3. 我有德行吗?
3. Am I Virtuous?
人是会作选择的受造物。我们能够以不同方式设想自己的人生,并选择按照自己认为最好的方式生活。能够成为会作选择的受造物,是极大的尊荣;而作出良好的选择,则是我们的责任。但这并不意味着作选择总是容易的。有时,面对我们生来就要做的事,我们偏偏会感到自己极不胜任。选择可能令人困惑:你学的是平面设计,现在别人问你的却是管理方面的问题。选择可能令人畏惧:你觉得自己已经准备好求婚,却无法想象自己成为幸福的丈夫和父亲。选择可能令人沮丧:你意识到一段友谊存在相互依赖,而且具有破坏性,却不想结束它。
Humans are choosing creatures. We can envision our lives in different ways and choose to live them however seems best. It’s a great honor to be creatures that choose, and it’s our responsibility to choose well. But that doesn’t always make choosing easy. At times, we feel singularly inadequate for the very thing that we are made to do. Choices can be bewildering: You studied graphic design, and here you’re being asked about a management situation. Choices can be intimidating: You think you’re ready to propose, but can’t imagine yourself as a happy husband and father. Choices can be disheartening: You realize a friendship is codependent and destructive, but lack the desire to end it.
罪使选择变得更加困难。原罪不但使我们失去恩典,也创伤了我们的本性。
Choices are made harder by sin. In addition to depriving us of grace, original sin also wounds our nature.
- 首先,我们的理智因无知而昏暗。我们往往不完全清楚自己行动的理由,别人的动机可能更加晦涩难明。
- 其次,我们的意志因恶意而扭曲。我们一心渴望得到认可和掌控,把别人视为对自身自由的威胁。
- 最后,我们的情绪因软弱和私欲而躁动。我们厌恶艰难之事,凡是舒适而不费力的事物,却总会吸引我们。
- First, our intellects are darkened by ignorance. We often aren’t fully aware of our reasons for acting, and others’ motivations can be yet more opaque.
- Second, our wills are twisted by malice. We are consumed with desire for recognition and control and look on others as a threat to our freedom.
- Finally, our emotions are inflamed by weakness and concupiscence. We find difficult undertakings repulsive and are inclined toward whatever is comfortable and effortless.
内心既然如此动荡,我们觉得选择困难,仿佛承受着沉重的负担,也就不足为奇了。在艰难时刻,我们或许会想:神为什么不把我们造成根本不会失败的样子?他为什么不作出安排,让我们直接完成该做的事,而不必经历这一切痛苦?其实,神确实创造了这样的受造物。石头不会选择。石头既不无知,也没有恶意、软弱或私欲。石头就只是石头。植物和动物也各以自己的方式如此。无论是借着重力、本性还是本能,每种受造物都会自然而然地实现其目的。然而,如果可以选择成为石头或人,几乎没有人会选择做石头。因为尽管我们面临石头不会面临的失败风险,却远比巨石或卵石高贵。承担得越多,收获也越多。
With all of this interior tumult, it’s no wonder that we experience choice as difficult, a heavy burden to bear. In tough moments, we might be led to wonder: Why couldn’t God have made us incapable of failure? Why couldn’t he have set it up so that we simply did what we were supposed to do without all of the anguish? Well, God did make creatures like that. Rocks don’t choose. Rocks aren’t ignorant, malicious, weak, or concupiscent. They’re just rocks. The same is true of plants and animals, in their own way. Each fulfills its purpose as a matter of course — whether by gravity, nature, or instinct. Very few people, though, if given the choice between rock or human being, would choose to be a rock. Because, even though we face the prospect of failure in ways that rocks do not, we are far more noble than boulders or pebbles. More ventured, more gained.
想想圣德肋撒(加尔各答)。她离家进入修会生活时,母亲嘱咐她把手交在主的手中,单单跟随他;她也的确这样做了。当基督引领她以彻底的方式服侍穷人中最贫穷的人时,她已经准备好了。她所做的事没有现成的剧本,她却发现了自己的「圣召中的圣召」,并自由地选择了它。石头做不到,树木做不到,狗也做不到;人却可以。你可以吗?
Think of St. Teresa of Calcutta. When she left home to enter religious life, her mother told her to put her hand in the Lord’s and to follow him alone; and that’s just what she did. When Christ led her to serve the poorest of the poor in a radical way, she was ready. There was no script for what she did, and yet she discovered her “call within a call” and chose it freely. Rocks can’t do that. Trees can’t do that. Dogs can’t do that. Human beings can. Can you?
当我们尝试回答这个问题时,心中要持守两个信念。第一,神为我们预备了美善之事,他愿我们幸福。第二,他会赐给我们履行自身呼召所需的一切。然而,即使怀有这些信念,前路依旧艰难。若要顺从并配合他的恩典,就必须以真正合乎人性的方式这样做,也就是作出良好的选择。明智正是以特定方式帮助我们作出良好选择的德行,因此,顺从并配合恩典也就意味着在明智中成长。
As we attempt to answer this question, we hold two convictions in mind. First, God has something good in store for us, and he wants us to be happy. Second, he gives us what we need to live up to our calling. Even with these convictions, though, the way forward remains difficult. If we are to consent to and cooperate with his grace, it will mean doing so in a genuinely human way. It will mean choosing well. And, since prudence is the virtue that helps us in a particular way to choose well, consenting to and cooperating with grace will mean growing in prudence.
