^1:4 Who was predestined the Son of God in power, according to the Spirit of sanctification, by the resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ from the dead: [n. 42]

42. Having commended Christ’s origin, he now commends his power, and mentions three things.

First, his predestination, when he says, who was predestined;

second, his dignity or power, when he says, the Son of God in power;

third, the sign or effect, when he says, according to the Spirit of sanctification.

43. In regard to the first it should be noted that the word ‘predestination’ is taken from ‘destination’; for something is said to be predestined as though destined beforehand. But destination is taken in two senses: in one sense, to destine is to send, for those who are sent to achieve some purpose are said to be destined, in accord with 1 Maccabees: some of the people were destined, and they went to the king (1 Macc 1:14). In another sense, to destine is to determine, as in 2 Maccabees: Eleazar destined not to do any unlawful things (2 Macc 6:20). But this second meaning seems to be derived from the first. For as a courier who is sent is directed to something, so whatever we determine we direct to some end. According to this, therefore, to predestine is nothing more than to determine beforehand in the heart what is to be done in regard to some thing.

44. Now someone can determine about a future thing or action: in one way, as to its make-up, as a builder determines how he should build a house; in another way, as to the use or governance of the thing, as when someone determines how to use his horse. It is to this second predetermination and not the first that predestination pertains.

45. For what one uses is referred to an end, because, as Augustine says in the book, On Christian Doctrine: to use is to refer something to an end to be enjoyed. When, however, a thing is made, it is not by that very fact directed to something else. Hence, the pre-determination of a thing’s make-up cannot properly be called predestination. Therefore, to deny predestination is the same as to deny the eternal divine pre-determination about things to be done in time. But because all natural things pertain to the make-up of the thing itself, for they are either the principles of which things are made or what follows from such principles, it follows that natural things do not properly fall under predestination; for example, it is not proper to say that man is predestined to have hands. What is left is that predestination is properly said only of things that are above nature, to which things the rational creature is ordained.

46. But God alone is above the nature of the rational creature, who is united to him by grace: in one way, as regards God’s own act, as when foreknowledge of the future, which belongs to God alone, is communicated to a man by the grace of prophecy. Of this sort are all the graces called graces freely given. In another way, as regards God himself, to whom the rational creature is united in the common manner through the effect of love: he who abides in love abides in God and God in him (1 John 4:16). This is done through sanctifying grace, which is the grace of adoption. In another way, which is particular to Christ, it is done through a union in personal being; and this is called the grace of union.

Therefore, just as a man’s union with God through the grace of adoption falls under predestination, so also the union with God in person through the grace of union falls under predestination. And as regards this he says, who was predestined the Son of God.

47. But to prevent this from being referred to the sonship of adoption, he adds, in power. As if to say: he was predestined to be such a Son as to have equal, indeed the same, power as God the Father, because, as it is said: worthy is the Lamb who was slain to receive power and divinity (Rev 5:12); in fact Christ himself is the power of God: Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God (1 Cor 1:24). Hence, whatever the Father does the Son does likewise (John 5:19).

In regard to the graces freely given, one is not said to be predestined in the strict sense, because such graces are not directly ordained to direct to his ultimate end the one who receives them, but to direct others by them, as it is said: to each is given the manifestation of the Spirit unto profit (1 Cor 12:7).

48. Now it is obvious that anything which exists of itself is the measure and rule of things which exist in virtue of something else and through participation. Hence, the predestination of Christ, who was predestined to be the Son of God by nature, is the measure and rule of our life and therefore of our predestination, because we are predestined to adoptive sonship, which is a participation and image of natural sonship: whom he foreknew, he also predestined to be made conformed to the image of his Son (Rom 8:29).

Therefore, just as the man Christ was not predestined to be the natural Son of God because of any antecedent merits, but solely from grace, so we are predestined to be adopted sons of God solely from grace and not from our merits: do not say in your heart, after the Lord your God has thrust them out before you: it is because of my justice that the Lord has brought me in to possess this land (Deut 9:4).

It is clear, therefore, what the goal of that predestination is, namely, that one be a son of God in power.

