伦理神学导论:真幸福与德行

与 Introducing Moral Theology: True Happiness and the Virtues 对照
William C. Mattison III
伦理神学导论:真正的幸福与德行

17. 贞洁与非婚性行为:测试案例三

17. Chastity and Nonmarital Sex: Test Case Three

在第五章我们曾举过这样一个例子:某人考虑是否与她的男友发生性关系。她有出于善意的理由,要在性方面更进一步地投入。她深深关心他,希望以身体方式表达对他的爱。她也有出于善意的犹豫。她知道这会对他们的关系产生巨大影响,也不确定他们的关系究竟会如何承受它,或者他们两人共同的长远计划究竟是什么。

In chapter 5 an example was given of a person thinking about becoming sexually active with her boyfriend. She has well-intentioned reasons to become more sexually involved. She cares for him deeply and wants to physically express her love for him. She also has well-intentioned hesitations about doing so. She knows it will have a huge impact on their relationship, and is not sure how exactly their relationship will handle it, or indeed what their long-term plans together are.

这个人在反思,如何最有德地活出自己的性生活。性意味着什么?他们的关系是否准备好了?关系中的哪些特征会使性成为合宜的活动?本章的焦点是如何有德——也就是如何以真正使人圆满的方式——来对待性。写一章关于有德之性的内容,是一项巨大任务。正如本书其他测试案例章节一样,要在一章中处理的事实和考量太多了。为了限制范围,本章聚焦一个具体问题,并围绕这一特定问题来探讨有德之性这一更大主题。本章的核心目标,是考察何时发生性交是有德的,尤其是性是否只有在一对男女已婚时才可能是有德的。

This person is reflecting on how to live out her sex life most virtuously. What does sex mean? Is their relationship ready for it, and what features of a relationship make sex an appropriate activity? The focus on this chapter is how to be virtuous—that is, how to live in a truly fulfilling manner—with regard to sexuality. Writing a chapter on virtuous sex is an enormous task. Reminiscent of the other test-case chapters in this book, there are far too many facts and considerations to address in one chapter. In order to limit its scope, this chapter focuses on one specific question and explores the bigger topic of virtuous sexuality as it concerns this one particular question. The central goal of this chapter is to examine the question of when having sexual intercourse is virtuous and, in particular, whether sex can only be virtuous when a couple is married.

第一部分会先回答三个预备性问题。第一,这是否是一个只有对基督徒才有意义的问题?第二,在这类微妙问题上,我们难道不应听从耶稣的话,「不要评断」吗?第三,传统立场的基本要旨是什么,即只有已婚伴侣发生性交才是有德的?所有这些问题,对于确定下一节的语气和内容都很重要。

The first section addresses three preliminary questions. First, is this a question that only makes sense for Christians? Second, shouldn’t we heed the words of Jesus and “judge not” on delicate questions such as this? And third, what is the basic gist of the traditional position that having sexual intercourse is only virtuous for a couple who are married? All of these questions are important in framing the tone and content of the next section.

该节在回答「性是否只有在婚姻中才是有德的」这一问题时,会处理两个关键主题。这一节是多年来倾听学生辩论这个问题的成果。他们的讨论一贯聚焦于两个问题。第一,性本身是否有任何内在目的或意义?显然,人们发生性行为都有某种理由。但性交这种行动本身是否向伴侣传达某些东西,还是性只是传达一个人想让它传达的任何东西?第二节的后半部分接着探讨婚姻。即使一个人承认性意味着排他、永久、向新生命开放的爱,是否必须结婚,才能拥有一种带有这些特征的关系?为什么一对男女需要一张纸(即结婚证)来证明他们的关系具有这些特征?

That section addresses two crucial topics when answering the question of whether sex is only virtuous in marriage. This section is the fruit of listening to students debate this question for years. They consistently focus their discussions on two questions. First, does sex have any inherent point, or meaning? Clearly, people have sex for some reason. But does the sort of action sexual intercourse is communicate something to one’s partner, or does sex simply communicate whatever one wants it to communicate? The second half of section two then explores marriage. Even if one grants that sex means exclusive, permanent love that is open to new life, need one be married to have a relationship marked by these characteristics? Why does a couple need a piece of paper (i.e., a marriage license) to prove this about their relationship?

性与婚姻之间的关系:预备性问题

The Relationship between Sex and Marriage: Preliminary Questions

本章真正的目标,是进入并就一个争论表明立场:性是否只有在婚姻关系中才可能是有德的。这是下一节的任务。但为了把这件事做好,必须先处理一些预备性问题。第一,这场辩论对哪些听众有意义?下文第一部分会论证,这场讨论不仅对基督徒重要,也对所有人重要。第二,这场辩论的语气和最终目的是什么?第二部分会解释作判断与论断人之间的差异,以避免后者,并转而努力以爱心引导我们自己和他人活得最幸福。第三,在今天这个时代,「性只属于婚姻」这种看法是认真的吗?第三部分会简洁概述这样一种立场:性只有在婚姻内才可能是有德的,好让这种看法被看作(至少有可能)合理,而不是旧时代遗留下来的某条规则。处理完这三个预备性问题后,读者就能准备好深入进入第二节的论证。

The real goal of this chapter is to enter into, and take a position on, the debate over whether sex can only be virtuous in a married relationship. That is the task for the next section. But in order to do that well, some preliminary questions must be addressed. First, for what audience does this debate make sense? The first part below argues that this discussion is important not only for Christians, but for all people. Second, what is the tone and ultimate purpose of this debate? The second part explains the difference between making judgments and being judgmental, so as to avoid the latter and seek instead to try to lovingly guide ourselves and others to live most happily. Third, in this day and age, is the view that sex is only for marriage for real? The third part presents a succinct summary of the position that sex can only be virtuous within marriage, so this view is seen as (at least potentially) reasonable, rather than some leftover rule from the olden days. Having treated these three preliminary questions, the reader will be prepared to engage the arguments of section two in depth.

把性保留给婚姻(甚至提出这个问题)是否只属于基督徒?

Is Reserving Sex for Marriage (and Even Asking That Question) Only for Christians?

贞洁,尤其是性与婚姻之间的关系,是本书在枢德和超性德行之后探讨的第一个议题。因此,这里适合停下来考察:a)这个问题是否只有在基督信仰脉络中才有意义;b)「有德的性只属于婚姻」这个答案是否只对基督徒有意义。对这两个问题的简短回答都是:不是。性是一种内在于世的活动。因此,以良好方式成为一个有性的人(这就是贞洁的意思)是枢德的问题(尤其是节制,贞洁就归在节制之下)。既然枢德所治理的内在于世活动,原则上可以由未经援助的人类理性(自然法推理)弄清并做好,一个人并不需要是基督徒才能贞洁。话虽如此,基督徒可以借助额外资源,更好理解贞洁,并且有恩典的进一步帮助来活出它。因此,性是一个完美例子,说明一种可由自然法推理触及的内在于世活动,如何在基督徒关于事物本来面貌的大方向信念这一更大脉络中得到更完善的理解。

Chastity, and in particular the relationship between sex and marriage, is the first issue explored in this book after the cardinal and theological virtues. Therefore, this is an appropriate place to pause and examine whether: a) this question only makes sense in a Christian context, and b) the answer that virtuous sex belongs only in marriage makes sense only for Christians. The short answer to both questions is no. Sex is an innerworldly activity. Thus, being a sexual person in a good manner (which is what chastity means) is a matter of the cardinal virtues (especially temperance, under which chastity falls). Since the innerworldly activities governed by the cardinal virtues can in principle be figured out, and done well by unaided human reasoning (natural law reasoning), one need not be Christian to be chaste. That said, the Christian person can draw on additional resources to better understand chastity, and has the further assistance of grace in living it out. So sex is a perfect example of how an innerworldly activity that is accessible to natural law reasoning is more perfectly understood in the larger context of Christian big-picture beliefs about the way things are.

尽管对有些人来说,这个词带有守旧,甚至压抑的含义,贞洁其实只是指在我们的思想、欲望和行为中善用我们的性这一德行。有些人会被「使用自己的性」这种表述弄得不知所措,好像它暗示我们的性与我们自己分离,就像某种可以拿起或放下的工具。这里并非这个意思。这个词意在提醒我们第十五章的主张:我们做某些事的方式(在这里是发生性行为),是由我们生命中更大的目标(在这里是作为爱神的仁爱)所塑造的。同样也可以说,贞洁就是好好做一个有性的人,而情欲就是糟糕地做一个有性的人。情欲是贞洁的反面;它是在思想、欲望和行为中糟糕地使用我们的性的恶习。虽然这些词带有浓厚的宗教意味(很大程度上是因为一些宗教人士对一切与性有关的事过分执着),但现实中,每个人都必须明确或隐含地决定如何好好活出自己的性。

Despite the old-fashioned, or even repressive, connotation of the term for some people, chastity simply means the virtue of using our sexuality well in our thoughts, desires, and deeds.Some people are thrown off by the phrasing, “use one’s sexuality,” as if it implies our sexuality is separate from ourselves, like some tool that may be picked up or put down. That is not intended here. The term is meant to remind us of the claim in chapter 15 about how the way we do certain things (in this case have sex) is shaped by our larger goals in life (in this case charity as love of God). It could equally be said that chastity is being a sexual person well and lust is being a sexual person poorly.Lust is the opposite of chastity; it is the vice of using our sexuality poorly in our thoughts, desires, and deeds. Though these words have heavy religious overtones (in no small part due to an obsession of some religious people with all things sexual), in reality every human person must determine, either explicitly or implicitly, how to live out his or her sexuality well.

回想本书前半部分对规则的讨论。规则,在最一般的意义上,是指导我们行动的原则(无论指导得好还是不好)。一个人的规则也许是:「只要你想,就和任何你想的人发生性关系!」除了这样的人很可能也会给这条规则加上一些限制(例如,性必须是双方同意的)之外,请注意,任何规则都暗示没有按这条规则生活的人活得不好。同样,许多人认为,决定何时发生性关系是一个严格个人的问题,只取决于相关当事人。等到婚姻,或不等——那是这对男女的选择。但请注意,即使这种看法也是一种立场,即决定一对男女何时发生性关系为善的唯一因素,就是他们两人都选择这样做。这两种看法也都是道德观,并且都有关于如何好好或糟糕地运用一个人的性的准则。

Recall our discussion of rules in the first half of this book. Rules, in the most general sense, are principles that guide our actions (whether well or poorly). One person’s rule may be, “have sex whenever and with whomever you want!” Besides the fact that such a person likely does have some restrictions to this rule (e.g., sex must be consensual), note that any rule implies that someone not living according to that rule is not living well. Similarly, many think that deciding when to have sex is a strictly personal question, that it simply up to those involved. Wait until marriage, or do not—that is the couple’s choice. But note that even this view is a position, that the only thing that dictates when it is good for a couple to have sex is when they both choose to do so. Both of these views are also moralities, and have guidelines for exercising one’s sexuality well or poorly.