那么,我们该如何克服选择的困难,塑造出前后一致的人生?基督教传统的回答很直接:借着在德行中成长。借着在德行中成长,人学会的不只是偶尔一两次作出良好选择,而是让良好的选择成为品格,始终如一、可靠稳妥。德行使人成为善于作出良好选择的人,让良好的选择化为第二本性。德行使人获得自由,能够按照神在圣经与圣传中的自我启示,成为蒙召成为的那种人。
How then do we work through the difficulty of choice and fashion a coherent life? The traditional Christian response is straightforward: by growth in virtue. By growth in virtue one learns to choose well not just once or twice, but consistently and dependably as a matter of character. Virtue makes one the kind of person who chooses well, so that choosing well becomes second nature. Virtue frees one to be who he or she is called to be, in accord with God’s revelation of himself in Scripture and Tradition.
细看德行
A Closer Look at Virtue
圣奥古斯丁把德行定义为:「心灵的一种善好品质,人借此活得高尚;没有人能用它作恶;神在我们内,却不凭我们而成就它。」说德行是心灵的一种善好品质,就是指它是一种加在人性之上、却与人性深切协调的成全。正如一个人可以越来越擅长某种乐器、运动或职业,也可以越来越善于生活。德行就是实现这种转变的品质。说德行是使人「活得高尚」并且「没有人能用它作恶」的品质,便使这幅图景更加完整。有些品质本身既不特别趋向善,也不特别趋向恶。如果你十分了解股票和债券,可以运用这份知识进行合乎伦理的投资,也可以钻制度的空子。如果你性格讨喜,可以运用这种特质让朋友感到自在,也可以用来操纵熟人。但德行就其本性而言,必然导向善的行动。人不可能为了邪恶的目的而实行正义、勇毅或节制;这种说法荒谬至极。如果你试图设想一个人为了偷窃或诱奸而实行正义,那你所描述的就不是真正的正义。圣奥古斯丁定义的结尾说明了德行的来源:「神在我们内,却不凭我们而成就它。」这又回到习得德行与灌注德行的讨论。有些德行可以通过反复行动,逐渐习得;但最伟大的德行却不能如此获得,而只能由神灌注。一个女婴受洗时,神不会衡量她到那时为止做过什么,也不会考虑她是否配得神的祝福。相反,神直接以恩典、德行和圣灵的恩赐充满她的灵魂。这一切都成就在她里面,却不凭她而成就。
Saint Augustine defines virtue as “a good quality of mind, by which a man lives nobly, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us without us.” To say that virtue is a good quality of mind is to say that it is a kind of perfection added to, but deeply in concert with, human nature. Just as one can get better at a particular instrument, sport, or profession, so too one can get better at living life in general. Virtue is the type of quality which works this transformation. To say that virtue is the type of quality “by which one lives nobly” and “of which no one can make bad use” fills out the picture. Some qualities have no particular tendency either to good or to evil. If you learn a lot about stocks and bonds, you could use that knowledge to invest ethically or to game the system. If you have a charming personality, you could use that trait to put your friends at ease or to manipulate your acquaintances. But a virtue is directed to good action by its very nature. One cannot be just or courageous or temperate for evil ends. It’s absurd. If you were to try to imagine a situation in which one were just in order to steal or seduce, you wouldn’t be describing true justice. Saint Augustine’s definition concludes by describing its source, “which God works in us without us.” This goes back to the discussion of acquired and infused virtues. While some virtues can be acquired over time through repeated action, the greatest of virtues cannot. They are simply infused by God. When a baby girl is baptized, God doesn’t take into account what she has done up to that point in her life or whether she is worthy of divine blessing. Instead, God just floods her soul with grace, virtues, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. They are done in her, without her.
德行在日常生活中得到实践,便会巩固品格。它医治受伤的爱,坚固软弱的渴望,使人能够更自由地选择善,也更充分地享受善。因此,德行使人更充分地成为人,使人能够在最真实的意义上成为自己。在《天主教徒相信什么》中,哲学家约瑟夫·皮珀与 Heinz Raskop 对德行有如下论述:
When exercised in daily life, virtue solidifies character. It heals wounded loves and strengthens weak desires so that one can choose the good more freely and enjoy it more fully. As a result, virtue has a humanizing effect. It enables one to become himself in the most genuine sense. In What Catholics Believe, philosophers Josef Pieper and Heinz Raskop say this about virtue:
善人比恶人更充分地成为人,因为他使自己的人性得到更充分的实现。他在各方面都更加健全。因此,一个人的德行表明,他正把自己的能力付诸实践;此时此地,他正在把原本只作为可能性存于自身的一切变成现实。这意味着他会行善,而且不是因为不得不这样做,而是因为他愿意这样做。他既想做,也做得到。
A good man is more of a man than a bad one, in the sense that he is making more of his humanity. He is in every respect more fit. Thus a man’s virtue shows that he is putting his ability into practice; here and now he is making actual what would otherwise remain merely possible within him. This means that he does good — and that he does it not because he has to, but because he wills to. He wants to, and he can.
