第五章：论第三种恶，即借记忆的明确自然知识临到灵魂的恶。
Chapter V: Of the third evil which comes to the soul by way of the distinct natural knowledge or the memory.
第三种借记忆的自然领受临到灵魂的恶是剥夺性的；因为这些领受能够妨碍道德善，并剥夺我们的属灵善。为了首先说明这些领受如何在灵魂中妨碍道德善，必须知道，道德善在于抑制情绪并约束失序的欲望；由这种抑制而来的是灵魂的宁静、平安和安息，以及道德德行，这一切都是道德善。若灵魂不忘却、不使自己脱离与自身有关、情感由之而起的事物，就不能真正完成对情绪的抑制与约束；而灵魂中的一切扰乱，无不是借记忆的领受而起。因为当一切都被忘却时，就没有什么能扰乱平安，也没有什么能激动欲望；正如人们所说，眼所不见，心所不欲。
The third evil which comes to the soul through the natural apprehensions of the memory is privative; for these apprehensions can hinder moral good and deprive us of spiritual good. And, in order that we may first of all explain how these apprehensions hinder moral good in the soul, it must be known that moral good consists in the restraining of the passions and the curbing of disorderly desires, from which restraint there come to the soul tranquillity, peace and rest, and moral virtues, all of which things are moral good. This restraining and curbing of the passions cannot be truly accomplished by the soul that forgets not and withdraws not itself from things pertaining to itself, whence arise the affections; and no disturbances ever arise in the soul save through the apprehensions of the memory. For, when all things are forgotten, there is naught that can disturb peace or that moves the desires; since, as they say, that which the eye sees not the heart desires not.
2. 这一点我们不断从经验中得知；因为我们观察到，每当灵魂开始思想任何事项时，它就会按其领受的性质，对那事或多或少地被激动和扰乱。若那是一件麻烦而令人忧伤的事，灵魂就在其中感到悲伤；若是愉快的事，便有欲望和快乐，如此等等。因此，随着那种领受的改变，扰乱必然随之而来；于是灵魂时而欢乐，时而悲伤；时而憎恨，时而爱；并且不能持续在同一种态度中（这正是道德宁静的效果），除非它努力忘却一切事物。由此可见，知识大大妨碍灵魂中道德德行的善。
2. This we are constantly learning by experience; for we observe that, whenever the soul begins to think of any matter, it is moved and disturbed, either much or little, with respect to that thing, according to the nature of its apprehension. If it be a troublesome and grievous matter, the soul finds sadness in it; if pleasant, desire and joy, and so forth. Wherefore the result of the changing of that apprehension is necessarily disturbance; and thus the soul is now joyful, now sad; now it hates, now loves; and it cannot continue in one and the same attitude (which is an effect of moral tranquillity save when it strives to forget all things. It is clear, then, that knowledge greatly hinders the good of the moral virtues in the soul.
3. 此外，以上所说也清楚证明，负载过重的记忆也妨碍属灵善；因为受扰乱、没有道德善根基的灵魂，在这个程度上便不能承受属灵善；属灵善只印刻在受约束而平安的灵魂上。除此以外，若灵魂注意并留心记忆的领受——既然它一次只能注意一件事——并忙于可被领受之物，如记忆的知识，它就不可能自由地注意那不可领会者，也就是神。因为灵魂若要接近神，就必须借不领会而前进，甚于借领会而前进；它必须以可变且可领会的，换取不变且不可领会的。
3. Again, what has been said clearly proves that an encumbered memory also hinders spiritual good; for the soul that is disturbed, and has no foundation of moral good, is to that extent incapable of spiritual good, which impresses itself only upon souls that are restrained and at peace. And besides this, if the soul pays attention and heed to the apprehensions of the memory – seeing that it can attend to but one thing at a time – and busies itself with things that can be apprehended, such as the knowledge of the memory, it is not possible for it to be free to attend to the incomprehensible, which is God. For, in order to approach God, the soul must proceed by not comprehending rather than by comprehending; it must exchange the mutable and comprehensible for the immutable and incomprehensible.