所以,每个人都有某种关于如何好好或糟糕地使用自己的性的看法,并有规则指导一个人如何活出这种看法。但本部分的问题不是性是否是一种内在于世的活动,而是「婚姻之外不得发生性关系」这条规则,是否是非基督徒能够提出并且确实提出过的规则。对前者的答案显然是肯定的,对后者的答案甚至也是肯定的。判断历史与文化中哪些民族认可这种贞洁观,是历史学家和文化人类学家的任务。这里当然不是声称人们一直都活出了这条规则。甚至也不是声称所有民族都认可,更不用说活出这条规则。一个很好的例子是伊壁鸠鲁派思想家卢克莱修,他非常有原则、经过深思熟虑地认可基督徒会视为情欲的东西;他建议读者无论如何都要按需要释放自己的性需求,但绝不要犯下坠入爱河的错误,因为这显然会妨碍人过美好生活!见第十章。 但这条规则并不只是基督徒认可过。它也可以在其他宗教委身的人那里找到。它甚至也可以在当代美国世俗话语中找到,最近一场劝导青少年等待再发生性关系的广告运动就是证据,其口号是:「我可以等!我值得!」基督徒与非基督徒在关乎内在于世活动的道德规则上有共同之处,这不应令人惊讶;既然这些活动以及指导如何把它们做好的原则可由未经援助的人类理性触及,它们就不依赖基督教启示。再说一次,这里的主张不是所有人,甚至也不是大多数人,都持有这条关于性的规则。这里的意思只是,基督徒和非基督徒都曾经并且现在也有人持有这样的规则,认为它是通向幸福生活的道路。

So everyone has some vision of how to use their sexuality well or poorly, with rules that guide how one lives that vision out. But the question for this part is not whether sex is an innerworldly activity, but whether the rule “no sex outside marriage” is a rule that people who are not Christian could and do come up with. The answer is clearly yes to the former, and even yes to the latter. Determining which peoples across times and cultures endorsed this view of chastity is a task for the historian and cultural anthropologist. It is certainly not claimed here that people have always lived out this rule. Nor is it even claimed that all peoples have endorsed, let alone lived out, this rule.A fine example of a very principled and thought-out endorsement of what Christians would see as lust can be found in the Epicurean thinker Lucretius, who advises his readers, by all means, to discharge one’s sexual needs as needed but never to make the mistake of falling in love, which is a clear impediment to living the good life! See chapter 10. But this rule has not only been endorsed by Christians. It can be found in people of other religious commitments. It can even be found in contemporary American secular parlance, as evidenced by the recent ad campaign enjoining teens to wait to have sex, with the phrase, “I can wait! I’m worth it!” The presence of commonality between Christians and non-Christians on moral rules concerning innerworldly activities should come as no surprise; as accessible to unaided human reasoning, these activities and the principles that guide how they are done well do not depend on Christian revelation. Once again, the claim here is not that all, or even most, people hold this rule regarding sex. It is simply that both Christians and non-Christians alike have and do hold such a rule to be the path to a happy life.

话虽如此,基督信仰确实会增强、支持并扩展「性属于婚姻」这一主张背后的理由。下文关于性与婚姻的大部分辩论,是沿着自然法的基础展开的。但这并不是说,鲜明的基督徒主张对于如何活出有德的性生活无关紧要。正如第十章所解释的,爱尔兰主教们很有帮助地用一个词概括了整个基督信仰故事:爱。见爱尔兰天主教主教会议,《爱是为了生命》(牧函,1985),15–24。另见教宗本笃十六世Deus Caritas Est(通谕,2005)。 神之爱的戏剧可以被看见在救恩历史的三个运动中展开:创造、罪和救赎。第十章解释了这些大方向信念如何具体影响持有这些信念的人活出其性生活的方式。

That said, Christian beliefs do augment, support, and extend the rationale behind the claim that sex belongs in marriage. Most of the debate over sex and marriage below proceeds along natural-law grounds. But that is not to say that distinctively Christian claims are irrelevant for how to live out a virtuous sex life. As explained in chapter 10, the Irish bishops helpfully sum up the entire Christian story with one word: love.See Irish Catholic Bishop’s Conference, Love is for Life (Pastoral Letter, 1985), 15–24. See also Pope Benedict XVI’s Deus Caritas Est (Encyclical Letter, 2005). The drama of God’s love can be seen to play out in the three movements of salvation history: creation, sin, and redemption. Chapter 10 explained the ways that these big-picture beliefs concretely influence how people who hold these beliefs live out their sex lives.

基督徒道德,或在基督里的生命,只是以一种反映这关于事物真实样子的叙事的方式生活。因此,基督徒性伦理不应是一套任意、外在强加、压抑性的规则,规定什么不能做。可悲的是,基督徒确实要为以这种方式呈现基督徒关于性的教导承担一些责任。但基督徒性伦理应被呈现并理解为一种指南,指导我们在性生活方面如何按照神之爱的这一叙事生活。正如爱尔兰主教们美妙地说:「教会关于性的一切道德教导,首先就是把神关于仁爱的最大诫命应用于性。」爱尔兰主教会议,《爱是为了生命》,24。

Christian morality, or life in Christ, is simply living in a manner reflective of this story of the way things truly are. Therefore, Christian sexual ethics should not be some arbitrary, externally imposed, repressive set of rules about what not to do. Sadly, Christians share some blame for presenting Christian teaching on sexuality in such a manner. But Christian sexual ethics should be presented and understood as a guide on how to live in accordance with this story of God’s love, as it concerns our sex lives. As the Irish bishops beautifully put it, “The Church’s whole moral teaching about sex is above all the application to sexuality of God’s greatest commandment to charity.”Irish bishops, Love is for Life, 24.

正如第十章所解释的,大方向信念确实会影响我们如何从事性这样的内在于世活动。记住这一点,可以帮助我们梳理人们讨论性伦理时可能出现的不同层次分歧。一个人可以反对,比如说,天主教会对性的立场,其方式之一就是质疑上述叙事中的某些或所有特征。这样的人也许会说:「我不认为爱是我们存在于此的原因,也不认为爱是我们应当生活的方式」;或者说:「并没有基督教意义上的罪这种东西,因为一切都是好的,而且人无论做什么都只是在成长和学习」;或者说:「耶稣基督并不是神的儿子,因此也不会赐给我们恩典来帮助我们活成神的儿女。」这样的人会提出与之竞争的大方向信念委身。既然这些委身会塑造人们在内在于世活动上如何有德地生活,那么关于性的不同实践规则就可能产生。这正是我们在第十章中从卢克莱修身上看到的情况。本章不处理这一层次的分歧。

As explained in chapter 10, big-picture beliefs do indeed matter for how we do innerworldly activities like sex. Remembering this can help us sort through the different levels of disagreement that may arise among people discussing sexual ethics. One way someone can disagree with, say, the Catholic Church’s stance on sex is to contest some or all features of the above story. Such a person might say: “I don’t think love is why we are here and how we should live;”or, “There is no such thing as sin in the Christian sense, since it’s all good, and people are just growing and learning no matter what they do;” or, “Jesus Christ is not the Son of God, and hence does not offer us grace to help live as sons and daughters of God.” Such a person would offer rival big-picture belief commitments. Since these commitments shape how people live virtuously with regard to innerworldly activities, different practical rules regarding sex may result. This is exactly what we saw with Lucretius in chapter 10. Disagreement at this level is not addressed in this chapter.

但在讨论性这样的内在于世活动时,分歧也可能出现在更直接的层面。例如,某人可能同意前几段所呈现的基督信仰故事,却认为在婚前的某些条件下发生性关系,也是按照那个故事生活。因此,例如天主教徒之间也可能在非婚性行为这样的问题上彼此不同意。当然,这并不意味着双方都是对的。但它确实意味着,这个层次上的差异主要并不关乎大方向主张,而是关乎性和婚姻等内在于世活动的意义。事实上,两个在大方向问题层面上意见不同的人,也完全可能在性这样的活动的意义上意见不同。这种分歧可能受到不同大方向信念的重要塑造,但不能完全化约为那个层次上的差异。

But disagreement can also arise on a more immediate level when discussing an innerworldly activity such as sex. For instance, someone could agree with the Christian story as presented in the previous paragraphs and think that sex under certain conditions before marriage is living in accordance with that story. Thus Catholics, for instance, may disagree with each other on an issue such as nonmarital sex. This does not, of course, mean that both sides are right. But it does mean that differences on this level will concern not primarily big-picture claims, but rather the meaning of innerworldly activities such as sex and marriage. In fact, two people who disagree on the level of big-picture questions could also conceivably disagree on the meaning of an activity such as sex. That disagreement could be importantly shaped by the different big-picture beliefs, but not reduced totally to differences at that level.

由此可见,人们对关于性的具体道德规则产生分歧,可能有不同来源:一是大方向信念的差异,会塑造人们如何理解性这种内在于世的活动;二是即使在这些大方向信念上有共识,人们仍会对性与婚姻等内在于世活动的意义有不同理解。本章考察的是后一类分歧,也就是关于性与婚姻意义的分歧。

Thus, there are different sources of disagreement on particular moral rules regarding sex: differences in big-picture beliefs that shape how the innerworldly activity of sex is understood, and different understandings of what inner-worldly activities like sex and marriage mean, even if there is agreement over those big-picture beliefs. It is the latter sort of disagreement—that is, on the meanings of sex and marriage—that is examined in this chapter.

关于判断、归咎与罪

A Word on Judgment, Blame, and Sin

为了给第二节关于非婚性行为是否可能有德的论证定下基调,还必须处理第二个议题。这里的目的,是简单说几句这项探究的重点是什么,或者更准确地说,它的重点不是什么。许多讨论性与婚姻关系的作者——当然也包括许多学习这一主题的大学生——都正当地担心论断人的态度。今天的年轻成年人常常拒绝把他人的行为标为错误,以免论断别人,这种倾向往往甚至过了头。这种倾向中有一个真实的核心:拒绝参与某些人(常常是宗教人士)利用道德议题(常常是性议题)来谴责别人和/或抬高自己的做法。耶稣劝勉跟随他的人说「你们不要评断别人,免得你们被审判」(太 7:1)时,所针对的肯定正是这种情况。

A second topic must be addressed to set the tone for the second section’s argument about whether sex can be virtuous outside of marriage. The purpose here is to say a few words about the point of this inquiry or, more accurately, what is not the point of this inquiry. Many authors who write on the relationship between sex and marriage—and certainly many college students who learn about this topic—are rightly concerned about judgmentalism. Often to a fault, young adults today so frequently refuse to label others’ behavior wrong, so as not to judge others. The kernel of truth in this tendency is a refusal to participate when certain (often religious) people use moral issues (often sexual ones) as a way to denounce other people and/or exalt themselves. Surely this is what Jesus was targeting when he counseled his followers, “judge not lest you be judged” (Matt. 7:1).