德行充实并完整展现了何以为人。它使人能够卓越地活出人性——善于思考、选择,甚至善于感受。归根结底,德行为我们提供了度幸福而圣洁生活所需的工具。举几个例子有助于说明这一点。
Virtue fills up and fills out what it means to be a human. It empowers one to be excellently human — to think, to choose, and even to feel well. Ultimately, virtue provides us the tools to live a happy and holy life. A couple of examples will help to illustrate the point.
节制是一种医治并提升爱、欲望、快乐、憎恨、厌恶和悲伤等情绪的德行。这些是我们遇到善或恶时产生的简单情绪,会使我们趋向善或远离恶。若没有节制,我们很容易被简单的情绪反应击垮。你打开一袋 Chex Muddy Buddies 巧克力糖霜脆片,不久后便惊讶地发现袋中一块不剩,自己身上还沾满了糖粉。想到要做点有成效的事,你便觉得不堪重负,于是连续看了四集 Netflix 新剧,回过神来才发现时间都不知去哪儿了。面对食物、饮品或性亲密关系等感官事物时,我们需要节制这种德行来帮助自己持守目标,以免被较低的益处吞没。节制使我们的情绪合乎理性。因此,看到一盘巧克力碎片曲奇时,我们可以想:「看起来很美味,但我不想在两餐之间吃零食」;或是「吃一块正好,但在拿第二块以前,我该离开了」;又或是「让我先把它传给客人吧」。有节制的人与感官益处保持健康的关系。他们不受这些益处支配,而能以秩序井然的方式把它们纳入生活。
Temperance is a virtue which heals and elevates the passions of love, desire, pleasure, hatred, aversion, and sorrow. These are simple passions that arise when we encounter something good or evil, causing us either to advance toward the good or withdraw from the evil. Without temperance, we can be easily undone by simple emotional responses. You open a bag of Chex Muddy Buddies and are soon surprised to find there are none left and that you’re covered with powdered sugar. The thought of doing something productive is so oppressive that you watch four episodes of a new Netflix series before realizing where the time has gone. When it comes to dealing with sensible things — like food, drink, or sexual intimacy — we need the virtue of temperance to help us cling to our purpose, lest we be swallowed up by lower goods. Temperance puts reason into our passions, so that when looking at a plate of chocolate-chip cookies we can think, “Looks delicious, but I’d prefer not to snack between meals,” or “One would be perfect, but I should move on before I have a second,” or “Let me pass this around to the guests first.” A temperate person has a healthy relationship with sensible goods. He or she is not ruled by them but is able to incorporate them into life in a way that’s well-ordered.
勇毅是一种医治并提升盼望、绝望、恐惧、无畏和愤怒等情绪的德行。这些是我们遇到难以获得的善或难以克服的恶时产生的较复杂情绪。节制帮助我们应对眼前那盘曲奇;勇毅却从一开始就促成了曲奇的诞生,因为我们得鼓起勇气走进人满为患的超市,不用电动搅拌器制作面团,还要在火候不稳的烤箱中精准掌握时间。勇毅会在各种情形下前来相助。也许你要取得硕士学位,只差写完一篇五十页的论文,却在第四十页卡了整整四个月。勇毅会帮助你冲过终点。又或许,你的老板以事无巨细的恐怖管控让工作变得无法忍受,但说实话,你很怕他,不愿正视这个处境。勇毅会帮助你挺身而出。在这些情况下,善是经过一番挣扎才能获得的果实,我们不得不面对自己的软弱。要勇敢承受这些考验,我们需要勇毅这种德行,才不会被恐惧吓倒、偏离目标。勇毅与节制一样,使我们的情绪更合乎理性。因此,当神要求我们作出牺牲时,我们能够毫不迟疑地献上;当四面战火正酣时,我们能够为了所珍爱的一切坚守战斗。勇毅的人与难以获得的善保持健康的关系。他们不会摇摆不定,而能自持坚定。
Fortitude is a virtue that heals and elevates the passions of hope, despair, fear, daring, and anger. These are more complex passions that arise when we encounter a good that is difficult to attain or an evil that is difficult to overcome. While temperance helped us deal with the plate of cookies right in front of us, fortitude made the cookies possible in the first place when it meant braving a busy supermarket, making the dough without an electric mixer, and timing them perfectly in an erratic oven. Fortitude comes to the rescue in a variety of circumstances. Perhaps all you need to finish off the master’s degree is a fifty-page thesis, and you’ve been stuck at forty pages for the last four months. Fortitude helps you get it across the finish line. Or maybe your boss makes work intolerable with his micro-managerial terrorism, but frankly you’re terrified of him and unwilling to confront the situation. Fortitude helps you to speak up. In these circumstances, the good represents the fruit of some struggle, and we are forced to confront our own weakness. To brave these trials, we need the virtue of fortitude so that we’re not cowed by fear and turned aside from the goal. Fortitude, like temperance, makes our passions more reasonable so that when God asks for a sacrifice, we can offer it without hesitation; or, when the battle rages on every side, we can stand and fight for love of what is ours. A courageous or brave person has a healthy relationship with difficult goods. He or she is not tossed to and fro but is self-possessed and resolute.
