第3讲：肉体在罪的律之下
Lecture 3: The flesh under the law of sin
7:14 我们原知道律法是属灵的，我却是属肉体的，是已经卖给罪了。[n. 556]
7:15 因为我所做的，我自己不明白。我所愿意的善，我并不做；我所恨恶的恶，我反而去做。（译者：「善」「恶」两字见作者所用拉丁文本，作者下文分别解释；和合本修订版本节省略这两个名词。）[n. 562]
7:16 如果我所做的是我所不愿意的，我得承认律法是善的。[n. 567]
7:17 事实上，这不是我做的，而是住在我里面的罪做的。[n. 568]
7:18 我也知道，住在我里面的，就是我肉体之中，没有善。因为意愿就在我近旁，只是我找不到成全善的能力。（译者：「意愿就在我近旁」直译 velle adiacet mihi，保留下文关于接近与软弱的解释；末句按拉丁文 perficere「成全」译出，作者将「行一些善」与「完全除去贪欲」加以区分；和合本修订版作「因为立志为善由得我，只是行出来由不得我」。）[n. 572]
7:19 我所愿意的善，我不去做；我所不愿意的恶，我反而去做。
7:20 如果我去做我不愿意做的，就不是我做的，而是住在我里面的罪做的。[n. 582]
7:14 For we know that the law is spiritual. But I am carnal, sold under sin. [n. 556]
7:15 For that which I work, I do not understand. For I do not that good which I will: but the evil which I hate, that I do. [n. 562]
7:16 If then I do that which I will not, I consent to the law, that it is good. [n. 567]
7:17 Now then it is no more I that do it: but sin that dwells in me. [n. 568]
7:18 For I know that the good does not dwell in me, that is to say, in my flesh. For to will is present with me: but to accomplish good, I cannot find. [n. 572]
7:19 For the good which I will, I do not: but the evil which I will not, that I do.
7:20 Now if I do that which I will not, it is no more I that do it: but sin that dwells in me. [n. 582]
556. 使徒排除了那些使律法看似为恶、产生恶果的说法以后，这里证明律法是好的。
556. After showing that the law is neither evil nor productive of an evil effect, the Apostle now proves that the law is good.
对此，他做两件事。
In regard to this he does two things:
首先，从人里面存在着、而律法无力消除的对善的抵抗，证明律法的良善；
first, he proves its goodness from the very repugnance to good found in man, a repugnance the law cannot take away;
其次，在「我真是苦啊」等语处，说明藉什么能够消除这种对律法的抵抗。
second, he shows what can take away this repugnance, at unhappy (Rom 7:24).
关于第一点，他做三件事。
In regard to the first he does three things:
首先，提出论点；
first, he states his proposition;
其次，在「因为我所做的」等语处，证明论点；
second, he proves it, at for that which I work;
第三，在「所以，我发现」等语处，推出所要的结论。
third, he draws the conclusion, at I find then a law (Rom 7:21).
关于第一点，他做两件事。
In regard to the first he does two things:
首先，提出律法的良善；
first, he asserts the goodness of the law;
其次，在「我却」等语处，提出人的状况。
second, man’s condition, at but I am carnal.
557. 因此，他首先说：前面说过，律法是圣的。这就是他说的：「我们知道」，即我们这些在神的事上有智慧的人，知道「律法」，即旧律法，「是属灵的」，使人与灵相协调。诗 19:7〔武加大本 18:8〕：「耶和华的律法全备。」或者，「是属灵的」，即由圣灵赐下；圣灵在圣经中被称为神的指头。路 11:20：「我若靠着神的指头赶鬼。」（译者：拉丁文直作「神的指头」，作者据此说明圣灵；和合本修订版译作「神的能力」。）因此，出 31:18 说：「耶和华把两块法版交给他，是神用指头写的石版。」
557. First, therefore he says: we have stated that the law is holy. We said this because we, who are wise in divine matters, know that the law, i.e., the old, is spiritual, i.e., in harmony with man’s spirit: the law of the Lord is stainless (Ps 19:7). Or it is spiritual, i.e., given by the Holy Spirit who is called the finger of God in the Scriptures: if by the finger of God I cast out demons (Luke 11:20). Hence it is said: he gave Moses two tablets of stone, written with the finger of God (Exod 31:18).