但同样可以肯定的是,耶稣并不是在谴责我们认识自己和他人的过错。例如,《登山宝训》的整个重点,就是解释如何按照神的国而生活;这样做就需要我们认出哪些行为与神的国相反,尤其是在自己身上认出这一点。事实上,耶稣还明确教导我们,如何面对一个其行为正在伤害自己和群体的同伴(太 18:15–17)。因此,在分辨什么是好行为、什么是坏行为这个意义上作判断,显然不是耶稣所谴责的。可是,按照耶稣的教导,把这种讨论当作贬低别人或抬高自己的方式,这种论断人的态度肯定必须避免。也许最能说明「判断」与「论断人」之区别的例子,就是基督与行淫时被抓的妇人的著名故事(约 8:1)。基督并没有拒绝把她的行为称为有罪。事实上,这个故事的结尾是他说:「去吧!从今以后不要再犯罪了。」但耶稣在那个故事中最关心的,是阻止那妇人的同伴自以为义地谴责她(因为他们没有想起自己的罪),而不是像耶稣自己那样以爱来纠正她。

Yet it is just as sure that what Jesus is not condemning is recognizing faults in ourselves and others. The whole point of the Sermon on the Mount, for instance, is to explain how to live in accordance with the kingdom of God, and doing so entails recognizing, especially in ourselves, what actions run counter to that kingdom. In fact, Jesus gives explicit instruction on how to confront a peer whose behavior is damaging herself and the community (Matt. 18:15–17). Thus, judging in the sense of making distinctions about what is good and bad behavior is clearly not what Jesus denounces. Yet being judgmental, in the sense of using such discussion as a way to demean others or exalt one’s self, is surely what must be avoided, according to Jesus.Perhaps the finest example of this judgment vs. judgmentalism distinction is the famous story of Christ and the woman caught in adultery (John 8:1). Christ does not refuse to label her behavior sinful. Indeed, the story ends by his saying, “Go and sin no more.” Yet Jesus’s primary concern in that story is to stop the woman’s peers from self-righteously (in that they failed to recall their own sin) denouncing her, rather than lovingly correcting her, as Jesus himself does.

因此,接下来内容的语气意在是一种出于爱的判断,而不是论断人。正如上一句中「出于爱」这个词所表明的,判断与爱被判断的人是相容的,无论被判断的是自己还是别人。论断人的态度则与爱不相容。在这场艰难讨论中,一个可以采取的好立场是:如果你十几岁的孩子或手足来向你寻求关于何时发生性关系的指引,你会怎样和他谈这个话题?你会给他哪些准则,让他知道什么时候才合适?只有拒绝给出任何回应,你才会避免作判断;而当这个青少年正在寻求指引时,这肯定不符合他的最大益处。大概你会告诉他,你认为怎样才真正符合他的最大益处,并鼓励他照此行动。那就是在作判断,因为你想要对他最好的东西。希望你会避免论断人,也就是说,避免居高临下地支配他,或在他失败时谴责他。这就是这场讨论的语气。我们所寻求的规则,不是外在强加的义务,而是真正通向真实幸福生活的指引。因此,在这些困难问题上,我们能为别人和自己做的最有爱心的事,就是谦卑地努力说出真理,而不是告诉人们他们想听的话,因为真理才是对人真正最好的东西。

Thus, the tone of what follows is meant to be one of loving judgment, but not judgmentalism. As the use of the word “loving” in the previous sentence indicates, judgment is compatible with loving the person judged, whether one’s self or another. Judgmentalism is not compatible with love. A good stance to adopt in this difficult discussion is this: how would you address this topic with your teenage child or sibling who sought guidance from you on when to have sex? What lines would you offer him as to when to know the time is right? Only by refusing to offer any response would you avoid making judgments, and that would surely not be in the teenager’s best interest as he seeks guidance. Presumably you would tell him what you think is in his genuine best interest, and encourage him to act accordingly. That would be making a judgment, because you want what it best for him. You would hopefully avoid being judgmental, that is, lording it over him or condemning him if he fails. That is the tone of this discussion. We are seeking rules that are not externally imposed obligations, but true guides to a genuinely happy life. Thus, the most loving thing we can do for others and ourselves on challenging questions such as these is to humbly strive to speak the truth rather than tell people what they want to hear, since the truth is what is genuinely best for people.

还应注意的是,下文讨论的重点并不是归咎那些没有按照最佳规则生活的人。重点是确定哪些规则最能指导人们决定何时发生性关系。当然,这一讨论与归责有关,因为如果有人故意背离那些规则,就是在选择违背「正当理性、真理和良心」,这就是罪。但对具体个人进行归责,是一个虽相关却独立的问题。归责需要弄清某个具体的人知道什么,以及本来可以知道什么关于最佳生活方式的事。哪些社会影响塑造了这个人?(回想良心形成的重要性。)如果某人真诚地相信自己行得好,尽管其实并非如此(错误良心),那么她是否本可以知道并非如此(可克服的无知),还是不能知道(不可克服的无知)?

It should also be noted that the point of the following discussion is not to blame people who do not live in accordance with the best rules. The point is to determine what rules best guide decisions on when to have sex. Of course, that discussion is related to assignment of blame, since if someone deliberately turns away from those rules they are choosing against “right reason, truth, and conscience,” which is sin. But assignment of blame to particular persons is a separate, although related, issue. Assignment of blame requires ascertaining what an individual person knew and could have known about the best way to live. What societal influences have shaped the person? (Recall the importance of formation of conscience.) If someone genuinely believes she is acting well, even though she is not (erroneous conscience), could she have known otherwise (vincible ignorance) or not (invincible ignorance)?

正如爱尔兰主教们所指出的,人可能感觉自己是在以圣洁而有爱的方式行动,但实际上却是错的,并在伤害自己和别人。爱尔兰主教会议,《爱是为了生命》,15。关于「判断」与「论断人」的更多区分,另见74–76。 如果情况如此,这并不必然意味着此人没有责任。正如我们从前面的讨论中知道的,好意并不足以让人活得好;要活得好,还需要明智。尽管如此,归责的讨论与下文内容是不同的。

As the Irish bishops note, people can feel as if they are acting in a holy and loving manner but actually be wrong and harming themselves and others.Irish bishops, Love is for Life, 15. See also 74–76, for more on judging vs. judgmental-ism. If that is the case, it does not necessarily mean the person is without blame. As we know from an earlier discussion, meaning well is not enough; prudence is required to live well. Nonetheless, the assignment of blame is a discussion distinct from what follows.

关于本章的语气,最后还要指出:在这一问题上采取自己认为正确的立场,并不意味着一个人一直都活出了这个立场。持有某些信念的人,如果没有活出这些信念,常常会被称为伪君子。但这并不必然意味着他们就是伪君子。伪君子是那些声称相信以某种方式生活最好,却显明他们并不真正相信这种方式的人,因为他们甚至自己都不尝试这样生活。这不同于真正相信以某种方式生活最好,也确实努力活出来,但有时失败。

As a final observation on the tone of this chapter, it should be noted that taking what one believes to be the right stand on this issue does not mean one has always lived up to it. People who hold certain beliefs are often called hypocrites if they fail to live up to them. But that does not necessarily mean they are. Hypocrites are people who claim to believe it is best to live in a certain way, and yet reveal they do not truly believe in that way, since they do not even try to live that way themselves. This is different from truly believing it is best to live a certain way and indeed trying to live it out, but failing at times.

回想前面关于青少年的类比,希望你会教导自己的孩子,最好不要在背后说别人坏话。遗憾的是,这并不意味着你一直都遵守了这条规则。但你相信这是最好的生活方式,而且当你没有活出来时,你曾对自己感到失望。在这种情况下,你教导这条规则并不是伪善。性也是如此。如果你教导自己的手足或孩子如何最好地活出性——也就是贞洁——你未必一直都活出了自己所教导的。事实上,性是我们生命中如此具有挑战性的一个面向,以至于我会说,没有人在这个领域是没有罪的——无论是在思想、欲望还是行为上。但你教导这一点并不是伪善,除非你其实并不认为这是最好的生活方式。否则,我们就只能告诉自己的手足或孩子:想做什么就做什么吧,因为没有人是完美的。这里的重点是,真正爱自己和别人,意味着想要我们自己或他们的真实幸福。为了帮助自己和别人在性这个领域实现这一点,我们必须以爱和谦卑说出真理,始终寻求最好的生活方式,同时也以怜悯承认我们和别人都会失败。

To recall the teenager analogy, hopefully you would teach your child it is best not to talk behind people’s backs. Sadly, this does not mean you have always heeded this rule. But you believe it is the best way to live, and you have been disappointed in yourself when you have not lived it out. In this case you are not a hypocrite for teaching this rule. The same is true of sex. If you teach your sibling or child about how to best live sexuality—be chaste— you may not have always lived out what you teach. In fact, sexuality is such a challenging facet of our lives that I would suggest no one is without sin in this area—in thought, desire, or deed. But you are not a hypocrite to teach that, unless you do not really think it the best way to live. Otherwise, we would just have to tell our siblings or children to do whatever they want, because no one is perfect. The point here is that truly loving ourselves and others means wanting our or their true happiness. To help ourselves and others achieve that in the area of sexuality, we must speak the truth lovingly and humbly, always seeking the best way to live, while compassionately recognizing that we and others do fail.

性与婚姻之间的关系

The Relationship between Sex and Marriage

本节前两部分已经为下一节关于性与婚姻的论证说明了听众对象(不只是基督徒)和语气(谦卑而有爱的判断,而不是论断人)。在进入那个论证之前,重要的是先简要说明「性只有在婚姻中才完全有德」这一立场的理由。为什么要这样做?鉴于婚姻之外的性交在我们社会中十分普遍,支持走那条路的理由很容易摆在我们面前。但太常见的情况是,「性只有在婚姻中才有德」这种看法被提出时,却没有充分解释为什么它不只是某种禁忌,或旧时代的残余。这条规范背后有什么道理吗?当然有。现在的任务就是解释这种道理,为本章第二节作准备;第二节会更深入探讨对这种道理的挑战。

The first two parts of this section have helped set the audience (not just Christian) and tone (humble and loving judgment but not judgmentalism) for the next section’s argument on sex and marriage. Before entering into that argument, it is important to succinctly state the rationale of the position that sex is fully virtuous only within marriage. Why? Given the prevalence of sexual intercourse outside marriage in our society, the reasons for following that path are readily available to us. But too often the view that sex is only virtuous within marriage is presented without any adequate explanation of why it is more than some taboo, or residue of the olden days. Is there any reasoning behind this norm? There most certainly is. The task now is to explain that reasoning in preparation for the second section of this chapter, which will explore in more depth the challenges to this reasoning.

怎样才算在性生活中活出贞洁,或说有德?除了节制的问题之外,这也是明智的问题,因为我们是在寻求看清一种内在于世的活动(性),以便有德地行动。哪些规范指引有德的性?规范有很多,其中许多取决于个别伴侣。譬如,不同伴侣发生性关系的频率可能不同,方式也可能不同。也有一些规范是绝对的,因为它们适用于所有人,违背它们总是构成对性的糟糕使用。这里先假设这些规范,而不作论证。例如,缺乏同意与贞洁不相容。与已经和别人结婚的人发生性关系也与贞洁不相容。有许多规则或规范治理有德的性,有些是绝对的,有些不是。我们更具体的问题是:与一个没有和自己结婚的人发生性关系,是否曾经可能是有德的。

What constitutes living out one’s sex life chastely, or virtuously? Besides a question of temperance, this is also a question of prudence, since we are seeking to see clearly an innerworldly activity (sex) so as to act virtuously. What norms guide virtuous sex? There are plenty of norms, and many of them are up to individual couples. For instance, different couples may have sex with different frequencies, and go about it in different ways. There are some norms that are absolute in that they apply to all, and their violation always constitutes bad use of sexuality. These are assumed rather than argued here. For instance, lack of consent is incompatible with chastity. Having sex with someone who is married to someone else is incompatible with chastity. There are many rules, or norms, that govern virtuous sex, some absolute and some not. Our more specific question is whether or not having sex with someone without being married to that person is ever virtuous.