我们一眼就能看出,节制和勇毅对人有益,也能帮助人作出良好选择。你有多少次希望自己只吃一块曲奇就能停下,或觉得自己无力应对一场艰难的谈话?我们深知,感官享乐或困难很容易使我们偏离正轨;一旦如此,作出良好选择就会变得无比复杂。借着节制与勇毅等德行(当然还可加上正义、谦卑、贞洁等),我们训练自己过更加合乎理性的生活,从而在作选择时少一些内心冲突。德行由此为我们开辟了一条通往自由的道路。德行使我们成为善于作出良好选择的人,也释放我们,使生命蓬勃发展。
Temperance and fortitude are immediately recognizable to us as good for the human person and as helps in choosing well. How often have you wished you could stop at one cookie or felt unable to tackle a difficult conversation? We know for sure that we can be easily derailed by sense delights or difficulties, and when we are, choosing well becomes infinitely more complicated. With virtues like temperance and fortitude (though we might add justice, humility, chastity, and others), we train ourselves to live more reasonably and so experience less conflict in choice. In so doing, the virtues chart a path to freedom. Virtue makes us persons who choose well and frees us to flourish.
德行中的自由
Freedom in Virtue
随着我们在德行生活中成长,我们会获得真正的自由——因为爱善,所以能自由地选择善。圣托马斯阿奎那承袭亚里士多德,坚持认为伦理生活的目的远远不只是克制或自律。德行生活并不是要人不断付出艰苦卓绝的努力,而是要使选择并拥有善变得容易、迅速,甚至令人喜悦。当你看到一位处于巅峰状态的顶尖运动员,或一位技艺臻于化境的音乐会演奏家时,他们做起一切来似乎毫不费力。我们每个人的目标,就是以这种自然而然的方式活出人的生命。
As we grow in the virtuous life, we become truly free — free to choose what is good because we love it. St. Thomas Aquinas, following Aristotle before him, insists that the point of the moral life goes well beyond restraint or discipline. The virtuous life isn’t intended to be a continuous series of Herculean efforts. Rather, the virtuous life makes choosing and possessing the good easy, prompt, even joyful. When you see an elite athlete at the top of his game or a concert musician at the height of her powers, they make it seem almost effortless. The goal for each of us is to live our human lives in just this effortless way.
关于这一点,亚里士多德和圣托马斯特别说明了德行与自制、失制和恶习之间的区别。这些是伦理现实中相当细微的差别,因此值得逐一举例说明。为此,不妨设想一个人正在决定是否如实申报所得税。对有德行的人来说,这根本不成问题。无论眼下的财务状况多么窘迫,她都会准确无误地申报收入,根本无法想象自己会有别的做法。她的动机不是害怕事情败露,也不会从义务驱使的角度思考。事实上,她甚至能从报税中获得某种乐趣。对有恶习的人来说,这同样根本不成问题,不过方向完全相反。她百分之百地认为,自己的每一分钱都理所当然地该归自己。要是有关部门找上门来,她还是会把同样的话原原本本地告诉他们。她知道法律,也知道法律的目的,只是毫不在乎。她想要那笔额外的钱。
On this point, Aristotle and Saint Thomas highlight how virtue differs from continence, incontinence, and vice. Since these are fine shades of moral reality, it’s worth illustrating each state. To that end, take the example of someone who is deciding whether or not to be honest on her tax returns. For the virtuous person, it’s not even a question. She reports her earnings accurately and precisely, and she couldn’t fathom doing anything else, regardless of present financial straits. She isn’t motivated by fear of discovery, nor does she think in terms of duty-driven obligation. In fact, she derives a kind of enjoyment from filing. For the vicious person, again, it’s not even a question, but in the opposite sense. She feels 100 percent entitled to all of her dollars. If they want to come after her, she’ll tell them the exact same thing. She knows the law and the purpose of the law; she just doesn’t care. She wants the extra cash.
德行与恶习处于光谱的两端,中间则是自制与失制两种状态。自制较接近德行,失制则较接近恶习。自制的人在追求目标时会经历冲突或困难,但最终仍能成功选择较高的善。在我们的例子中,这位女士面对账目内心挣扎,不断为自己寻找理由,想把收入少报一点,或把慈善捐款多报一点。经过一番痛苦的挣扎,她终于战胜诱惑;这部分是出于一种说不清的对美国国税局的恐惧,最终还是如实申报。失制的人追求目标时同样会经历冲突或困难,却向自己的软弱屈服。尽管如此,她远不像有恶习的人那样满意自己的选择。这个选择令她提心吊胆,每当电话响起,她都会以为自己的所作所为已经败露。
Virtue and vice live at opposite ends of a spectrum. Between them are the two intermediate states of continence and incontinence. Continence is closer to virtue, while incontinence is closer to vice. The continent person experiences conflict or difficulty in her pursuit but eventually succeeds in choosing the higher good. In our example, the woman struggles to balance the ledger, running through different rationalizations why she might report a little less for income or a little more for charitable donations. After some tortured moments, she overcomes the temptation, motivated in part by an ill-defined terror of the IRS, and reports honestly. The incontinent person also experiences conflict or difficulty in her pursuit, but she succumbs to her weakness. That being said, she’s not nearly as pleased with her choice as is the vicious person. The choice makes her nervous, and whenever her phone rings, she assumes that she’s been found out.