然而，新律法不只称为属灵的律法，也称为「圣灵的律」，如后文 8:2 所示；因为它不仅来自圣灵，而且圣灵将它刻在自己所居住的心中。
Yet the new law is not only called spiritual but the law of the Spirit (Rom 8:2), because it is not only given by the Holy Spirit but the Holy Spirit imprints it on the heart in which he dwells.
558. 随后，他说「我却是属肉体的」等语，说明人的状况。
558. Then he indicates man’s condition, when he says, but I am carnal.
这句话可以有两种解释。一种是使徒代表处于罪中的人说话；奥古斯丁在《八十三问题集》（De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus）中作这样的解释。但后来，他在《驳朱利安》（Contra Iulianum）中，解释为使徒以自己的身份说话，即代表处于恩典之下的人说话。
This passage can be interpreted in two ways: in one way so that the Apostle is speaking in the person of a man existing in sin. This is the way Augustine explained it in the book of 83 Questions. But later in a book against Julian he explained it as though the Apostle is speaking in his own person, i.e., of a man in the state of grace.
因此，我们将继续说明，这些话及以下的话怎样分别按两种方式解释；不过，第二种解释更好。
Let us continue, therefore, by showing how these words and those that follow can be explained under both interpretations, although the second explanation is better.
559. 因此，首先说的「我却」等语，应这样理解：「我」指人的理性，它在人里面居于主导。因此，每个人仿佛就是自己的理性或理智，正如城邦仿佛就是城邦的统治者，以致他所做的，便被看作城邦所做的。
559. The first statement, therefore, but I am carnal, is so interpreted that the word I stands for man’s reason, which is the chief thing in man; hence each man seems to be his own reason or intellect, as a city seems to be the ruler of the city, so that whatever he does the city seems to do.
560. 人称为属肉体的，是因为他的理性属肉体；理性称为属肉体，也有两种意义。一是理性服从肉体，同意肉体所煽动的事，如林前 3:3：「你们中间有嫉妒、纷争，这岂不是属乎肉体」，等等。这是指尚未藉恩典得以恢复的人。另一种是理性受到肉体攻击，因此称为属肉体，如加 5:17：「肉体的情欲和圣灵相争。」在这种意义上，甚至处于恩典之下的人的理性，也称为属肉体。因为这两种属肉体的状况都出于罪，所以他接着说：「是已经卖给罪了。」
560. But man is called carnal, because his reason is carnal. It is called carnal in two ways: in one way from the fact that it is submissive to the flesh and consents to things to which the flesh urges it: for while there is jealousy and strife among you, are you not of the flesh? (1 Cor 3:3). In this way it is understood of man not yet healed by grace. In another way reason is said to be carnal, because it is under attack from the flesh: the desires of the flesh are against the Spirit (Gal 5:17). In this way, even the reason of a man in the state of grace is said to be carnal. In both cases it is carnal on account of sin; hence he adds, sold under sin.
561. 不过，应注意：包含肉体反抗灵的这种属肉体状况，出于始祖的罪，因为它属于罪欲，而罪欲的败坏来自那罪。但包含服从肉体的这种属肉体状况，不但出于原罪，也出于本罪；人藉本罪顺从肉体的欲望，使自己成为肉体的奴隶。因此，他接着说：「是已经卖给罪了。」即因始祖的罪，或因自身的罪而被卖。
561. But it should be noted that the carnality, which implies rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, arises from the sin of the first parent, because this pertains to the inclination to sin derived from that sin. But the carnality which implies submission of reason to the flesh arises not only from original sin but also from actual, through which a man by obeying the desires of the flesh makes himself a slave of the flesh; hence he adds: sold under sin, namely, of the first parent or of the self.