回答这问题,需要阐述「性意味着什么」,以及「婚姻意味着什么」;第二节会更详细探讨这两个问题。此处先说明:传统上反对婚姻之外的性,并不是武断的,好像婚姻只是某种许可证,让人可以毫无罪疚地发生性关系。首先,已婚并不是有德之性的唯一要求。换言之,在传统观点中,它是有德之性的必要条件,但不是充分条件。人在婚姻中有很多方式可以落入情欲,甚至是在与自己配偶发生性关系时也是如此。其次,婚姻长期以来之所以被视为有德之性的必要条件(即使不是充分条件),是因为婚姻和发生性关系这两种活动,被理解为具有相同的意义或目的。在基督徒传统里,婚姻由其三大益处来理解:忠贞(即排他性)、永久性,以及向新生命开放。即使是民事婚姻,也是一项承诺:在一种长期以来与生儿育女相关的关系中,无限期地与一个人(而不是其他人)在一起。

Answering this question requires some explanation of what sex means, and what marriage means. These are the two issues that are addressed in more detail in section two. It should be noted now that the traditional norm against sex outside of marriage is not arbitrary as if marriage were some license that enables one to have sex guilt-free. First of all, being married is not the only requirement for virtuous sex. In other words, in the traditional view it is a necessary, but not sufficient condition, for virtuous sex. There are plenty of ways to be lustful while married, even regarding sex with one’s spouse. Second, the reason why marriage has long been regarded as a necessary (even if not sufficient) condition for virtuous sex is because both activities—being married and having sex—have been understood to have the same meaning or purpose. In the Christian tradition, marriage is understood by its three goods: fidelity (i.e., exclusivity), permanence, and openness to new life. Even civil marriage is a pledge to remain with one person indefinitely, in a relationship that has long been associated with bearing children.

这与性有什么关系?性是一种把人结合在一起(排他地、并且随着时间持续)且导向子女的活动。这就是为什么基督徒和许多非基督徒过去和今天都主张,婚姻是性最好的家,或说最好的所在。《天主教教理》谈到指引性交的双重规则:它必须是生育性的合一性的《天主教教理》第二版(梵蒂冈城:Libreria Editrice Vaticana,1997),2363。 既然性作为一种活动意味着这些,那么人们出于这些理由去行,才是在有德地行。性在一对男女向新生命开放时就是生育性的;这不仅是愿意接纳由他们的性结合而来的孩子,也包括承诺好好照顾和养育这个孩子。请注意,有些生理原因,有的是暂时的,有的是永久的,可能会阻止孩子实际受孕。这就是为什么标准是「向新生命开放」,而不是已经生下新生命。一个人可能向新生命开放,却(常常令人难过地)始终没有孩子。这一规范所禁止的是,一边发生性关系,一边使其失去生育能力。这会引出避孕这个有争议的议题;它是相关主题,但超出本章范围。 性在一对男女已经彼此永久而排他地委身时就是合一性的(= 使人合一)。当这些事情真实地存在于一种关系中时,性就不只是被允许或许可;它是活出这种关系的一种合宜、美丽而有效的方式。这就是为什么性与婚姻属于彼此。

What does this have to do with sex? Sex is the sort of activity that binds people together (exclusively and over time) and leads to children. This is why Christians and many non-Christians alike have traditionally and today claimed that marriage is the best home, or place, for sex. The Catechism of the Catholic Church speaks of a twofold rule to guide sexual intercourse: it must be procreative and unitive.Catechism of the Catholic Church. 2nd ed. (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1997), 2363. Since this is what sex as an activity means, people do it virtuously when they do it for these reasons. Sex is procreative when the couple is open to new life, understood not only as being willing to have a child that comes from their sexual union, but also being committed to caring for and raising the child well.Note that there are biological reasons, some temporary and some permanent, that may prevent the actual conception of a child. That is why the criterion is “open to new life” rather than having given birth to new life. It is possible to be open to new life but (often sadly) never have a child. What is prohibited by this norm is having sex and at the same time making it infertile. This raises the contested issue of contraception, a related topic but beyond the scope of this chapter. Sex is unitive (= unifying) when the couple has committed themselves permanently and exclusively to each other. When these things are true of a relationship, sex is not simply allowed or permitted; it is an appropriate, beautiful, and effective way to live out that relationship. This is why sex and marriage belong together.

一对男女结婚之前发生性关系,按定义就不是完全合一性的。男人和女人还没有公开承诺,永久地与彼此(而不是其他任何人)在一起。事实上,婚前性也不是真正合乎生育性的。如果一对男女愿意接纳可能由他们的性结合而受孕的孩子,为什么还会如此呢?既然性的生育面向只有在一对男女愿意生养并好好养育孩子时才得到充分尊重,而婚姻又是养育孩子的最佳环境,那么婚前发生性关系也违背了性的生育面向。

Sex before a couple is married is by definition not fully unitive. The man and woman have not committed themselves publicly to stay with each other (and no one else) permanently. In fact, sex before marriage is not even properly procreative. How can this be if a couple is open to having a child that may be conceived from their sexual union? Since the procreative aspect of sex is only fully respected when a couple is open to having and raising the child well, and since marriage is the best environment in which to raise a child, then having sex before marriage also defies the procreative facet of sex.

这一基本立场还需补充几点。首先,请注意,虽然这里的主张是性只有在婚姻中才可能有德,但这并不是说所有非婚性行为都同等恶劣。显然,一对订婚男女在婚礼前发生性关系,和随意的一夜情之间有巨大差别。暴力性行为,与两个确实彼此相爱但还没有准备好永久委身于彼此的年轻成年人之间的性行为,也有巨大差别。但这不是这里的问题。本章的问题是:一种关系必须跨过哪条线,性才会是有德的?换言之,一种关系必须满足哪些条件,这对伴侣才能有德地发生性关系;更具体地说,已婚是否总是这些条件之一?非婚伴侣可能离这组条件很近,也可能很远。即使已经结婚的人,也可能没有满足使性有德的那组条件。但这里给出的答案是,在非婚关系中,某些条件本质上就是缺失的;这使得这对男女最好不要发生性关系。

Some nuances to this basic position must be addressed. First, note that though the claim here is that sex can only be virtuous in marriage, the claim is not that all extramarital sex is equally vicious. Obviously there is an enormous difference between an engaged couple having sex before their wedding, and a casual one-night stand. There is a huge difference between violent sex, and sex between young adults who do love each other but are not ready to commit themselves to each other permanently. But that is not the question here. The question for this chapter is: what is the line a relationship must cross for sex to be virtuous? In other words, what set of conditions should hold true of a relationship in order for the couple to have virtuous sex; and, more specifically, is being married always one of those conditions? Non-married couples may be close to, or far from, that set of conditions. And even people who are married may fail to meet the set of conditions that makes sex virtuous. But the answer offered here is that certain conditions are inherently absent from a non-married relationship that make it best for the couple not to have sex.

其次,说「婚姻是养育孩子的最佳关系」,并不等于说离婚、单亲或丧偶的父母不能把孩子养育得好。值得感恩的是,在所有这些环境中都有茁壮成长的孩子,正如在父母已婚却破碎或充满虐待的家庭中,也有孩子茁壮成长。但承认这一点,并不意味着这些因素对孩子如何被养育毫无影响。它们都会对孩子的养育产生负面影响,因此不应被追求。当然,这些情况都会发生;当它们发生时,我们希望(也感恩地看见)好事可以从中出来。但这仍然不同于有意以一种会导致这些处境的方式行动。

Second, saying that marriage is the best relationship to have children is not the same as saying children cannot be raised well by divorced, single, or widowed parents. Thankfully, thriving children have come from all these environments, as they have from broken or abusive households where the parents are married. But recognizing this does not mean that these factors make no difference in how children are raised. All have negative influence on how children are raised, and therefore should not be sought. All of course happen, and when they do we hope (and thankfully have seen) that good can come out of them. But again this is different than purposely acting in a manner that leads to these situations.

以上简要概述,足以呈现性和婚姻为什么属于彼此这一论证的核心。不用说,人们常常没有活出这一点。但那不是本章的焦点。本章的焦点是确定那些努力最充分、最幸福地生活的人,因此应当想要如何活出自己的性生活。按照目前呈现的立场,我们应当想要在婚姻中,而且只在婚姻中发生性关系,因为性的意义与婚姻的意义相对应,因此性是婚姻关系的一种美丽而合宜的表达。现在我们转向讨论的,不是那些把这看作最佳生活方式却有时失败的人,而是那些主张这不是活出一个人之性的理想方式的人。

This brief overview suffices to present the crux of the argument why sex and marriage belong together. It should go without saying that people often do not live this out. But that is not the focus of this chapter. The focus of this chapter is determining how people who strive to live most fully, most happily, therefore should want to live out their sex lives. According to the position presented thus far, we should want to have sex in, and only in, marriage since the meaning of sexuality corresponds with the meaning of marriage, and thus sex is a beautiful and fitting expression of a marriage relationship. We now turn to address not those who see this as the best way to live and sometimes fail, but rather those who claim this is not the ideal way to live out one’s sexuality.

关于婚姻之外是否可能有有德之性的辩论

Debating the Possibility of Virtuous Sex Outside of Marriage

关于为什么性交只有在婚姻关系中才是有德的,这一立场的核心依赖于一个主张:发生性关系和处在婚姻中,都是具有相应意义的人类活动。因此,说它们属于彼此是合理的。那么毫不意外,当人们质疑这一立场时,最常见的两种反驳就是:a)性并没有这种意义;和/或,b)婚姻并没有这种意义(或者至少婚姻并不是唯一具有这种意义的关系)。因此,这些反驳将用来构成本章第二节关于婚姻之外是否可能有有德之性的辩论结构。第一部分处理性意味着什么的问题。如果性交并不表示,或者至少不必总是表示,排他、永久、向新生命开放的爱,那么它也可以在非婚关系中安家。第二部分处理这样一种主张:即使性确实有这种意义,婚姻也不是唯一真正具有排他性、永久性并向新生命开放的关系。我们现在就转向这些问题。

The crux of the position on why sexual intercourse is only virtuous in a married relationship relies upon the claim that having sex and being married are human things to do that have corresponding meanings. Thus it makes sense that they belong together. Unsurprisingly then, when people contest this position, the two most common counterarguments are that: a) sex does not have this meaning; and/or, b) marriage does not have this meaning (or at least marriage is not the only relationship that has this meaning). Therefore these counterarguments will be used to structure this second section of the chapter on the debate over the possibility of virtuous sex outside of marriage. The first part addresses the question of what sex means. If sexual intercourse does not, or at least need not always, signify love that is exclusive, permanent, and open to new life, then it could be at home in non-married relationships too. The second part addresses the claim that even if sex does have this meaning, marriage is not the only relationship that truly is exclusive, permanent, and open to new life. To these issues we now turn.