这一系列状态勾勒出,人对善的判断和追求可以受到程度不等的良好塑造。有恶习的人受到错误塑造,有德行的人则受到良好塑造;自制的人正在走向德行,失制的人离德行则更远一些。这一系列状态也有助于澄清伦理生活的目标。人受造不只是为了循规蹈矩或履行义务,而是要培养一种真正善于行善的能力,仿佛出于第二本性,自然而然地趋向善。人借着在德行中成长,培养出善度生活——作出良好选择——的能力。成为有德行的人,就是成为善度人生的大师。
This spectrum of states delineates how human beings can be more or less well-formed in their estimation and pursuit of what is good. The vicious person is malformed. The virtuous person is well-formed. The continent person is on the way and the incontinent person a bit further off. This range of options also helps to clarify the goal of the moral life. Man is made for more than merely following the rules well or performing his duty. He is meant to cultivate a real knack for the good and to incline spontaneously toward it as if by a kind of second nature. By growth in virtue, he develops this facility for living well — for choosing well. To become virtuous is to become a virtuoso at living human life.
不妨想想一位音乐家。小学三四年级时,班上几乎一半的学生都报名租用乐器并参加音乐课,我们这位音乐家也是其中一员。到六年级结束时,她的大多数同学都已放弃,她却坚持了下来。起初,练习有些枯燥艰苦,但后来她逐渐掌握了窍门。持之以恒地练习音阶、琶音和练习曲,使她发现了这件乐器的美。随着时间推移,她从朴素的小曲逐步进阶到技巧日益复杂的改编曲。她重新认真操练姿势、技巧和章法,纠正了起初的马虎。不久,初尝卓越滋味的她开始渴望完美,追求更高的艺术造诣和更细腻的表达。她的才能起初在父母的督促下得到培养,后来则遵循其内在规律自行成长。对艺术的热爱激励她不断努力。她起先只是掌握基本功,不久便能在自己的技艺上出类拔萃,并乐在其中。她的自律结出了自由的果实,这份自由在她的技法与风采中展露无遗。她成了演奏大师——一位真正「有德」的音乐家。
Consider a musician. At some point in primary school, whether third or fourth grade, practically half of the class signed up for an instrument rental and music lessons. Our musician was among their number. By the end of the sixth grade, most of her classmates have dropped out, but she persisted. At first it was a bit of a slog, but then she started to get the hang of it. A steady ration of scales, arpeggios, and etudes revealed to her the beauty of the instrument. In time, she advanced from modest pieces to arrangements of increasing technicality. She corrected her initial sloppiness with renewed commitment to posture, technique, and form. Soon, her first tastes of excellence fueled a desire for perfection — for greater artistry and subtlety. Her talent, first encouraged by parental oversight, then grew by its own interior laws. Love of the art inspired her efforts. What began with mastering the rudiments soon had her excelling at and delighting in her craft. The fruit of her discipline was a freedom made visible in both workmanship and flair. She had become a virtuoso — a virtuous — musician.
音乐家的例子有助于我们更清楚地理解自制与德行之间的关键区别。许多人似乎以为,伦理生活的目标就是自制,仿佛我们生来就是为了终身苦练音阶、琶音和练习曲。事实上,伦理生活的目标是德行。我们生来是为了登台演奏,是为了充分发挥所有能力,而且做得仿佛毫不费力。德行不只是伦理上的意志力,实际上还会改变我们最深处的存在,使我们成为善人,并且善于行善。有德行的人知道什么是美善的生活,并且毫不犹豫地选择它。德行使我们能够善于思考、选择和感受。德行释放我们,使生命蓬勃发展。继续阅读时,请把这幅图景放在心中。无论我们关注的是更好的理论还是更好的实践,最终都是为了这个目的。在本章余下的部分,我们将继续朝这个目标前进,尤其聚焦于明智。不过在此之前,我们先要确定明智在各种德行中的位置。
The example of the musician helps us better to grasp the crucial difference between being continent and being virtuous. A lot of people seem to think that the point of the moral life is continence, as if we were made for a lifetime’s toil of scales, arpeggios, and etudes. In fact, the point of the moral life is virtue. We are made for concert performance. We are made to fire on all cylinders and to do so as if effortlessly. Virtue is not a matter of mere moral might; it actually changes us in our inmost being. It makes us good and fit for good deeds. The virtuous person knows what the good life is and chooses it without hemming or hawing. Virtue empowers us to think, to choose, and to feel well. Virtue frees us for flourishing. This is the vision to hold before your mind’s eye as you keep reading. Whether we are focusing on better theory or better practice, it is ultimately to this end. In what remains of the chapter, we will continue advancing toward this goal, homing in on prudence in particular. Before that, though, we’ll situate prudence among the different kinds of virtues.