他说「被卖」，是因为罪人把自己卖为罪的奴隶，所换得的价钱是满足自己的意志。赛 50:1：「看哪，你们被卖是因你们的罪孽。」
He says, sold, because the sinner sells himself into the slavery of sin as payment for fulfilling his own will: for your iniquities you were sold (Isa 50:1).
562. 随后，他说「因为我所做的」等语，证明所提出的。
562. Then he clarifies what he had stated, when he says, for that which I work:
首先，证明律法是属灵的；
first, that the law is spiritual;
其次，在「事实上，这不是我」等语处，证明人是属肉体的，已经卖给罪。
second, that man is carnal, sold under sin, now then it is no more.
关于第一点，他做两件事。
In regard to the first he does two things:
首先，提出证明；
first, he presents a proof;
其次，在「如果我所做的是我所不愿意的」等语处，引出结论。
second, he draws the conclusion, at if then I do that which I will not.
证明取自人的软弱，他首先提出这种软弱；
The proof is based on man’s infirmity, which he first asserts;
其次，在「因为我并不」等语处，提出证明。
second, he gives the proof, at for the good which I will.
563. 人的软弱，从他做自己明知不应做的事，也显而易见。因此，经文说：「因为我所做的，我自己不明白」，即我不认为这是应当做的。
563. The proof is based on man’s infirmity, revealed by the fact that he does what he knows should not be done; hence it is said: for that which I work, I do not understand, i.e., do not know that it should be done.
这可以有两种理解。一是指服于罪的人；他在普遍意义上明白不应犯罪，但被魔鬼的诱惑、情绪或败坏习性的倾向战胜，仍然去做。因此，说他做自己明知不应做的事，就是违反良心而行，如路 12:47：「仆人知道主人的意思，却未顺他的意思做，那仆人要多受责打。」
This can be taken in two ways: in one way of a person subject to sin, who understands in general that sin should not be committed, but overcome by the suggestion of the devil or by passion or by the inclination of a perverse habit, he commits it. Therefore, he said to do what he understands is not to be done, acting against conscience, just as the servant who knew his master’s will but did not act according to his will (Luke 12:47).
另一种理解，是指处于恩典中的人。他虽行恶，却不是在行为上实行，也不是心灵同意，而只是在感觉欲求的情绪中生出贪欲；这贪欲在理性和理智之外，因为它先于理性的判断而发生，等判断来到，这种活动便被阻止。因此，他特意不是说「我明知不应做」，而说「我不明白」，因为这种贪欲的活动发生时，理智尚未审议，也未发出命令。加 5:17：「肉体的情欲和圣灵相争，圣灵和肉体相争。」
In another way it can be understood of one in the state of grace. He does evil not by performing the deed or consenting with the mind, but only by desiring through a passion in the sensitive appetite; and that desire escapes the reason or intellect, because it exists before the intellect’s judgment. When the judgment is made, the desire is impeded. Therefore, it is significant that he does not say: I understand it is not to be done but I do not understand; namely, because such a desire arises before the intellect has deliberated or has perceived it: the desires of the flesh are against the spirit, and the desires of the spirit are against the flesh (Gal 5:17).
564. 随后，他说「因为我所愿意的，我并不做」等语，藉划分以及效果，证明先前所说的。
564. Then he proves what he had said by division and by effect, when he says, for I do not that good.
就划分而言，他划分「因为我所做的」等语所包含的两方面，即不行善与行恶；因为不行善的人，也被称为犯罪，即犯失职之罪。
First, he distinguishes under the division between not doing the good and doing evil, because even a person who does not do the good is said to commit sin, i.e., the sin of omission, when he says for that which I work.