性的目的或意义

The Purpose, or Meaning, of Sex

发生性关系的要点是什么?换言之,性是否有任何意义或目的?如果有,那是什么?是什么决定了性的意义,是行动本身的某些东西,还是只是这对男女想让它表达什么?性是否总是必须有同样的意义或目的?这些就是本节第一部分的问题。

What is the point of having sex? In other words, does sex have any meaning or purpose? If so, what is it? What determines the meaning of sex, something about the action itself, or simply whatever the couple wants it to express? And need sex always have the same meaning, or purpose? These are the questions for this first part of this section.

说性「意味着」某些东西是什么意思?

What Does It Mean to Say Sex “Means” Something?

在考察性意味着什么这个重要问题之前,我们必须先停下来解释「性意味着什么」这个短语的意思。说一项活动「意味着」某些东西,就是说这项活动有某种要点或目的。如何确定性的要点?我们这里不从关于性交本质的某种抽象讨论开始,而是从一个简单观察开始:我们的实践——我们做活动的方式——会显明我们认为这些活动意味着什么。通过考察人们何时发生性关系、何时不发生性关系,我们可以更好地具体说明这一特定行动意味着什么。当然,人们发生和不发生性关系的方式并没有一种完全一致的样式。但其中有显著的共同点。我们从这里开始,就能从共同实践中识别性的一般目的,然后用我们的发现来评估差异,看看不同方式是否都服务于这一目的,或者某些实践实际上违背了性的一般目的。

Before examining the important question of what sex means, we must first pause to explain the meaning of the phrase, “what sex means.” To say that an activity “means” something is to say that there is a point, or purpose, to the activity. How to determine the point of sex? Rather than start with some abstract discussion of the nature of sexual intercourse, we begin here with the simple observation that our practices—the way we do activities—reveal what we think those activities mean. By examining when people do and do not have sex, we can better specify what that particular action means. Of course, there is not one consistent way people do and do not have sex. But there is significant commonality. By starting there, we can identify the general purpose of sex from common practices, and then use what we find to evaluate differences to see if the different ways all serve that purpose, or if some practices actually defy the general purpose of sex.

先考虑一个没有争议的例子。像握手这样简单的记号意味着什么?人们在进入或维持某种关系时握手。它是和平与善意的具身记号。它可以伴随着别人把你介绍给朋友的朋友,或一笔商业交易的完成。它可以表示对老朋友或熟人的情意和友谊。观察我们何时以及如何与人握手,会显明这一行动意味着什么。有些情形下,握手是不合宜的。如果你久别之后和母亲握手,她很可能会觉得哪里不对劲!如果你还在为某人冒犯你的事和他争论,却向他伸出手,他很可能会觉得奇怪。这个动作不适合这些场合,正是因为它的意义。当然,文化和社会因素在具体说明这类身体行动的意义时非常重要。但即使承认存在显著的文化差异,这些差异也有一些边界。没有任何文化会把一拳打在脸上当作友谊和善意的记号!也没有任何地方把性交当作向新人介绍自己的常见方式。

Consider an uncontroversial example first. What does a simple sign like a handshake mean? People shake hands when they are entering into, or sustaining, some sort of relationship. It is an embodied sign of peace and goodwill. It may accompany an introduction to a friend’s friend, or the closing of a business deal. It may signify affection and friendship for an old friend or acquaintance. Looking at when and how we shake hands with people reveals what that action means. There are certain situations where a handshake would be inappropriate. If you shook your mother’s hand after a long absence, she would likely think something amiss! If you offered your hand to someone while still arguing with them about some offense they committed, they would likely think it odd. The gesture would not fit these occasions because of its meaning. Of course, cultural and social factors are very important in specifying the meanings of such bodily acts. But even granting significant cultural variation, there are some boundaries to those variations. In no culture is a punch in the face a sign of friendship and goodwill! Nowhere is sexual intercourse a commonly practiced way of introducing yourself to a new person.

行动的意义或要点,是判断某个姿势是否适合某个场合的重要方式。用第二章的术语来说,这是一种考察行动对象的方式。但只看行动对象并不足够。我们还必须考察行动者在进行该行动时的意图。例如,握手可能是结束一笔商业交易的合宜方式。但如果我们得知其中一个合伙人其实在欺骗另一个人,我们就会说,不只是这笔交易,连这个握手也是欺骗性的。虽然握手的对象或意义本身没有错,但行动者并没有意图表达那个意义。因此,行动的目的与行动者的意图之间出现了脱节。我们会称这样的人为欺骗者,并说他的行动(握手)在某种意义上是一个谎言,因为这个人的意图与这个姿势的意义不相符。在所有这些判断中,我们都必须注意相关情境。

The meaning, or point, of an action is an important way to determine if some gesture is fitting for an occasion. This is a way of looking at the object of the action, to use terminology from chapter 2. But looking at the object of the action alone is not adequate. We must also examine the agent’s intention in performing the action. For instance, a handshake may be an appropriate way to close a business deal. But if we learn that one of the partners was actually cheating the other, we would call not just the deal, but also the handshake, deceptive. Though there is nothing wrong with the object or meaning of a handshake, that meaning was not intended by the agent. Thus, there was a disconnect between the purpose of the act and the agent’s intention. We would call such a person deceptive, and say their act (the handshake) was a lie in some sense, since the person’s intention did not match the meaning of the gesture. In all this we would have to attend to the relevant circumstances.

因此,当我们问性意味着什么时,我们是在寻求确定性的要点或目的,以帮助我们判断它在哪些情形中是合宜的,好让我们在确实意指其所代表的意义时,才进行这一象征性行动。请注意,这里承认性意味着某些东西,或者有某种要点。如果性毫无意义,那么我们就不会关心什么时候发生性关系、和谁发生性关系,因为性会是没有要点的,或者字面上毫无意义。即使人们对性意味着什么有重大分歧,情况显然也不是这样。例如,如果性在字面上毫无意义,我们就不能说它在某些人之间是不合宜的(家庭成员、有配偶者和其情人、医生和病人等)。值得感恩的是,有些情形基本上一致被理解为不适合发生性关系的场合。用一个更容易理解的例子来说,如果你交往多年的男友或女友告诉你他们和别人发生了性关系,倘若性没有要点或意义,你为此难过就是荒谬的。你就必须像回应他们只是替别人扶了一下门,或做了其他简单姿势一样回应,因为这不会意味着任何东西。(事实上,就连这些姿势也有某种要点。)显然,情况并非如此;即使你被告知他们并不打算让它意味着任何东西,情况也不会如此。你很可能会回答说,即使他们本来想让它毫无意义,它仍然意味着某些东西!有争议的不是性是否有意义,而是它具有哪种意义。

Therefore, when asking what sex means, we are seeking to determine the point or purpose of sex, in order to help us determine in which situations it is appropriate so that we can perform this symbolic act when we mean what it stands for. Note that it is granted here that sex means something, or has some point. If there were no meaning whatsoever to sex, then we would be unconcerned when we had it and with whom, since sex would be pointless, or literally mean nothing. That is obviously not the case, even if there is significant disagreement about what sex means. For instance, if sex literally meant nothing, we could not say it was inappropriate between certain persons (family members, a married person and their lover, doctors and patients, etc.). Thankfully, there are certain situations that are basically unanimously understood as inappropriate venues for sex. To use a more accessible example, if your longtime boyfriend or girlfriend told you they had sex with someone else, it would be nonsensical to be upset about it if sex had no point or meaning. You would have to respond as if they simply held the door for someone, or did some other simple gesture, since it would not mean anything. (In fact, even these gestures have some point.) Clearly, that is not the case, nor would it be the case even if you were told that they did not intend it to mean anything. You would likely reply that even if they intended it to mean nothing, it still did mean something! What is contested is not whether sex has meaning, but which meaning it has.

这里也承认,性交在浪漫关系中是爱的表达。文化研究在这里有重要位置,因为适合性的场合并不总是、也并非在每个地方都是我们自己社会所理解的那种浪漫关系。见Lawrence Stone,「Passionate Attachments in the West in Historical Perspective」,载Amy Kass与Leon Kass编,Wing to Wing, Oar to Oar(Notre Dame, IN:University of Notre Dame Press,2000),38–44。Dame Press, 2000)。 尽管如此,鉴于本章范围,这里不会进行那项考察。此外,事实上即使没有浪漫爱情也可能有有德之性(比如在包办婚姻中),这并不能推翻下面关于性之意义的论证。今天更常见的问题是:在浪漫关系的哪个阶段,性交才是合宜的。我们现在就转向这个问题。

It is also granted here that sexual intercourse is an expression of love in romantic relationships. There is an important place for cultural studies here, since it has not always and everywhere been the case that the appropriate venue for sex is a romantic relationship of the sort we understand in our own society.See Lawrence Stone, “Passionate Attachments in the West in Historical Perspective,” in Wing to Wing, Oar to Oar ed. Amy Kass and Leon Kass (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 38–44. Dame Press, 2000). Nonetheless, given the scope of this chapter, that investigation will not be done here. Furthermore, the fact that romantic love need not be present in order for there to be virtuous sex (in, say, arranged marriages) does not defeat the following argument about the meaning of sex. The more common question today is at what stage in a romantic relationship is sexual intercourse appropriate. To that question we now turn.

性意味着什么?

What Does Sex Mean?

若已同意性确有意义,并关联到爱,那么它究竟表达哪种爱?毕竟,只说性意味着「我爱你」并不足够。我们生命中有很多我们所爱的人,却不会与他们发生性关系(家人、朋友、导师等)。如果性只是意味着我爱你,我们就会与这些人发生性关系。所以我们发生性关系,不只是为了说我爱你,而是为了说:「我以某种方式爱你」,这种方式并不适用于其他我们也真心爱的人。性表达的是哪些类型的爱?即便说性意味着我以浪漫方式爱你,也还不够。人们发生性关系的浪漫关系应当具有哪些特征?是否需要有浪漫之爱的感觉?如果需要爱的感觉,单凭这些感觉是否就足以使性变得合宜?如果是这样,我是否可以和几个不同的、我对其有这种感觉的人发生性关系,或者和一个刚认识、我对其有好感的人发生性关系?我们对这些问题的回答,有助于显明我们认为性的意义是什么。

So, granting that sex has a meaning and that it has to do with love, what exactly does sex mean? After all, saying sex means “I love you” is not enough. There are plenty of people in our lives whom we love, but with whom we do not have sex (family, friends, mentors, etc.). If sex simply meant I love you, we would have sex with these people. So we have sex not just to say I love you, but to say, “I love you in a certain way,” a way that is not true of other people whom we also truly love. What types of love does sex express? Even saying that sex means I love you in a romantic way is not enough. What should characterize a romantic relationship where people are having sex? Need there be feelings of romantic love? If feelings of love are needed, do they alone suffice to make sex appropriate? If so, can I have sex with several different people with whom I have such feelings, or have sex with someone I just met that I have a crush on? Our answers to these questions help reveal what we think the meaning of sex is.

