^7:14 For we know that the law is spiritual. But I am carnal, sold under sin. [n. 556]
^7:15 For that which I work, I do not understand. For I do not that good which I will: but the evil which I hate, that I do. [n. 562]
^7:16 If then I do that which I will not, I consent to the law, that it is good. [n. 567]
^7:17 Now then it is no more I that do it: but sin that dwells in me. [n. 568]
^7:18 For I know that the good does not dwell in me, that is to say, in my flesh. For to will is present with me: but to accomplish good, I cannot find. [n. 572]
^7:19 For the good which I will, I do not: but the evil which I will not, that I do.
^7:20 Now if I do that which I will not, it is no more I that do it: but sin that dwells in me. [n. 582]

556. After showing that the law is neither evil nor productive of an evil effect, the Apostle now proves that the law is good.

In regard to this he does two things:

first, he proves its goodness from the very repugnance to good found in man, a repugnance the law cannot take away;

second, he shows what can take away this repugnance, at unhappy (Rom 7:24).

In regard to the first he does three things:

first, he states his proposition;

second, he proves it, at for that which I work;

third, he draws the conclusion, at I find then a law (Rom 7:21).

In regard to the first he does two things:

first, he asserts the goodness of the law;

second, man’s condition, at but I am carnal.

557. First, therefore he says: we have stated that the law is holy. We said this because we, who are wise in divine matters, know that the law, i.e., the old, is spiritual, i.e., in harmony with man’s spirit: the law of the Lord is stainless (Ps 19:7). Or it is spiritual, i.e., given by the Holy Spirit who is called the finger of God in the Scriptures: if by the finger of God I cast out demons (Luke 11:20). Hence it is said: he gave Moses two tablets of stone, written with the finger of God (Exod 31:18).

Yet the new law is not only called spiritual but the law of the Spirit (Rom 8:2), because it is not only given by the Holy Spirit but the Holy Spirit imprints it on the heart in which he dwells.

558. Then he indicates man’s condition, when he says, but I am carnal.

This passage can be interpreted in two ways: in one way so that the Apostle is speaking in the person of a man existing in sin. This is the way Augustine explained it in the book of 83 Questions. But later in a book against Julian he explained it as though the Apostle is speaking in his own person, i.e., of a man in the state of grace.

Let us continue, therefore, by showing how these words and those that follow can be explained under both interpretations, although the second explanation is better.

559. The first statement, therefore, but I am carnal, is so interpreted that the word I stands for man’s reason, which is the chief thing in man; hence each man seems to be his own reason or intellect, as a city seems to be the ruler of the city, so that whatever he does the city seems to do.

560. But man is called carnal, because his reason is carnal. It is called carnal in two ways: in one way from the fact that it is submissive to the flesh and consents to things to which the flesh urges it: for while there is jealousy and strife among you, are you not of the flesh? (1 Cor 3:3). In this way it is understood of man not yet healed by grace. In another way reason is said to be carnal, because it is under attack from the flesh: the desires of the flesh are against the Spirit (Gal 5:17). In this way, even the reason of a man in the state of grace is said to be carnal. In both cases it is carnal on account of sin; hence he adds, sold under sin.

561. But it should be noted that the carnality, which implies rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, arises from the sin of the first parent, because this pertains to the inclination to sin derived from that sin. But the carnality which implies submission of reason to the flesh arises not only from original sin but also from actual, through which a man by obeying the desires of the flesh makes himself a slave of the flesh; hence he adds: sold under sin, namely, of the first parent or of the self.

He says, sold, because the sinner sells himself into the slavery of sin as payment for fulfilling his own will: for your iniquities you were sold (Isa 50:1).

562. Then he clarifies what he had stated, when he says, for that which I work:

first, that the law is spiritual;

second, that man is carnal, sold under sin, now then it is no more.

In regard to the first he does two things:

first, he presents a proof;

second, he draws the conclusion, at if then I do that which I will not.

The proof is based on man’s infirmity, which he first asserts;

second, he gives the proof, at for the good which I will.

563. The proof is based on man’s infirmity, revealed by the fact that he does what he knows should not be done; hence it is said: for that which I work, I do not understand, i.e., do not know that it should be done.

This can be taken in two ways: in one way of a person subject to sin, who understands in general that sin should not be committed, but overcome by the suggestion of the devil or by passion or by the inclination of a perverse habit, he commits it. Therefore, he said to do what he understands is not to be done, acting against conscience, just as the servant who knew his master’s will but did not act according to his will (Luke 12:47).

In another way it can be understood of one in the state of grace. He does evil not by performing the deed or consenting with the mind, but only by desiring through a passion in the sensitive appetite; and that desire escapes the reason or intellect, because it exists before the intellect’s judgment. When the judgment is made, the desire is impeded. Therefore, it is significant that he does not say: I understand it is not to be done but I do not understand; namely, because such a desire arises before the intellect has deliberated or has perceived it: the desires of the flesh are against the spirit, and the desires of the spirit are against the flesh (Gal 5:17).