而就「我不明白」这句话而言，他藉效果加以证明；因为理智推动意志，意愿就是认识的效果。
From his part, however, where he says, I do not understand, he proves through the effect; for since the intellect moves the will, willing is its effect, which is to understand.
565. 因此，就遗漏善而言，他首先说：「我所愿意行的善，我并不做。」
565. In regard to the omission of the good therefore, he says, for I do not that good which I will.
这可以理解为处于罪中的人；这样，他所说的「做」，应当按完整的行为来理解，即经理性同意而在外在行为中实行的活动。而他说的「愿意」，不应理解为发令实行的完整意愿，而应理解为某种不完整的意愿：人普遍地愿意善，如同普遍地对善具有正确判断；但这判断被败坏的习性或情绪扭曲，这意愿也在个别事项上败坏了，使人不去做他普遍地明白应做、也愿意去做的事。
In one way this can be understood of a man in the state of sin; then I do ought to be understood as a complete action performed outwardly with the consent of reason, whereas I will refers not to a complete act of will commanding the deed, but to an incomplete willing by which men want the good in general, just as they have a correct judgment about the good in general; yet this judgment is perverted by a bad habit or a perverse passion with the result that the will goes wrong, when it gets down to the particular case, and does not do what it knows in a general way should be done and would want to do.
若理解为藉恩典得以恢复的人，就须反过来：把「愿意」理解为完整的意愿，持续到选择某项具体行为；把「做」理解为不完整的活动，仅存在于感觉欲求中，尚未达到理性的同意。因为处于恩典之下的人，确实愿意保守自己的心灵免于邪恶的贪欲，却由于感觉欲求中生出失序的贪欲活动，未能成就这善。他在加 5:17 所说的相似：「使你们不能做所愿意做的。」
In another way it is understood of a man healed by grace; then, conversely, I will refers to a complete act of willing which lasts through the act of choosing a particular deed, whereas I do refers to an incomplete action which has gone no further than the sense appetite and has not reached the stage of consent. For a man in the state of grace wants to preserve his mind from wicked desires, but he fails to accomplish this good on account of disorderly movements of desire that arise in the sensitive appetite. This is similar to what he says in Galatians: so that you do not do all that you will (Gal 5:17).
566. 第二，就实行恶而言，他接着说：「我所恨恶的恶，我反而去做。」若理解为罪人，「恨恶」就指某种不完全的憎恶，因为每个人都自然地憎恶恶。而「做」则指完整的活动，即按理性的同意，在行为中实行。因为对恶的一般憎恶，会因习性或情绪的倾向，在某项具体选择上消失。
566. Second, in regard to perpetrating evil he says: but the evil which I hate, that I do. If this is understood of the sinner, I hate means an imperfect hatred in virtue of which every man naturally hates evil; I do means an action completely performed in keeping with reason’s consent. For that general hatred of evil is frustrated in a particular choice by the inclination of a habit or passion.
若理解为处于恩典之下的人，「做」则反指不完整的活动，仅存在于感觉欲求的贪欲中。「恨恶」指完全的憎恶，使人持续厌弃恶，直到最终拒绝它。诗 139:22〔武加大本 138:22〕对此说：「我恨恶他们到极点」，即就恶人是罪人而言恨恶他们。加下 3:1：「因大祭司敖尼雅（Onias）的虔敬，以及其他人恨恶邪恶，法律仍得到极好的遵守。」（译者：作者所引拉丁文把「恨恶邪恶」也归于其他人；思高本作「敖尼雅作大司祭的时候，因他的热诚和嫉恶的心……人民无不奉公守法」。这里按作者引文保留主语区别。）
But if it is understood of a person in the state of grace, I do means an incomplete action which has gone no further than existing as a desire in the sensitive appetite; I hate refers to complete hatred, by which one continues hating evil until its final reprobation: I hate them with a perfect hatred (Ps 139:22), namely, evil men, inasmuch as they are sinners: while the laws were very well observed because of the piety of the high priest Onias and his hatred of wickedness (2 Macc 3:1).