爱尔兰主教们在一段优美描述中这样说明性的意义:

In a beautiful description of the meaning of sex, the Irish bishops claim:

性结合以非常深刻的方式说出「我爱你」。通过性结合,男人和女人彼此说:「我爱你。在全世界,没有别人是我以爱你的方式所爱的。我爱你,只因为你就是你。我希望你变得比现在更加美好。我想与你分享我的生命和我的世界。我希望你与我分享你的生命和你的世界。我希望我们一起建立新的生活、共同的未来,那将是我们的未来。我需要你。没有你我不能活。我需要你爱我,而且不只是现在,而是永远。我会忠于你,不只是现在,而是永远。我绝不会让你失望,也不会离你而去。我绝不会让任何人取代你。无论顺境逆境,我都会与你同在。我会为你负责,也希望你为我、为我们负责,无论发生什么。」爱尔兰主教会议,《爱是为了生命》,9。

Sexual union says, “I love you”, in a very profound way. By sexual union, a man and woman say to each other: “I love you. There is nobody else in all the world I love in the way I love you. I love you just for being you. I want you to become even more wonderful than you are. I want to share my life and my world with you. I want you to share your life and your world with me. I want us to build a new life together, a future together, which will be our future. I need you. I can’t live without you. I need you to love me, and to love me not just now but always. I will be faithful to you not just now but always. I will never let you down or walk out on you. I will never put anyone else in place of you. I will stay with you through thick and through thin. I will be responsible for you and I want you to be responsible for me, for us, no matter what happens.Irish bishops, Love is For Life, 9.

他们在这段有力文字中所说的性意味着的许多东西,并不是性所独有的。例如,希望我们生命中有许多人,我们可以对他们说:「我想与你分享我的生命和我的世界。我希望你与我分享你的生命和你的世界。」或者说:「我爱你,只因为你就是你。」我们大概可以对朋友或家人说这些话。但这里所说的许多内容关乎一种非常特定的关系,也就是婚姻。有几个短语描述忠贞的排他性,例如「在全世界,没有别人是我以爱你的方式所爱的」。更多短语则描述永久性:「我需要你爱我,而且不只是现在,而是永远」,以及「无论顺境逆境,我都会与你同在」,还有「我会忠于你,不只是现在,而是永远。」

Much of what they claim sex means in this powerful passage is not distinctive to sex. For instance, there are, hopefully, many people in our lives to whom we could say, “I want to share my life and my world with you. I want you to share your life and your world with me.” Or, “I love you for just being you.” Presumably we could say these things to a friend or family member. But much of what is said here concerns a very particular type of relationship, namely marriage. Several phrases describe faithful exclusivity, such as, “there is nobody else in all the world I love in the way I love you.” Even more describe permanence: “I need you to love me, and to love me not just now but always,” and, “I will stay with you through thick and thin,” and, “I will be faithful to you not just now but always.”

简言之,爱尔兰主教们主张,性是一种具身的沟通形式,具有内在意义,而这种意义就是排他且永久的爱。性的意义另有一个关键面向,将在下文描述。 性说出排他且永久的爱,无论发生性关系的人在发生性关系时是否意图这样说。因此,由于这种意义,性只适合发生在一对男女能够并且已经说明这一点的关系中。当然,他们发生性关系时不必正在说这句话,甚至不必正在想到它!但为了让性成为一个诚实的行动,他们的关系必须确实如此。如果确实如此,那么性就是这种爱的美丽、愉悦而有力的表达,也会进一步滋养这种爱。如果并非如此,爱尔兰主教们就主张,性是一个谎言。两个人正在用自己的身体说出他们并不意图说出的话。

In summary, the Irish bishops claim that sex is an embodied form of communication that has an inherent meaning, and that meaning is exclusive and permanent love.Another crucial facet of the meaning of sex is described below. It speaks exclusive and permanent love, regardless of whether or not those having sex are intending to say that when they have sex. Due to this meaning, therefore, sex is only appropriate in a relationship where a couple can and has stated just that. They need not be saying it or even thinking of it while having sex, of course! But it must be true of their relationship in order for sex to be an honest act. If it is, then sex is a beautiful, pleasurable, and powerful expression of, and further nourishment of, such love. If it is not, the Irish bishops claim that sex is a lie. Two people are saying something with their bodies that they do not intend.

显然,这一论证的核心在于主张:性的要点是永久、忠贞的爱。为了给爱尔兰主教们的主张提供脉络,不妨考虑一些替代看法。你可以想象一张图表,描绘一种关系不断上升的层次。它开始于两个人刚刚相遇并产生感觉,或者彼此倾心。接下来,也许会出现一种期待,即他们会在接下来的几天、几周或几个月里再次见面。然后出现对排他性的期待。换言之,在关系中的某个时点,双方都期待对方没有在和别人交往;如果对方这样做,就会正当地感到被背叛。然后事情也许变得更认真,不仅有排他性,甚至还开始对共同的未来计划持开放态度并进行讨论。在这个阶段,这段关系至少会成为决定是否搬家、接受什么工作等问题时的一个因素。这一点尤其可见于这样的伴侣:至少其中一人即将上大学或大学毕业,正在考虑转换职业,或搬迁到别处。在某个时点,可能会出现明确的希望,甚至期待,即两人将永久在一起,通常是在婚姻中。如果婚姻确实是目标,那么婚姻本身之前通常会有一段订婚期。

Obviously, the heart of this argument lies in the claim that the point of sex is permanent, faithful love. In order to contextualize the Irish bishops’ claim, consider some alternatives. Imagine a graph charting the ascending levels of a relationship, if you will. It starts at two people just meeting and having feelings, or falling for each other. Next, perhaps, comes an expectation that they will see each other again in coming days, weeks, or months. Then comes an expectation of exclusivity. In other words, at some point in the relationship, each expects the other is not seeing someone else, and would rightly feel betrayed if that were the case. Then perhaps things get more serious, such that there is not only exclusivity, but even openness to and discussion of future plans together. At this stage the relationship is at least a factor in decisions of whether to move, what job to take, and so on. This is seen especially in couples where at least one person is going off to or graduating from college, considering a career change, or relocating. At some point there may come an explicit hope, and even expectation, that the two will stay together permanently, often in marriage. If marriage is indeed the goal, then a period of engagement generally precedes the marriage itself.

在这张整齐的小图表中,随着委身层次不断上升,有三点需要注意。第一,关系可以停在其中任何一个阶段并结束,或者不再继续发展。第二,你可以加入、合并或删除任何特定阶段。这里的重点并不是精确划分关系究竟如何发展,而只是具体说明并想象性会在图中哪里进入。第三,同居并没有被列为一个阶段,因为它几乎可以在上述任何阶段成为关系的一部分。

In this tidy little graph of ascending levels of commitment, three things should be noted. First, the relationship can stop at any one of these and end, or go no further. Second, you could add in, combine, or eliminate any particular stage. The point here is not a precise delineation of how exactly relationships develop. It is simply to specify and imagine where sex enters into the picture. Third, living together is not given as a stage since it can become part of the relationship at nearly any of the above stages.

我们的问题是:在哪个阶段,性才是表达这种关系的合宜方式?回答这个问题,会显明一个人认为性意味着什么。如果你认为一旦有了排他性,性就是合宜的,你就同时是在说,性传达的是一种「我爱你」,即排他的浪漫之爱,并且人在这种情况出现之前不应发生性关系。如果你认为只有已婚伴侣才应发生性关系,你就是在说,性意味着一种我爱你;这种爱不仅是排他的,而且已被许诺为永久,并向新生命开放。你也在说,未处于这样一种婚姻关系中的伴侣不应发生性关系。

Our question is, at what stage is sex an appropriate way to express such a relationship? Answering this question reveals what one thinks sex means. If you think sex is appropriate once there is exclusivity, you are simultaneously saying that sex conveys an “I love you” that is exclusive romantic love, and that one should not have sex before that is the case. If you think only those couples who are married should have sex, you are saying that sex means an I love you that is not only exclusive but vowed to be permanent, and open to new life. You are also saying couples who are not in such a married relationship should not have sex.

显然,不同的人会活出不同看法,认为性在这条光谱上的各个位置都是合宜的。所以我们很容易说,性可以意味着任何我们想让它意味着的东西。对有些人来说,它只是单纯的消遣性快感。对另一些人来说,它是排他的自我奉献之爱的表达。对还有一些人来说,它是排他、永久并向新生命开放的自我奉献之爱的表达。没有人会怀疑,不同的人确实以这些不同方式生活。问题是:性是否有任何内在意义,以至于我们可以告诉某人,他们所在的关系并不是适合性的场合,因为他们并不意图说出性所意味着的东西?

Clearly there are different people who live out the view that sex is appropriate at each of the spots on this spectrum. So it is tempting to say that sex can mean whatever we want it to mean. For some it’s a simply recreational pleasure. For others it’s an expression of exclusive self-giving love. For others it’s an expression of exclusive self-giving love that is permanent and open to new life. No one can doubt that different people live in these different ways. The question is, does sex have any inherent meaning, such that we might tell someone the relationship they are in is not an appropriate venue for sex because they do not intend to say what sex means?

往往到了这里,基督信仰这类宗教传统中的人会援引自己传统特有的权威,说一些诸如「圣经说不可行淫乱!」或者「创世记2:24说『二人成为一体』,清楚表明这是要在婚姻中发生」之类的话。这都很好;基督教启示确实提供了额外资源,使基督徒能够更好理解性这样的内在于世活动。许多天主教徒发现,一种名为「身体神学」的性观,能够在信仰与门徒身份的脉络中,对性提供很有说服力的说明。身体神学主要由教宗若望保禄二世明确阐述。见他那本相当艰深的《他创造了他们:男人与女人——身体神学》,Michael Waldstein 译(波士顿:Pauline Books and Media,2006)。也有许多对若望保禄思想的通俗呈现,准确程度不一。一个特别流行的例子是Christopher West的《性与婚姻的好消息》(Ann Arbor, MI:Servant Publications,2004)。虽然几乎所有通俗呈现都有许多有帮助之处,但这里并不整体认可其中任何一种。 但既然性是一种内在于世的活动,我们就可以相信,这些启示规范背后的推理,确实可以由我们运用理性来理解,即使这可能很困难,而且我们并不都以同样方式看见它。那么,爱尔兰主教们为什么主张性具有他们所说的意义,使它只有在婚姻中才合宜而诚实?我们对性有哪些认识,使这种主张可信?这里给出两个答案。

This is the place people of religious traditions like Christianity commonly cite some authority specific to their tradition and say things like, “the Bible says not to fornicate!” Or, “Genesis 2:24 makes it clear in its claim that the ‘two become one flesh’ that this is meant to happen in marriage.” This is all well and good, and Christian revelation does indeed offer additional resources to enable Christians to better understand innerworldly activities like sex.Many Catholic people have found an approach to sexuality called “theology of the body” to be a compelling account of sexuality in the context of faith and discipleship. The theology of the body was explicitly articulated primarily by Pope John Paul II. See his rather dense Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body, trans. Michale Waldstein (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 2006). There are also numerous popular portrayals of John Paul’s thought, done with varying degrees of accuracy. One particularly popular example is Christopher West’s The Good News about Sex and Marriage (Ann Arbor, MI: Servant Publications, 2004). Though nearly all contain much that is helpful, no one popular presentation is endorsed here in its totality. But since it is an innerworldly activity, we can trust that the reasoning behind these revealed norms can indeed be understood by us using our reason, even if it may be difficult and we do not all see it the same way. So why do the Irish bishops claim sex has the meaning it does, which makes it appropriate and honest only in marriage? What do we know about sex that makes this claim credible? Two answers are offered here.