564. Then he proves what he had said by division and by effect, when he says, for I do not that good.

First, he distinguishes under the division between not doing the good and doing evil, because even a person who does not do the good is said to commit sin, i.e., the sin of omission, when he says for that which I work.

From his part, however, where he says, I do not understand, he proves through the effect; for since the intellect moves the will, willing is its effect, which is to understand.

565. In regard to the omission of the good therefore, he says, for I do not that good which I will.

In one way this can be understood of a man in the state of sin; then I do ought to be understood as a complete action performed outwardly with the consent of reason, whereas I will refers not to a complete act of will commanding the deed, but to an incomplete willing by which men want the good in general, just as they have a correct judgment about the good in general; yet this judgment is perverted by a bad habit or a perverse passion with the result that the will goes wrong, when it gets down to the particular case, and does not do what it knows in a general way should be done and would want to do.

In another way it is understood of a man healed by grace; then, conversely, I will refers to a complete act of willing which lasts through the act of choosing a particular deed, whereas I do refers to an incomplete action which has gone no further than the sense appetite and has not reached the stage of consent. For a man in the state of grace wants to preserve his mind from wicked desires, but he fails to accomplish this good on account of disorderly movements of desire that arise in the sensitive appetite. This is similar to what he says in Galatians: so that you do not do all that you will (Gal 5:17).

566. Second, in regard to perpetrating evil he says: but the evil which I hate, that I do. If this is understood of the sinner, I hate means an imperfect hatred in virtue of which every man naturally hates evil; I do means an action completely performed in keeping with reason’s consent. For that general hatred of evil is frustrated in a particular choice by the inclination of a habit or passion.

But if it is understood of a person in the state of grace, I do means an incomplete action which has gone no further than existing as a desire in the sensitive appetite; I hate refers to complete hatred, by which one continues hating evil until its final reprobation: I hate them with a perfect hatred (Ps 139:22), namely, evil men, inasmuch as they are sinners: while the laws were very well observed because of the piety of the high priest Onias and his hatred of wickedness (2 Macc 3:1).

567. Then when he says, now if I do, he concludes from the aforementioned condition of man that the law is good, saying, now if I do that which I will not. No matter which of the aforementioned ways is taken, by the very fact that I hate evil I consent to the law, that it is good in forbidding evil which I naturally do not want.

For it is clear that man’s inclination in keeping with reason to will the good and flee evil is in accord with nature or grace; and each is good. Hence, the law also, which agrees with this inclination by commanding what is good and forbidding what is evil, is good for the same reason: I give you good precepts; do not forsake my teaching (Ps 4:2).

568. Then, when he says, now then it is no more I, he proves what he had said about man’s condition, namely, that he is carnal and sold under sin.

In regard to this he does three things:

first, he states his proposition;

second, he proves it, at for I know;

third, he draws the conclusion, at if then I do that which I will not.

569. That man is carnal and sold under sin, as though somehow a slave of sin, is clear from the fact that he does not act but is led by sin. For a free man acts of himself and is not led by another.

Therefore, he says: I have said that I consent to the law so far as my intellect and will are concerned, but when I act against the law, it is no more I that do it, i.e., do what is against the law, but sin that dwells in me. So it is evident that I am a slave of sin, inasmuch as sin by exercising its dominion over me does it.

570. It is easy to understand this of a man in the state of grace; for the fact that he desires something evil, so far as the sensitive appetite pertaining to the flesh is concerned, does not proceed from the work of reason but from the inclination to sin. But a person is said to do what his reason does, because man is what he is according to reason; hence the movements of concupiscible desire, which are not from reason but from the inclination to sin, the man does not do but the inclination to sin, which is here called sin: whence wars and fightings among you? Is it not your passions that are at war in your members? (Jas 4:1).

But this cannot properly be understood of a man in sin, because his reason consents to sin; therefore, he commits it. Hence Augustine and a Gloss say: greatly deceived is the man who consents to the desires of the flesh and decides to do what they desire and then thinks he can say of himself: I am not doing this.

571. However, there is a way, although forced, to understand this even of a sinner.

For an action is mainly attributed to the principal agent acting in virtue of its proper characteristic, not to the agent acting in virtue of a characteristic proper to some other thing by which it is moved. But it is clear that man’s reason, considered in the light of what is proper to it, is not inclined to evil, but insofar as it is moved by concupiscible desire. Therefore, the doing of evil, which reason does, inasmuch as it has been overcome by desire, is not attributed principally to reason, which is understood here to be man, but rather to the desire or habit in virtue of which reason is inclined to evil.