德行的种类
Kinds of Virtues
信心依附于那发言的第一真理——神;盼望紧系于那应许的终极美善——神;仁爱拥抱那首要而至善的朋友——神。
Faith adheres to God as First Truth speaking. Hope fastens to God as Final Good promised. Charity embraces God as First and Best Friend.
基督教传统列举德行时,会按照类别或组别来思考。首先是信心、盼望和仁爱这三种超性德行。超性德行之所以称为超性德行,是因为它们来自神,也归向神。前文说过,有些德行是习得的,另一些则是灌注或领受的。超性德行绝不可能靠人习得,只能由神灌注。此外,我们说它们归向神,意思是它们以神为目的——每一种德行都以某种方式真正接近或抵达神。信心依附于那发言的第一真理——神;盼望紧系于那应许的终极美善——神;仁爱拥抱那首要而至善的朋友——神。超性德行从神而来,又归向神,并在此过程中安居于人灵魂的属灵官能之中。信心成全理智,盼望和仁爱则成全意志。它们来自最高的原因,抵达最高的目的,又成全我们最高的官能,因而合在一起被视为最伟大的德行。
When listing virtues, the Christian tradition thinks in terms of categories or groups. First, there are the theological virtues: faith, hope, and charity. The theological virtues are called theological because they come from God and go to God. Earlier it was said that some virtues are acquired, while others are infused or received. The theological virtues can in no way be acquired; they can only be infused. Also, when we say that they go to God, this means that they have God as their end — each of these virtues genuinely approaches or arrives at God in some way. Faith adheres to God as First Truth speaking. Hope fastens to God as Final Good promised. Charity embraces God as First and Best Friend. Between their arising from God and returning to God, the theological virtues come to rest in the spiritual powers of the human soul. Faith perfects the intellect, and hope and charity perfect the will. Together, they are considered the greatest of virtues since they come from the highest cause, attain to the highest end, and perfect our highest powers.
其次是正义、勇毅和节制这三种伦理德行。这些德行既可以是习得的,也可以是灌注的。天主教神学家对这一点争论颇多,但大多数人认为,灵魂可以同时具有这些德行的习得形式与灌注形式。因此,凭借习得的节制,你可能纯粹出于自然层面的理由注意饮食;凭借灌注的节制,你则可能主要出于对神的爱而注重禁食。伦理德行与超性德行不同,始终处于人类事务的有限领域之内,为感性生活的内在活动和人际交往的外在活动建立秩序。正义成全意志(理性欲求),勇毅与节制则成全情绪(感性欲求)。超性德行使人更完全地与神相似,伦理德行则使人更完全地成为人。
Second, there are the moral virtues of justice, fortitude, and temperance. These virtues can be both acquired and infused. There is a lively debate among Catholic theologians on this point, but most hold that the soul can accommodate both acquired and infused versions of these virtues at the same time. So, by acquired temperance, you might concern yourself with dieting for purely natural reasons, whereas by infused temperance you might concern yourself with fasting primarily for the love of God. By contrast to the theological virtues, the moral virtues stay within the limited sphere of human affairs — bringing order to the interior dynamics of sense life and the exterior dynamics of human interaction. Justice perfects the will (rational appetite), and fortitude and temperance perfect the passions (sense appetite). Whereas the theological virtues make one more perfectly like God, the moral virtues make one more perfectly human.
说到这里,你或许会想起小学教理课,心想:「等等,明智不也是伦理德行吗?」既是,也不是。大多数天主教神学家教导说,伦理德行存在于欲求能力中,无论是意志还是情绪。明智虽与欲求能力有关,真正且确切地说,却存在于理智之中。不过,由于它与欲求能力密切合作,便发挥双重作用,在伦理德行与理智德行之间架起桥梁。严格来说,明智是一种理智德行。然而,我们也可以把明智与伦理德行归为一类;它们合称四枢德。「枢」的原文取自拉丁语中表示「门轴」的词。如此使用时,它表明这四种德行对人类生命蓬勃发展的重要性。它们共同构成一扇门的「枢轴」,我们借着这扇门进入圆满的伦理生活。
At this stage, you might be remembering grade-school catechism and thinking, “Wait, isn’t prudence a moral virtue?” It is and it isn’t. Most Catholic theologians teach that moral virtues are found in the appetites, whether in the will or the passions. Prudence is involved with the appetites, but it is really and truly found in the intellect. But because of its close cooperation with the appetites, it plays a double role, bridging the moral virtues and the intellectual virtues. If we are being precise, prudence is an intellectual virtue. There is a way, however, of grouping prudence with the moral virtues. Together, they are called the cardinal virtues. The word cardinal is taken from the Latin word for “hinge.” Used in this way, it signifies the importance of these four virtues for human flourishing. Together, they are the very “hinges” of the door through which we enter into the fullness of the moral life.