首先,性是一种有力的身体行动,会使人在身体和情感上结合在一起。性是愉悦的,但它不止如此。两个人确实在身体上结合。赤裸而脆弱,笨拙而尴尬,渴望并被渴望,两个人以身体联合,其方式比我们采用的其他重要身体沟通形式(微笑、握手、亲吻等)更有力、更亲密。它不只是已经存在的爱的记号,虽然它也是这一点。它还会通过其亲密性进一步把这种爱铭刻进去。性确实会把人结合在一起。

First, sex is a powerful bodily act that bonds people together physically and emotionally. Sex is pleasurable, but it is more than that. Two people are literally joined in their bodies. Naked and vulnerable, clumsy and awkward, longing and longed for, two people unite bodily in a manner that is more powerful and intimate than other important forms of bodily communication we employ (smiles, handshakes, kisses, etc.) It is not just a sign of love that is already there, although it is that too. It also helps further ingrain that love through its intimacy. Sex works in bonding people together.

有许多证据显示,性的意义是强有力地把人结合在一起。科学家描述了性在伴侣身上带来的荷尔蒙变化。但也许最常见的证据,是性会改变伴侣如何看待彼此,以及别人如何看待这对男女。我们会假定发生过性关系的一对男女,分享着某种不同于其他友谊和亲密关系的亲密。双方各自的朋友通常会把那位朋友的伴侣看作在浪漫上不可接近的人,以某种方式与他们的朋友连接在一起,意味着现在他们已经不可触碰。性也会使伴侣以不同方式看待彼此。一种联结被建立起来;即使只是「约炮」并发生随意性关系的两个人,如果很快又见到彼此,通常也会感到尴尬。一个身体上的连接已经形成,却与他们在其他层面(情感、心智、灵性等)上的关系,或缺乏关系,不成比例。这也就是为什么我们可以告诉一个伴侣,虽然发生了性关系,但我们并不打算认真起来,也许他或她会同意;可是在这种情形中仍然会有人受伤,因为尽管我们用言语这样说,我们用身体所说的却有重要不同。

There is much evidence for the meaning of sex as powerfully bonding. Scientists describe hormonal changes that sex brings about in partners. But perhaps the most common evidence is the difference sex makes in how partners view each other, and how others view the couple. We assume that a couple who has had sex shares some intimacy that is different than other friendships and intimacies. Friends of each person in the couple generally view that friend’s partner as unavailable romantically, somehow connected to their friend in a way that means they are now off-limits. Sex also leads the partners to view one another differently. A bond is established, and even two people who have “hooked up” and had casual sex generally feel awkward if they see each again soon afterward. A bodily connection was made that was disproportionate to their relationship, or lack thereof, on other levels (emotional, mental, spiritual, etc.) It is also why we can tell a partner that we do not intend to get serious despite having sex, and perhaps he or she will agree; yet someone still gets hurt in that scenario, since despite what we say with our words, what we are saying with our bodies is importantly different.

这里马上有人会反驳说,有些人随意发生性关系,毫不在乎;他们似乎并没有与伴侣结合在一起,也不会在没有相应关系的性接触之后感到尴尬。承认吧,确实有这样的人。但因此就得出结论说性没有内在的结合意义,这很像是因为酗酒者喝得太多,就说我们不能说明多少酒才是有德的。令人惊讶的是,即使像饮食这样更明显受健康问题限制的事情,人也能扭曲自己,形成坏习惯,以至于习惯于各种实际上对自己有害的活动。性当然也可能如此。

One can immediately object here that this is clearly not the case for some people who have sex casually without a care in the world, who do not seem to be bonded to their partners, or who do not feel awkward after sexual encounters without a proportionate relationship. Granted, there are people like this. But concluding that sex therefore has no inherent bonding meaning is much like saying that we cannot specify what amount of alcohol is virtuous due to the example of alcoholics, who drink too much. Amazingly, even with things like food and drink that are more clearly limited by health concerns, human persons manage to warp themselves, to form bad habits, so as to become persons who are used to all sorts of activities that are actually bad for them. Surely the same can be true of sex.

所有这些轶事性证据都表明,性确实会把人结合在一起,即使在看起来并非如此意图的情形中也是这样。承认吧,这并不是一个一锤定音的论证,不能决定性地证明性意味着排他而永久的爱。这里正是一个好例子,说明即使是内在于世的活动,其意义在我们中间也可能有争议,尽管它们是内在于世的(即自然法事项)。不过,虽然无法加以演示,把性的意义理解为永久而排他的说法仍最有说服力。相爱的伴侣确实可以发生性关系并结合在一起,即使他们并不意图说自己是永久而排他的。但这样做时,他们是在使用一种强有力而亲密的沟通形式,来表达一种也许强烈而真诚、却在排他性和永久性上没有完全委身的爱。这样做时,他们夺去了性原本能够表示并进一步滋养一种真正完全委身之关系的能力。虽然性确实发挥作用,并且有力地把人结合在一起,以表示和滋养他们忠贞的永久性,但只有当发生性关系的人怀有这种意图时,性才在其意义上完全有效。若不是如此,在这种关系之外发生性关系的人,不仅是用身体说出他们并不意图说的话,从而说谎;他们也耗散了自己性的力量,满足于一种也许真诚且有爱的性表达,但那根本还没有成为它本来能够成为的一切。

All of this anecdotal evidence suggests that sex works in bonding people together, even in situations where that does not seem to be the intent. Granted, this is not a knock-down argument proving definitively that sex means exclusive permanent love. Here is a good example of how the meaning of even innerworldly activities may not be uncontested among us even though they are innerworldly (i.e., matters of natural law). But though not demonstrable, the case for the meaning of sex as permanent and exclusive is most persuasive. Loving couples can indeed have sex and bond together even if they do not intend to say they are permanent and exclusive. But in doing so, they use a powerfully intimate form of communication to speak a love that may be strong and genuine, but not fully committed in its exclusivity and permanence. In doing so, they rob sex of its capacity to signify and further nourish a relationship that is truly fully committed. Though sex works, and powerfully bonds people to signify and nourish their faithful permanence, it is only fully effective in its meaning when that is the intention of those who have sex. When it is not, people who have sex outside such a relationship not only lie by speaking with their bodies that which they do not intend; they also dissipate the power of their sexuality and settle for sexual expression that may be genuine and loving, but is simply not all it is capable of being.

到目前为止,本文的主张是,性具有基督教传统所称的合一性,或使人合一的意义。它表示并维系忠贞、永久的关系。但性所意味着的第二件事,到目前为止还没有谈到。是的,性似乎会把人结合在一起。但如果说性有一件事肯定会做,那就是生育孩子。性是生孩子的一种方式,也是我们每个人来到这里的原因。请注意,第一批不是由性交受孕,而是通过体外受精受孕的孩子,现在已经是年轻成年人了。虽然这一主张对他们并不成立,但性仍然确实会导向孩子。 这称为性的生育性意义。爱尔兰主教们这样描述它:

Thus far the claim has been that sex has what the Christian tradition has called a unitive, or unifying, meaning. It signifies and sustains faithful, permanent relationships. But the second thing that sex means has been neglected so far. Yes, sex seems to bond people together. But if there is one thing that sex does for sure, it is to engender children. Sex is a way to have kids, and is the reason why each of us is here.Note that the first children conceived not as a result of intercourse, but through in vitro fertilization, are now young adults. Though this claim is not true of them, it is nonetheless still the case that sex leads to children. This is called the procreative meaning of sex. The Irish bishops describe it this way:

性结合说出一个男人愿意或准备好把一个孩子「给予」一个女人,作为她的孩子,也说出一个女人准备好「与他」生育或「拥有」一个孩子。它说出男人和女人准备好敞开自己,在一个将成为「他们的孩子」的孩子身上分享他们的存在;这个孩子将是他们之爱的表达,是他们共同生活的纽带。它说出男人和女人渴望「一起开始一个新生命」,既以他们孩子的形式,也以围绕这个孩子的共同生活的形式。爱尔兰主教会议,《爱是为了生命》,11。

Sexual union speaks of a man’s willingness or readiness to “give” a child to a woman as hers, and of a woman’s readiness to bear or “have” a child “with him.” It speaks of a man and a woman’s readiness to openness to share their being in a child which will be “their child,” the expression of their love, the bond of their shared life. It speaks of a man’s and a woman’s desire to “begin a new life together,” both in the form of their child and in the form of their shared life around that child.Irish bishops, Love is For Life, 11.

再说一次,一对男女在发生性关系时,并不需要口头上、甚至有意识地怀有这种意图。但在发生性关系时,他们正在参与一种具有这种意义的行动,无论他们是否意图这个意义(因此才有「意外怀孕」这种说法)。爱尔兰主教们雄辩地陈述了基督教传统一贯的肯定:性具有生育性的意义;显然,一个人并不需要是基督徒也能认识到这一点。当然,鉴于今天避孕的普遍和有效,一对男女可以尝试阻止性成为生育性的行动,而且常常能够成功。但即使这种把生育性与性交行为分离的做法,似乎也承认了性的这种内在意义。虽然这里显然可以探讨避孕之道德性这一有争议的问题,但本章范围不允许在此讨论。至于性具有生育性在基督教传统中是一贯主张这一点,请注意,即使那些肯定节育可允许的基督徒,也是以自称尊重性的生育性的方式来这样做。事实是否如此,则是另一个讨论的主题。

Again, a couple need not verbally or even consciously have this intention while having sex. But in having sex they are engaging in an act that has this meaning, whether they intend that meaning or not (hence the expression, unintended pregnancy). The Irish bishops eloquently state the Christian tradition’s consistent affirmation that sex has a procreative meaning, an affirmation that one clearly need not be Christian to recognize.Of course, given the prevalence and effectiveness today of contraception, a couple can try to prevent sex from being a procreative act, often successfully. But even this separation of procreativity from acts of sexual intercourse seems to acknowledge that inherent meaning of sex. Though this is an obvious occasion to explore the contested issue of the morality of contraception, the scope of this chapter precludes that discussion here. As for the claim that the procreative nature of sex is a consistent claim in the Christian tradition, note that even Christians who affirm the permissibility of birth control do so in ways that purport to respect the procreative nature of sex. Whether that is in fact the case is a topic for another discussion.