It should be noted that sin is said to dwell in man, not as though sin were some reality, since it is a privation of good, but to indicate the permanence of this kind of defect in man.

572. Then he proves that sin dwelling in man does the evil which man commits, when he says, for I know:

first, he presents the middle term proving the proposition;

second, he explains the middle term, at for to will.

573. First, therefore, he proves that sin dwelling in man does the evil which man commits. This proof is clear when the words are referred to a man in the state of grace, who has been freed from sin by the grace of Christ (Rom 6:22). Therefore, as to a person in whom Christ’s grace does not dwell, he has not yet been freed from sin. But the grace of Christ does not dwell in the flesh, but in the mind; hence it is stated below that if Christ is in us, the body is indeed dead because of sin, but the spirit lives because of justice (Rom 8:10). Therefore, sin, which the desire of the flesh works, still rules in the flesh.

For he takes flesh here to include the sensitive powers. For the flesh is thus distinguished against the spirit and fights it, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite tends to the contrary of what reason seeks, as it says in Galatians: the desires of the flesh are against the spirit (Gal 5:17).

574. He says, therefore: we have said that in me, even though healed by grace, sin works; but this must be understood of me according to the flesh along with the sensitive appetite. For I know through reason and experience that the good, namely, of grace by which I have been reformed, does not dwell in me.

But lest this be understood to include reason according to the manner explained above, he adds: that is to say, in my flesh. For in me, i.e., in my heart, this good does dwell, for it says in Ephesians: that Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith (Eph 3:17).

575. This makes it clear that this passage does not favor the Manicheans who want the flesh not to be good according to its nature and, consequently, not a good creature of God, whereas it is written: everything created by God is good (1 Tim 4:4). For the Apostle is not discussing a good of nature but the good of grace, by which we are freed from sin.

576. If this passage referred to man existing under sin, it would be superfluous to add, that is to say, in my flesh, because in a sinner the good of grace does not dwell either in regard to the flesh or the mind. A forced interpretation would explain this passage by saying that sin, which is the privation of grace, is somehow derived from the flesh to the mind.

577. Then he clarifies what he had said, when he says for to will:

first, from man’s capabilities;

second, from his action which proves his capability, at for the good which I will.

578. Man’s capability is described first in regard to willing, which seems to be in man’s power; hence he says, for to will is present with me, i.e., is close to me, as though existing beneath my power. For nothing is so much within man’s power as his will, as Augustine says.

Second, he describes man’s capability, or rather his difficulty in achieving an effect, when he says, but to accomplish good, I cannot find, i.e., I do not find it within my power, as it says in Proverbs: it is the part of man to prepare the soul (Prov 16:1); the heart of a man disposes his way, but the Lord directs his steps (Prov 1:9).

579. This passage of Paul seems to favor the Pelagians who said that the start of a good work is from us, inasmuch as we will the good. And this is what the Apostle seems to say: but to accomplish good, I cannot find.

However, he rejects this interpretation in Philippians: but God is at work in you both to will and to do (Phil 2:13).

580. Therefore, the fact that for to will is present with me, once I have been healed by grace, is due to the work of divine grace, through which I not only will the good but also do some good, because I resist concupiscence and, led by the spirit, act against it; but I do not find it within my power to accomplish that good so as to exclude concupiscence entirely. This indicates that the good of grace does not reside in the flesh, because if it did, then just as I have the faculty of willing the good because of grace dwelling in the mind, so I would have the faculty of accomplishing the good in virtue of grace residing in the flesh.

But if it be referred to man existing under sin, then it could be explained so that to will is taken for an incomplete act of willing, which from the impulse of nature is good in some who sin. But to will is present to man, i.e., it lies next to man, as though it is weak, unless grace bestows to the will the ability for perfection.

581. Then when he says, for the good which I will, I do not, he manifests what he had said by citing man’s action, which is a sign and effect of human capability. For man does not have the strength to accomplish good, because he does not do the good he wants but does the evil he does not want. This has been explained earlier.

582. Then, when he says, now if I do that which I will not, he concludes to what he had previously proposed, saying, now if I do that which I will not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwells in me. This, too, has been explained earlier.

But it should be noted that in virtue of the same middle term, i.e., which I will not, the Apostle concludes to the two things he had proposed above, namely, the goodness of the law, when he said, now if I do that which I will not, I consent to the law, that it is good, and the dominion of sin in man, when he says here, now if I do that which I will not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwells in me. The first of these conclusions pertains to his statement that the law is spiritual; the second to the statement: but I am carnal, sold under sin. But he draws the first conclusion, which is about the goodness of the law, from that middle term by reason of I do not will, because his mind does not want what the law forbids, which shows that the law is good. But in virtue of the phrase that I do he concludes that sin, which functions against reason’s will, holds sway over man.