理智德行
Virtues of the Intellect
超性德行、伦理德行和枢德都已讲过,现在只剩下理智德行。果真如此吗?许多人往往乐于把理智德行搁在一边,有些人甚至告诫别人要提防它。正如查尔斯·金斯利所讥讽的:「做个善良可爱的姑娘吧,聪明的事就留给想聪明的人。」但我们非得在聪明与善良之间作选择吗?基督教传统的主流并不这样认为。事实上,它认为聪明与善良密不可分。近年来,认知行为疗法(CBT)广受欢迎,使当代文化更清楚地意识到,生命蓬勃发展在一定程度上源于善于思考和认识。一切德行都带有理性的印记;任何种类的德行都需要理性,而理性本身也必须由德行来成全。理智德行,尤其是明智,正是为了满足这一需要。
That covers theological, moral, and cardinal virtues; only the intellectual virtues remain. Or do they? Often enough, many people are content to leave the intellectual virtues to the side, and some go so far as to caution against them. As Charles Kingsley chides, “Be good, sweet maid, and let who will be clever.” But must we choose between intelligence and goodness? The main current of the Christian tradition doesn’t think so. In fact, it sees intelligence and goodness as inextricably bound up. The recent popularity of cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) has helped raise contemporary cultural awareness to the fact that flourishing is, in part, a product of thinking and knowing well. All virtue bears the mark of reason, and virtue of whatever sort requires a reason that is itself perfected by virtue. Intellectual virtues, especially the virtue of prudence, answer to this need.
人的理智可以用两种不同方式来运用。有时,我们求知只是为了求知。这种运用称为思辨理性。(在这里,「理性」只是指理智。)另一些时候,我们求知是为了行动。这种运用称为实践理性。需要说明的是,我们并没有两种理性;同一个理性只是有思辨与实践两种不同的运用方式。
The human intellect can be exercised in two different ways. Sometimes we seek to know for knowing’s sake. This use is referred to as the speculative reason. (Reason just means intellect in this context.) Other times, we seek to know for doing’s sake. This use is referred to as the practical reason. To be clear, there aren’t two reasons, rather there are just two different uses — speculative and practical — of the one reason.
思辨理性主要有三种德行:明悟、知识和智慧。明悟是一种揭示人类认识最基本原理的习性。在你开始思考以前,便已具有理解现实的先天能力。明悟使我们把握这些根本洞见,例如「整体大于它的任何部分」。知识是人判断现实并对其进行推理所结出的果实,使人把握关于世界的必然结论,例如「所有人都会死」以及「凡被推动的,都是由另一事物推动的」。智慧既是对最高事物的认识,也是最高层次的认识方式。智慧之人具有敏锐的理智眼光,能看出整个现实如何相互贯通,并能恰当地认识和安排万物。
There are three main virtues of the speculative reason: understanding, knowledge, and wisdom. Understanding is the habit that discloses the most basic principles of human knowing. Before you even begin to think, you already have an innate capacity for making sense of reality. Understanding is the virtue that registers these fundamental insights — things like, “A whole is greater than any of its parts.” Knowledge is the fruit of one’s judging and reasoning upon reality. It registers necessary conclusions about the world — things like “All men are mortal” and “Whatever is moved is moved by another.” Wisdom is both the knowledge of the highest things, and the highest mode of knowledge. The wise person has a keen intellectual sense for how all of reality hangs together and is able to know and order all things fittingly.
实践理性主要有两种德行:技艺与明智。技艺被定义为应用于制作的正确理性。显然,它所涵盖的不只是绘画或音乐,而包括任何塑造物质现实的行业或技能。木匠、运动员、教师和诗人都属于此列。判断一门技艺或一位技艺者的优劣,要看其作品制作得好不好。技艺者是否卓越,并不取决于他的动机或诚意,而取决于其作品是否卓越。
There are two main virtues of the practical reason: art and prudence. Art is defined as right reason applied to making. Obviously, this covers more than just painting or music. It includes any trade or skill that shapes material reality. Carpenters, athletes, teachers, and poets all qualify. Art, and the artist, is judged good or bad based on whether the thing is well or ill made. The excellence of the artist is not determined by his motive or his sincerity, but by the excellence of his product.
