much power to lead men to death as it had later, when it took opportunity from the law. For that is considered dead whose strength is weakened: mortify your members which are on earth (Col 3:5). This, therefore, was the condition before the law as far as sin was concerned.

546. But the condition so far as man was concerned is indicated when he says, and I lived some time without the law.

This can also be understood in two ways; in one way with respect to the fact that it seemed to man that he was alive, so long as he did not know that sin was that by reason of which he was dead: you have the name of being alive, but you are dead (Rev 3:1). Or in another way, this is said in comparison to the death which followed by occasion of the law. For those who sin less are said to be alive in comparison to those who sin more.

547. Then he describes conditions under the law, when he says, but when the commandment came.

First, in regard to sin when he says: but when the commandment came, i.e., after the law was decreed, sin revived. This can be understood in two ways: in one way with respect to the knowledge of man, who began to know that sin existed in him, which he did not know before: after I was instructed, I struck my thigh; I was ashamed and confounded (Jer 31:19). He says, revived because in paradise man had full knowledge of sin, although he did not have it through experience. Or, in another way, sin revived as to its power, because after the law was given, the opportunity was given for the power of sin to increase: the power of sin is the law (1 Cor 15:56).

548. Second, with respect to man himself; hence he says, and I died. This can also be understood in two ways: in one way as referring to man’s knowledge, so that I died means that I knew myself dead. In another way in comparison to the previous state, so that the sense is: I died, i.e., I was more bound to death than before. Hence what was said to Moses and Aaron is somewhat true: you have killed the Lord’s people (Num 16:13).

549. Then he concludes from the comparison between the two states the outcome of the law, saying that the commandment that was ordained to life . . . was found according to the intention of the lawgiver; second insofar as it pertains to the honesty and devotion of the one subject to the mandate: I gave them my statutes and showed them my ordinances by whose observance man shall live (Ezek 20:11) proved to be an occasion unto death to me, i.e., through sin which existed in man: his food is turned in his stomach, it is the gall of asps within him (Job 20:14).

550. Then when he says, for sin, he repeats the cause as though intending to clarify it by the outcome of the law, saying: this happened, namely, that the commandment which promised life proved to be death, for sin, taking occasion by the commandment, seduced me through the covetousness it wrought in me. Beauty has deceived you and lust has perverted your heart (Dan 13:56), and by it, namely, the commandment, sin took occasion to kill me: the letter kills (2 Cor 3:6).

551. Then when he says, wherefore the law, he reaches the main conclusion, namely, that the law is not only not sin but furthermore is good, making sin to be known and forbidding it.

First he concludes with respect to the whole law, saying: as is clear from the foregoing, the law indeed is holy: the law of the Lord is without blemish (Ps 19:7); we know that the law is good (1 Tim 1:8).

Second, with respect to the particular commandments of the law, saying: and the commandment of the law is holy in regard to the ceremonial precepts by which men are directed in the worship of God: be holy because I am holy (Lev 20:7) and just, in regard to the judicial precepts by which man is ordered to his neighbor in the proper way: the ordinances of the Lord are true and just altogether (Ps 19:9); and good, in regard to the moral precepts: the law of your mouth is better to me than thousands of gold and silver pieces (Ps 119:72). Yet, because all the commandments ordain us to God, he called the whole law holy.

552. Then, when he says, did that then which is good, he raises a question in regard to the effect of the law.

First, the question, saying, did that then which is good, namely, in itself, bring death unto me, i.e., act as a per se cause of death? For someone could falsely gather this from what he stated above, namely, that the commandment that was ordained to life . . . was found to be unto death to me.

553. Second, he answers negatively, saying, God forbid. For that which in itself is good and life-giving cannot be the cause of evil and death, because a good tree cannot bear evil fruit (Matt 7:18).

554. Third, at but sin, he shows that what he is now saying is in agreement with what he had said above. For the commandment itself does not bring death; but sin, finding occasion in the commandment, brings death.

And that is what he says: but sin, that it may appear sin, through the good of the law, wrought death in me, i.e., through the commandment of the law, because the law is good by the very fact that it brings knowledge of sin. And this occasionally, as it makes sin manifest.

555. This does not mean that sin worked death through the law, as though there was no death without the law. For it was stated above that death reigned from Adam to Moses (Rom 5:14), i.e., before the law was given. This should be understood to mean that sin worked death through the law, because the condemnation of death was increased when the law came.

And this is what he says: I say that the working of sin is death through good, that sin, by the commandment, might become sinful, that is, as if, on occasion, it makes one sin on account of the precept of the law. And this above measure either because the liability for transgression grew or because the inclination to sin increased with the coming of the law’s prohibitions.

As stated above, sin here means the devil, or rather the inclination to sin.