567. 随后，他说「如果我所做的是我所不愿意的」等语，从前述人的状况，得出律法是好的结论，说：「如果我所做的是我所不愿意的」，不论按上述哪种方式理解，正因为我不愿意恶，「我就承认律法是善的」，因为它禁止了我按本性所不愿意的恶。
567. Then when he says, now if I do, he concludes from the aforementioned condition of man that the law is good, saying, now if I do that which I will not. No matter which of the aforementioned ways is taken, by the very fact that I hate evil I consent to the law, that it is good in forbidding evil which I naturally do not want.
因为显然，人按理性意愿善、逃避恶的倾向，或出于本性，或出于恩典，而二者都是好的。因此，律法命人行善，禁止恶，与这种倾向一致，根据同样的理由，它也是好的。箴 4:2：「因我给你们好的教导，不可离弃我的教诲。」
For it is clear that man’s inclination in keeping with reason to will the good and flee evil is in accord with nature or grace; and each is good. Hence, the law also, which agrees with this inclination by commanding what is good and forbidding what is evil, is good for the same reason: I give you good precepts; do not forsake my teaching (Ps 4:2).
568. 随后，他说「事实上，我」等语，证明先前关于人的状况所说的，即人属肉体，已经卖给罪。
568. Then, when he says, now then it is no more I, he proves what he had said about man’s condition, namely, that he is carnal and sold under sin.
对此，他做三件事。
In regard to this he does three things:
首先，提出论点；
first, he states his proposition;
其次，在「我也知道」等语处，证明论点；
second, he proves it, at for I know;
第三，在「如果我所做的是我所不愿意的」等语处，得出所要的结论。
third, he draws the conclusion, at if then I do that which I will not.
569. 属肉体、已经卖给罪的人，在某种意义上是罪的奴隶，这从下面一点显明：不是他自己行动，而是罪推动他。因为自由的人自己行动，不由他人推动。
569. That man is carnal and sold under sin, as though somehow a slave of sin, is clear from the fact that he does not act but is led by sin. For a free man acts of himself and is not led by another.
因此，他说：前面说过，我藉理智和意志「承认律法」；但「现在」，当我行违反律法的事时，「这已经不是我做的」，即我违反律法所行的事，「而是住在我里面的罪做的」。这样，罪仿佛在我里面具有统治权而行动，就显明我是罪的奴隶。
Therefore, he says: I have said that I consent to the law so far as my intellect and will are concerned, but when I act against the law, it is no more I that do it, i.e., do what is against the law, but sin that dwells in me. So it is evident that I am a slave of sin, inasmuch as sin by exercising its dominion over me does it.
570. 将这理解为处于恩典之下的人，是正确而容易的：他按属于肉体的感觉欲求贪求恶，并不是出于理性的活动，而是出于罪欲的倾向。所谓人做某事，是指理性做它，因为人之所以为人，在于理性；因此，不出于理性而出于罪欲的贪欲活动，并非人所做，而是罪欲所做，这里将罪欲称为罪。雅 4:1：「你们中间的冲突是哪里来的？争执是哪里来的？不是从你们肢体中交战着的私欲来的吗？」
570. It is easy to understand this of a man in the state of grace; for the fact that he desires something evil, so far as the sensitive appetite pertaining to the flesh is concerned, does not proceed from the work of reason but from the inclination to sin. But a person is said to do what his reason does, because man is what he is according to reason; hence the movements of concupiscible desire, which are not from reason but from the inclination to sin, the man does not do but the inclination to sin, which is here called sin: whence wars and fightings among you? Is it not your passions that are at war in your members? (Jas 4:1).
但若指处于罪中的人，就不能严格这样理解，因为他的理性同意罪，因此是他自己在做。所以奥古斯丁说，《注疏》也载有这话：「一个人若同意自己肉体的私欲，决定并定意实行肉体所欲求的，却以为自己仍可以说『这不是我做的』，就大错特错了。」
But this cannot properly be understood of a man in sin, because his reason consents to sin; therefore, he commits it. Hence Augustine and a Gloss say: greatly deceived is the man who consents to the desires of the flesh and decides to do what they desire and then thinks he can say of himself: I am not doing this.