49. But we must still inquire who it is that has been predestined to this.

For since predestination implies antecedence, it seems that the one predestined to be the Son of God in power was not always the Son of God in power; for predestination does not seem to be concerned with what always has been, since that involves nothing antecedent. Hence if we suppose, according to Nestorius, that the person of the Son of man were other than the person of the Son of God, there would be no problem, because we could say that the created person of the Son of man did not exist eternally but began in time to be the Son of God in power.

The same would apply if one were to say the hypostasis or suppositum of the Son of God and of the Son of man were distinct.

But this is alien to the faith, as has been said.

Therefore, since not only the person but also the hypostasis and suppositum of the Son of God and of the Son of man are the same, so that it cannot be truly and properly said that the Son of man was made the Son of God, lest any created suppositum be implied of whom Son of God would be newly predicated, for an equal reason it does not seem possible to say that the Son of man was predestined to be the Son of God, because ‘the Son of man’ presupposes the eternal suppositum, who was always the Son of God. Hence, the antecedent which predestination involves has no place.

50. For this reason Origen says that the text should not read, who was predestined, but, who was destined the Son of God in power, so that no antecedence is indicated. If this is accepted, the sense is plain, because Christ was destined, i.e., sent into the world by God the Father as the true Son of God in divine power.

But because all the Latin texts generally have who was predestined, others have explained this according to the custom of Scripture whereby something is considered to be made when it is made known, as the Lord after the resurrection says: all authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me (Matt 28:18), because it was after the resurrection that he made known that such power had been given to him from eternity.

But if this is correct, the word predestined is not taken in the proper sense, because predestination concerns matters pertaining to grace; whereas no grace was given to Christ by the fact that his divine power was made known, but rather to us.

Hence, it is even stated in a Gloss that according to this sense, predestined is used in the wider sense of ‘foreknown,’ so that the sense would be: Christ was predestined, i.e., foreknown, from eternity to be revealed in time as the Son of God in power.

51. Therefore, others, relating predestination to the union itself, did not attribute it to the person but to the nature, so that the sense would be: who was predestined the Son of God in power, i.e., whose nature was predestined to be united to him who is the Son of God in power.

But even this explanation is improper and extorted. For since predestination implies an ordering to an end, predestination affects that to which it belongs to be ordered to an end by its own activity. But it is not the nature but the person that acts for an end.

Therefore, if the word ‘predestination’ be taken in the strict sense, predestination must be attributed to the very person of Christ. But because the person of Christ subsists in two natures, the human and the divine, something can be said of him with respect to either nature. For just as something can be said of a man regarding his body, for example, to be touched or wounded, and something regarding his soul, for example, to understand and to will, so, too, something can be said of Christ both as to his divine nature, as when he says: I and the Father are one (John 10:30), and as to his human nature, as when we say that he was crucified and died. It is in this way that he is said to be predestined according to his human nature. For although the person of Christ has always been the Son of God, nevertheless it was not always a fact that, while existing in a human nature, he was the Son of God; rather, this was due to an ineffable grace.

52. There is another consideration concerning the participle made (Rom 1:3), which designates a real act, and the participle predestined, which designates an act of the soul.

For the soul, through its intellect and reason, can distinguish things that are joined in reality. For one can think of a white wall and speak separately about the fact that it is a wall and separately about the fact that it is white. So, too, in predestination. For predestination can be attributed to the person of Christ inasmuch as he subsists in a human nature, even though it is not attributed to him as subsisting in the divine nature.

This is why the Apostle first presents the Son of God as being incarnate and then attributes predestination to him, to let it be understood that he was predestined according as he was made of the seed of David, according to the flesh (Rom 1:3). Thus, in explaining the mystery of the Incarnation, from the Son of God he descends to the flesh and from the flesh; according to predestination, he ascends to the Son of God, in order to show that neither did the glory of the Godhead prevent the weakness of the flesh nor did the weakness of the flesh diminish the majesty of the Godhead.

53. In the Gloss it is asked, first, whether Christ is the Son of God according as he is man.

It seems so, because here is Christ, who was predestined to be the Son of God; but he was predestined to be the Son of God according as he is a man. Therefore, as a man he is the Son of God.

However, I answer that if the as denotes the unity of the person, it is true that as man he is the Son of God, because the person of God and man is one. But if it designates the condition of the nature or its cause, it is false. For it is not from the human nature that he is Son of God.