最后剩下的,就是明智这种德行。你大概很想更深入地理解并实践明智;毕竟,你拿起了这本书,而且一直读到这里。然而,许多人似乎对这个主题没什么兴趣,至少还没有兴趣到愿意为此读一本书。为什么会这样?部分原因在于,对许多人来说,明智听起来很扫兴。我们常把明智的人想成精于商业交易之人:他善于作出经济实惠的安排,谨小慎微地维护自身利益。约瑟夫·皮珀在《四枢德》中这样描述现代人对明智的理解:
The last virtue standing is the virtue of prudence. You are probably interested in understanding and practicing prudence better; after all, you picked up this book and have read this far. And yet, many people seem to care little for the subject, or at least not enough to read a book about it. Why is that? In part, it’s because prudence sounds, to many ears, like a wet blanket. We often think of the prudent person as someone who is shrewd in business dealings. He is a maker of economical arrangements. He is cautious and careful in providing for his own interests. Josef Pieper writes of this modern characterization in The Four Cardinal Virtues:
在日常用语中,明智总带有胆怯、狭隘地自保以及相当自私地关切自身等意味。人们以为,「明智」的人就是能够避免陷入不得不勇敢的尴尬处境之人。「明智」的人是「精明的战术家」,总能设法逃避亲身投入。躲避危险的人往往诉诸「明智」的必要性,为自己的态度辩解。
In colloquial use, prudence always carries the connotation of timorous, small-minded self-preservation, of a rather selfish concern about oneself. A ‘prudent’ man is thought to be one who avoids the embarrassing situation of having to be brave. The ‘prudent’ man is the ‘clever tactician’ who contrives to escape personal commitment. Those who shun danger are wont to account for their attitude by appealing to the necessity for ‘prudence.’
明智难道仅此而已吗?同样,基督教传统对此还有丰富得多的论述;把明智局限于狭隘的自身利益,只会遮蔽它真正的美。这个词的常见用法,不过是真正德行的贫乏版本。
Is this all there is to it? Again, the Christian tradition has much more to say on the matter, and limiting prudence to narrow self-interest only obscures its true beauty. The word as it is often used is an impoverished version of the true virtue.
明智是应用于行动的正确理性,是理智上的胜任能力或实践智慧形成的习性。它与法国人所谓的savoir-faire(处事才能)或clairvoyance(洞察力)有关。明智意味着睿智或理智上的洞察,指对真理清楚而娴熟的认识。对本书的目的而言,尤其重要的是,明智在伦理成长中发挥着决定性作用。它逐步成全人的选择,帮助人获得完全而真实的自由。明智确保我们的选择不是一次次孤立的伦理困境,而是一个更宏大故事的组成部分;在这个故事中,我们在德行中成长,在自由中成熟,并获得真正的幸福。
Prudence is right reason applied to doing. It’s the habit of intellectual competence or practical wisdom. It’s related to what the French call savoir-faire or clairvoyance. Prudence suggests sagacity or intellectual penetration. It means clear and skillful knowledge of the truth. Importantly for our purposes, prudence plays a decisive role in moral growth. It works to perfect human choice by degrees, helping one to become completely and truly free. Prudence sees to it that our choices are not isolated instances of moral misery, but part of a bigger story of growing in virtue, maturing in freedom, and attaining true happiness.
明智确保我们的选择不是一次次孤立的伦理困境,而是一个更宏大故事的组成部分;在这个故事中,我们在德行中成长,在自由中成熟,并获得真正的幸福。
Prudence sees to it that our choices are not isolated instances of moral misery, but part of a bigger story of growing in virtue, maturing in freedom, and attaining true happiness.
在德行生活中,明智发挥着至关重要的作用。鉴于这一点,本书余下各章将致力于更深入地理解明智,好使我们更用心地加以实践。我们希望,把得到坚固的明智稳稳置于伦理想象的中心以后,便能在善度生活和作出良好选择上大步前进。人的一生虽充满艰难的选择,但坚持走完全程正是我们的崇高呼召。靠着神的恩典,明智之人能够借着选择一路攀登,直至获得真正的幸福。石头做不到,树木做不到,狗也做不到;你却可以。
In the virtuous life, the role played by prudence is paramount. Mindful of this, the remaining chapters are devoted to understanding prudence better, so that we can apply ourselves to practicing it better. The hope is that, with a bolstered prudence placed squarely at the center of our moral imagination, we can make strides toward living and choosing well. Because although human life is filled with difficult choices, it is our high calling to see it through. By the grace of God, the prudent person can ascend by choice all the way to genuine happiness. Rocks can’t. Trees can’t. Dogs can’t. You can.
反思
Reflect
想到德行生活时,你会想象怎样的景象?你是否觉得自己注定要过着循规蹈矩的无聊生活,或要在地狱之火的边缘咬紧牙关艰难攀爬?本章所呈现的德行图景如何挑战这种观念?
What do you imagine when you think of the life of virtue? Do you feel like you are doomed to a life of boring rule-following or to a white-knuckling climb on the brink of hell-fire? How does this picture of virtue challenge that notion?
想一想你认为堪称善度人生大师的人。他或她的生活有哪些特征,使之如此美好、如此令人钦佩?这个人有哪些德行,是你希望融入自己生活的?
Think of someone whom you consider a virtouso of human life. What marks out his or her life as so wonderful, so admirable? What are some of this person’s virtues that you want to incorporate in your own life?
对你而言,理智在美善生活中发挥什么作用?在追求幸福与圣洁时,你更容易思虑过度,还是思虑不足?从理智德行的角度设想美善生活,如何帮助你解决这个问题?
What role does intelligence play in the good life for you? Are you more likely to overthink or to underthink your pursuit of happiness and holiness? How does envisioning the good life in terms of the intellectual virtues help to work through that?