571. 不过，虽较牵强，也可以把它解释为罪人。
571. However, there is a way, although forced, to understand this even of a sinner.
因为行为主要归于首要行动者，它按照自身特性推动；并不主要归于那按推动它的另一行动者的特性而推动或行动的行动者。显然，人的理性按其自身特性，并不倾向恶；它是受贪欲推动，才倾向恶。因此，理性被贪欲战胜而做出的恶行，并不主要归于理性——这里以「人」表示理性——而更应归于贪欲本身，或使理性倾向恶的习性。
For an action is mainly attributed to the principal agent acting in virtue of its proper characteristic, not to the agent acting in virtue of a characteristic proper to some other thing by which it is moved. But it is clear that man’s reason, considered in the light of what is proper to it, is not inclined to evil, but insofar as it is moved by concupiscible desire. Therefore, the doing of evil, which reason does, inasmuch as it has been overcome by desire, is not attributed principally to reason, which is understood here to be man, but rather to the desire or habit in virtue of which reason is inclined to evil.
所谓罪住在人里面，并不是说罪是某种实物，因为罪是善的缺失；这说法表示此种欠缺持续存在于人里面。
It should be noted that sin is said to dwell in man, not as though sin were some reality, since it is a privation of good, but to indicate the permanence of this kind of defect in man.
572. 随后，他说「我也知道」，证明人所行的恶，是住在人里面的罪造成的。
572. Then he proves that sin dwelling in man does the evil which man commits, when he says, for I know:
首先，提出用来证明论点的中项；
first, he presents the middle term proving the proposition;
其次，在「因为立志」等语处，阐明这个中项。
second, he explains the middle term, at for to will.
573. 因此，他首先证明：人所行的恶，是住在人里面的罪造成的。若将这些话理解为处于恩典之下的人，这证明就很清楚；此人藉基督的恩典脱离罪，如上文 6:22 所说。因此，就人里面基督恩典尚未居住的部分而言，他还没有脱离罪。基督的恩典并不住在肉体中，而是住在心灵中；因此，后文 8:10 说：「基督若在你们里面，身体就因罪而死，灵却因义而活。」所以，肉体的贪欲所产生的罪，仍在肉体中掌权。
573. First, therefore, he proves that sin dwelling in man does the evil which man commits. This proof is clear when the words are referred to a man in the state of grace, who has been freed from sin by the grace of Christ (Rom 6:22). Therefore, as to a person in whom Christ’s grace does not dwell, he has not yet been freed from sin. But the grace of Christ does not dwell in the flesh, but in the mind; hence it is stated below that if Christ is in us, the body is indeed dead because of sin, but the spirit lives because of justice (Rom 8:10). Therefore, sin, which the desire of the flesh works, still rules in the flesh.
因为这里的「肉体」，包括感觉能力。肉体正是在这种意义上与灵区分，并抵抗灵：感觉欲求趋向与理性所欲求的相反的事，如加 5:17：「肉体的情欲和圣灵相争。」
For he takes flesh here to include the sensitive powers. For the flesh is thus distinguished against the spirit and fights it, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite tends to the contrary of what reason seeks, as it says in Galatians: the desires of the flesh are against the spirit (Gal 5:17).
574. 因此，他说：前面说过，即使我已经藉恩典得以恢复，罪仍在我里面活动；但应理解为在我的肉体连同感觉欲求里面。「因为我知道」，即凭理性和经验知道，「善」，即使我得以更新的恩典之善，「并不住在我里面」。
574. He says, therefore: we have said that in me, even though healed by grace, sin works; but this must be understood of me according to the flesh along with the sensitive appetite. For I know through reason and experience that the good, namely, of grace by which I have been reformed, does not dwell in me.