In the argument there is a fallacy of composition and division, because the as can modify the participle predestined, and taken this way it is true that as man he is predestined; or it can modify that being the Son of God to which the predestination is ordained, and taken this way it is false. For he was not predestined that as man he be Son of God; and this is the sense of the words assumed by the argument.

54. The second question is whether Christ as man is a person.

I answer that if the as is referred to the very suppositum of the man, it must be admitted that this suppositum is a divine person. But if it designates the condition of the nature or the cause, taken this way Christ as man is not a person, because the human nature does not cause a new personhood in Christ. For it is joined to a nobler person into whose personhood it passes.

55. Likewise, an objection is made against a statement in the Gloss, namely, that the one who assumed and what he assumed are one person. But what the Son of God assumed is a human nature. Therefore, the human nature is a person.

I answer that such expressions must be explained so that the meaning is this: he who assumed and the nature he assumed are united in one person.

56. The fourth question is whether this is true: a man was assumed by the Word.

It would seem so according to the Psalm: blessed is he whom you did choose and assume (Ps 65:4).

I answer that since a man implies a suppositum, in this case an eternal one, it cannot properly be said that a man was assumed by the Word; for a same thing is not assumed by itself. Hence, wherever the expression man was assumed is found, it is taken as the human nature.

57. The fifth question is whether this is true: this man has always existed.

The answer is that it is true, because a man supposes a suppositum, in this case an eternal one. Hence it is said: Jesus Christ is the same yesterday and today and forever (Heb 13:8). However, the statement is not true if man is taken precisely as man. For it is not true that that man, as man, always has existed, but as he is Son of God.

So, the matters concerning the preordainment and power of the Son of God are clear.

58. But a third matter remains, namely concerning the sign, which is touched upon when he says, according to the Spirit of sanctification.

It is the custom of divine power to sanctify men by conferring the Holy Spirit: I am the Lord who sanctifies you (Lev 20:8). He alone can give the Holy Spirit: thus says God, the Lord who created the heavens, who gives breath to the people upon it and the Spirit to those who walk in it (Isa 42:5). Therefore, it is clear that Christ has divine power, because he gives the Holy Spirit: when the Counselor comes whom I shall send (John 15:26). Furthermore, it is by his power that we are sanctified: you were sanctified, you were justified, in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and in the Spirit of our God (1 Cor 6:11).

He says, therefore, that Christ is the Son of God in power and appears according to the Spirit of sanctification, i.e., inasmuch as he gives the sanctifying Spirit. This sanctification began by the resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ from the dead: for as yet the Spirit had not been given, because Jesus was not yet glorified (John 7:39). However, this does not mean that no one had received the sanctifying Spirit before Christ’s resurrection, but that from the time he arose, a more copious and general Spirit of sanctification began to be given.

59. It can also mean that two signs of the divine power in Christ are designated here.

First, indeed, from the fact that he says, according to the Spirit of sanctification, whether it be understood according to the sanctifying Spirit, as has been explained, or in view of the fact that he was conceived in the Virgin’s womb by the Holy Spirit—which, of course, is a sign of the divine power in him according to the words of Luke: the Holy Spirit will come upon you, and further on: therefore, the child to be born will be called holy, the Son of God (Luke 1:35).

The second sign of the divine power is the raising of the dead: as the Father raises the dead and gives life, so also the Son (John 5:21).

The sense, therefore, is this: that Christ is the Son of God in power is evident from his resurrection from the dead, i.e., from the fact that he made the dead rise with him: many bodies of the saints who had fallen asleep were raised (Matt 27:52), and will finally make all rise: all who are in the tombs will hear his voice and come forth (John 5:28).

Or it can be understood of a spiritual resurrection of the dead, i.e., from sin: awake, O sleeper, and arise from the dead (Eph 5:14). Those who are raised by him are called Christ’s dead because they are raised by him just as those under a doctor’s care are called his sick.

But these two signs can be referred to two previous clauses in this way: who was made to him according to the flesh of the seed of David, according to the flesh (Rom 1:3), and this according to the Spirit of sanctification, from whom his flesh was conceived; and who was predestined the Son of God in power, and this is apparent in the resurrection of the dead.

But the first explanation is better.