但为免按上文的方式理解为理性，他解释说：「就是在我的肉体之中。」因为在我里面，即在我的心中，这善确实居住着，如弗 3:17：「使基督因着你们的信住在你们心里。」
But lest this be understood to include reason according to the manner explained above, he adds: that is to say, in my flesh. For in me, i.e., in my heart, this good does dwell, for it says in Ephesians: that Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith (Eph 3:17).
575. 由此可见，这句话并不支持摩尼教徒；他们主张肉体按本性不是好的，因此不是神所造的善的受造物，尽管提前 4:4 写着：「神所造之物样样都是好的。」因为使徒这里所论的不是本性之善，而是恩典之善，我们藉此脱离罪。
575. This makes it clear that this passage does not favor the Manicheans who want the flesh not to be good according to its nature and, consequently, not a good creature of God, whereas it is written: everything created by God is good (1 Tim 4:4). For the Apostle is not discussing a good of nature but the good of grace, by which we are freed from sin.
576. 但若将这理解为处于罪中的人，加上「就是在我的肉体之中」，便成了多余的。因为在罪人里面，无论肉体还是心灵，都没有恩典之善；除非有人愿意牵强地解释说，这是因为罪作为恩典的缺失，在某种意义上从肉体传到心灵。
576. If this passage referred to man existing under sin, it would be superfluous to add, that is to say, in my flesh, because in a sinner the good of grace does not dwell either in regard to the flesh or the mind. A forced interpretation would explain this passage by saying that sin, which is the privation of grace, is somehow derived from the flesh to the mind.
577. 随后，他说「因为立志」等语，阐明先前所说的。
577. Then he clarifies what he had said, when he says for to will:
首先，从人的能力来说明；
first, from man’s capabilities;
其次，在「因为我所愿意的，我不做」等语处，从显示能力的人的行动来说明。
second, from his action which proves his capability, at for the good which I will.
578. 首先，就意志描述人的能力；意志似乎在人的掌握之中。因此，他说：「因为意愿就在我近旁」，即它离我很近，仿佛在我的能力范围之内。因为如奥古斯丁所说，没有什么比人的意志本身，更处于人的意志掌握之中。（译者：「意愿就在我近旁」按拉丁文 velle adiacet mihi 译出，保留作者对「近旁」的解释；和合本修订版作「立志为善由得我」。）
578. Man’s capability is described first in regard to willing, which seems to be in man’s power; hence he says, for to will is present with me, i.e., is close to me, as though existing beneath my power. For nothing is so much within man’s power as his will, as Augustine says.
第二，就效果的完成，提出人的能力，或更确切说，人的困难。他接着说：「我却找不到成全善的能力」，即发现成全善不在我的能力范围内。（译者：「成全」按拉丁文 perficere 译出，保留作者以下所作「行一些善」与「完全除去贪欲」的区分；和合本修订版作「只是行出来由不得我」。）如箴 16:1：「心中的筹谋在乎人」；同章又说〔16:9〕：「人心筹算自己的道路；惟耶和华指引他的脚步。」
Second, he describes man’s capability, or rather his difficulty in achieving an effect, when he says, but to accomplish good, I cannot find, i.e., I do not find it within my power, as it says in Proverbs: it is the part of man to prepare the soul (Prov 16:1); the heart of a man disposes his way, but the Lord directs his steps (Prov 1:9).
579. 这句话看来支持伯拉纠派：他们说，善行的开端出于我们，因为我们愿意善。而使徒所说的「我却找不到成全善的能力」，似乎正是这个意思。
579. This passage of Paul seems to favor the Pelagians who said that the start of a good work is from us, inasmuch as we will the good. And this is what the Apostle seems to say: but to accomplish good, I cannot find.
但使徒在腓 2:13 排除这种理解，说：「是神在你们心里运行，使你们又立志又实行。」
However, he rejects this interpretation in Philippians: but God is at work in you both to will and to do (Phil 2:13).
580. 因此，他说「意愿就在我近旁」，即对于已经藉恩典得以恢复的我，是出于神恩典的运行。藉这恩典，我不但愿意善，也行一些善，因为我在圣灵引导下抵抗贪欲，作与之相反的事；但我在自己的掌握中找不到如何成全这善的能力，即完全除去贪欲的能力。由此表明，恩典之善并不住在肉体中；因为若住在肉体中，正如我藉住在心灵中的恩典而有意愿善的能力，我也会藉住在肉体中的恩典而有成全善的能力。
580. Therefore, the fact that for to will is present with me, once I have been healed by grace, is due to the work of divine grace, through which I not only will the good but also do some good, because I resist concupiscence and, led by the spirit, act against it; but I do not find it within my power to accomplish that good so as to exclude concupiscence entirely. This indicates that the good of grace does not reside in the flesh, because if it did, then just as I have the faculty of willing the good because of grace dwelling in the mind, so I would have the faculty of accomplishing the good in virtue of grace residing in the flesh.
但若指处于罪中的人，可这样解释：「立志」指不完整的意愿，它由于本性的推动，存在于所有犯罪的人里面，使他们愿意善。但这意愿只是靠近人，即躺在人的旁边，仿佛软弱无力，除非恩典赋予意志成全善的效能。
But if it be referred to man existing under sin, then it could be explained so that to will is taken for an incomplete act of willing, which from the impulse of nature is good in some who sin. But to will is present to man, i.e., it lies next to man, as though it is weak, unless grace bestows to the will the ability for perfection.
581. 随后，他说「因为我所愿意的，我不做」等语，从人的行动阐明先前所说的；行动是人的能力的征象和效果。人不做自己愿意的善，却做自己不愿意的恶，就显明他找不到成全善的能力。这点前面已经解释。
581. Then when he says, for the good which I will, I do not, he manifests what he had said by citing man’s action, which is a sign and effect of human capability. For man does not have the strength to accomplish good, because he does not do the good he wants but does the evil he does not want. This has been explained earlier.
582. 随后，他说「如果我所做的是我所不愿意的」等语，得出上文所提出的结论，说：「如果我去做我不愿意做的，就不是我做的，而是住在我里面的罪做的。」这点也已在上文解释。
582. Then, when he says, now if I do that which I will not, he concludes to what he had previously proposed, saying, now if I do that which I will not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwells in me. This, too, has been explained earlier.
但应注意，使徒从同一个中项，即「我做我所不愿意的」，得出了上文提出的两个结论：一是律法的良善，他说：「如果我所做的是我所不愿意的，我得承认神的律法是善的。」另一是罪在人里面掌权，他在这里说：「如果我去做我不愿意做的，就不是我做的，而是住在我里面的罪做的。」这两个结论中的第一个，关联于他所说的「律法是属灵的」；第二个，关联于他所说的「我却是属肉体的，是已经卖给罪了」。但第一个关于律法良善的结论，是从中项里的「我不愿意」得出的，因为他的理性不愿意律法所禁止的事，由此显明律法是好的。而从「我做」这一方面，则得出罪在人里面掌权的结论，因为罪违反理性的意愿而活动。
But it should be noted that in virtue of the same middle term, i.e., which I will not, the Apostle concludes to the two things he had proposed above, namely, the goodness of the law, when he said, now if I do that which I will not, I consent to the law, that it is good, and the dominion of sin in man, when he says here, now if I do that which I will not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwells in me. The first of these conclusions pertains to his statement that the law is spiritual; the second to the statement: but I am carnal, sold under sin. But he draws the first conclusion, which is about the goodness of the law, from that middle term by reason of I do not will, because his mind does not want what the law forbids, which shows that the law is good. But in virtue of the phrase that I do he concludes that sin, which functions against reason’s will, holds sway over man.