关于性的生育性和合一性意义,这里适合提出两点观察。首先,爱尔兰主教们接着描述性交这两种意义之间的相互关联。

Two observations are fitting here concerning the procreative and unitive meanings of sex. First, the Irish bishops go on to describe the interconnectedness of these two meanings of sexual intercourse.

性结合的两种意义彼此交融。一个真正而诚实地表达男人和女人之间完全、终身、排他之结合的性结合行动,也是一个向孩子这一新生命开放的行动。如果这个行动被故意阻止向新生命开放,这只能是通过在这个赋予生命的行动中引入某种障碍或分离。但故意把分离引入一个意图并说出完全结合的行动,就是在真理上失败。爱尔兰主教会议,《爱是为了生命》,12。

The two meanings of sexual union blend into each other. An act of sexual union which truly and honestly expresses total and life-long and exclusive union between a man and woman is also an act which is open to new life in a child. If the act is deliberately prevented from being open to new life, this can only be by the introduction of some barrier or separation into the life-giving act. But deliberately to introduce separation into an act which intends and says total union is a failure in truth.Irish bishops, Love is For Life, 12.

虽然爱尔兰主教们强调,不向新生命开放的性交因此也不是完全使人合一的,但也可以说,并非忠贞永久之表达的性交,也不是完全生育性的。这就引向第二点观察。性的生育性意义,并不只是愿意接纳由性受孕的孩子。它还包括愿意照顾和养育这个孩子。对孩子的正义,以及对显然会受到意外怀孕影响的更广泛社会的正义,都要求孩子在一种人们承诺共同照顾这个孩子的关系中出生。正如本章前面指出的,有时这并没有发生。而且,值得感恩的是,在并非如此的环境中,孩子也可以成长得很好。但如果我们假定,孩子最好由爱孩子也彼此相爱的父母养育,那么以一种并不完全合一的方式发生性关系,也就同时冒犯了性的生育性本质。

Though the Irish bishops emphasize that sexual intercourse which is not open to new life is therefore also not fully unifying, it could also be said that sexual intercourse that is not an expression of faithful permanence is also not fully procreative. This leads to the second observation. The procreative meaning of sex is not simply openness to having a child that is conceived from sex. It is a willingness to care for and raise that child. Justice to the child, and justice to a wider society that is clearly impacted by unintended pregnancy, dictates that having a child occur in relationship where people are committed to care for that child together. As noted earlier in this chapter, sometimes this does not happen. And, thankfully, children can grow up well in environments where that is not the case. But assuming that a child is best raised by parents who love the child and each other, having sex in a manner that is not fully unitive simultaneously offends the procreative nature of sex.

在本章继续往下之前,还需要处理最后一个论证。有些人声称,我们可以承认这里所表达的看法:性的意义只有在一种忠贞永久并向养育新生命开放的关系中,才得到充分尊重,因此才被做好。然而,他们继续说,虽然这是他们活出自己之性的最终目标,但人在生命中的某些时候,仍可能为了另一种意义而发生性关系(单纯为了快感,甚至是为了真诚的爱,但这种爱并不是忠贞永久并向新生命开放的),然后在后来某个时点,再以一种成全其意义的方式发生性关系。难道我们现在不能更随意地发生性关系,或者至少在尚未完全委身的关系中发生性关系,同时又意识到我们最终希望以一种表达性之完整意义的方式来活出自己的性生活吗?事实上,也许我们这样做还很重要,好在排他而永久地委身于对方之前,先在所有层面(包括性)试验一段关系!

One final argument needs to be addressed before moving on in this chapter. Some claim it is possible to grant the view expressed here that the meaning of sex is only fully respected, and therefore done well, in a relationship that is faithfully permanent and open to nurturing new life. Yet, they continue, while that is their ultimate goal in living out their sexuality, it is possible to engage in sex for a different meaning at certain times in one’s life (for pleasure alone, or even for genuine love, but which is not faithfully permanent and open to new life), and then at some later point engage in sex in a manner that fulfills its meaning. Can’t we have sex now more casually, or at least not in a fully committed relationship, even while realizing that eventually we want to live out our sex lives in a manner that expresses the full meaning of sex? In fact, perhaps it is important that we do so, in order to try out a relationship on all levels (including sex) before committing exclusively and permanently to the other person!

这是对「性只有在婚姻中才完全有德」这一立场最常遇到的反驳。实际上,这些人承认这个主张,却认为在这种关系出现之前,性也可以是可允许的,只是在当下意味着较少的东西。但这一立场有一个重要问题,而且这完全关系到本书对发展德行的依赖。德行是善用某种人类能力(比如性)的习惯。这里相关的德行是贞洁,相关的恶习是情欲。德行使我们倾向于某一类行动。它不仅使我们倾向于进行某些类型的行动,也使我们倾向于带着某种意向性、从而带着某种意义来进行这些行动。意图塑造我们行动的意义,而德行就是倾向于带着某种意义持续行动的倾向。持有刚才所描述立场的人,实际上是在培养一种以某种意义运用自己之性的习惯,即把性当作快感的表达——或者也许是当作真诚却没有完全委身之爱的表达。他们正在把自己塑造成这样一种人:对他们而言,性意味着的东西并不是忠贞的永久性和向新生命开放。这样的人实际上承认,性意味着某种更美丽、更有力的东西,却把自己发展成这样的人:对他们而言,性意味着不同的东西。这种不一致应当很清楚。但问题并不只是理智上的不一致。如果我们通过发展习惯而成为我们所做的那种人,而性的完整意义又正是这些人所承认的那样,那么这样的人实际上是在阻止自己发展出能使他们最真实、最幸福地生活的性习惯。即使这样一对真心相爱的伴侣最终结婚,他们的性交也并不意味着向新生命开放的忠贞永久性。他们已经把它发展成了别的样子。他们能改变吗?值得感恩的是,可以。但贪婪、嫉妒或贪食的人也可以改变。人们能够纠正坏习惯这一事实,当然不能成为一开始就发展坏习惯的正当理由!而且,当然,拥有以不同方式运用其性的习惯,会使他们将来更倾向于这样做。

This is by far the most common objection encountered to the position that sex is only fully virtuous in marriage. In effect these people grant this claim, but think sex can be permissible before such a relationship is present, and simply mean less at the present time. But there is an important problem with this position, and it has everything to do with this book’s reliance on developing virtues. A virtue is a habit of using some human capacity (like sex) well. The relevant virtue here is chastity, and the relevant vice is lust. Virtues incline us to acts of a certain sort. They not only incline us to perform certain types of actions, but also to perform those acts with a certain intentionality, and thus meaning. Intentions shape the meaning of our actions, and virtues are inclinations to consistent acts with a certain meaning. People who hold the position just described are in effect developing a habit of exercising their sexuality with a certain meaning, namely, as an expression of pleasure—or perhaps, as an expression of love that is genuine but not fully committed. They are shaping themselves to be the sorts of persons for whom sex means something that is not faithful permanence and open to new life. Such people in effect recognize that sex means something more beautiful and powerful, but develop themselves into people for whom sex means something different. The inconsistency should be clear. But the problem is not simply intellectual inconsistency. If we become what we do through the development of habits, and the full meaning of sexuality is what these people grant it is, then such people in effect prevent themselves from developing sexual habits that will enable them to live most truthfully, most happily. Even should such a couple who truly loves one another eventually get married, their sexual intercourse does not mean faithful permanence open to new life. They have developed it differently. Can they change? Thankfully, yes. But so can people who are greedy, envious, or gluttonous. The fact that people can rectify a bad habit is surely no argument justifying the development of the bad habit in the first place! And, of course, having the habit of exercising their sexuality differently inclines them to do so more in the future.

概括而言,本节第一部分一直在努力确定性的要点或意义是什么。这里的主要主张并不是性有某种要点或意义——这一点已经承认了。第一个主要主张是,由于性是这样一种行动,性具有排他、永久且向新生命开放的爱的意义。因此,当这对男女在发生性关系时意图表达的正是这一点,性才是有德地被行出来。如果他们并非如此,他们所说的与他们所意指的之间就有脱节。第二个主要主张是,由于我们把自己的能力发展成德行或恶习的方式,性具有稳定的要点或意义,即使这对男女希望性按照他们的关系状态意味着不同东西。这两个主张都导向一个结论:性只有在一种永久、排他、向新生命开放的关系中才是完全有德的。那种关系就是婚姻。我们现在转向这样一个问题:那种关系是否只能存在于婚姻中。

In summary, this first part of this section has sought to determine what the point, or meaning of sex is. The main claim here is not that sex has some point, or meaning—granted. The first main claim is that due to the sort of action it is, sex has a meaning of exclusive, permanent love that is open to new life. Therefore, sex is done virtuously when this is what the couple intends to express while having sex. If they do not, there is a disconnect between what they say and what they mean. The second main claim is that, due to the way we develop our capacities into virtues or vices, sex has a stable point or meaning even if the couple wishes it to mean different things according to their states of relationship. Both of these claims lead to the conclusion that sex is fully virtuous only in a permanent, exclusive, relationship that is open to new life. That sort of relationship is marriage. To the question of whether that sort of relationship can only be in marriage we now turn.

婚姻到底有什么大不了?

What’s the Big Deal about Marriage?

过去几年教授这个主题时,比较令人惊讶的一点是,学生通常承认性交具有上一节所描述的意义。对性的排他性的肯定,甚至承认性与生孩子密不可分,都不那么令人惊讶。令人瞩目的是,大家常常承认性意味着永久的爱,因此它在完全委身的关系中才是合宜的。我一直以为,承认这一点就是讨论的终点。结论:性只有在婚姻中才是完全有德的。但要得出这一结论,还需要再走一步——对许多学生来说是相当大的一步。为什么已婚才是完全委身之关系的唯一描述?事实上,这正是许多学生在讨论何时性才是完全有德时,花绝大多数时间辩论的问题。

One of the more surprising things about teaching this topic over the past few years has been that students generally recognize that sexual intercourse has the meaning described in the previous section. The affirmation of sexual exclusivity, and even the recognition that sex is inextricably linked to having children, is less surprising. What is striking is the common recognition that sex means permanent love, and thus is at home in a fully committed relationship. I had always assumed that recognizing this was the end of the discussion. Conclusion: sex is only fully virtuous in marriage. But there is one more step—for many students a rather large one—required to draw this conclusion. Why is being married the only descriptor of a fully committed relationship? This is actually the question that many students spend a clear majority of time debating in their discussions of when sex is fully virtuous.

即使承认前面对性之意义的看法,人们仍会提出三种常见反驳,反对必须结婚才能拥有这样一种关系。第一,人们可以理解地抱怨,婚礼常常更多在说明财富和地位,而不是说明一对男女的关系,因此在讨论何时有德地发生性关系时并无道德相关性。第二,人们常常声称,即使没有彼此作出婚姻誓言,他们也可以完全委身。第三,人们常常声称,婚姻本应表示的一切,都可以不靠一张说某人已婚的纸而拥有。接下来一部分将围绕这三种反驳展开。

Even granting the previous view of what sex means, three common objections are offered against the need to be married in order to have such a relationship. First, people understandably gripe that weddings too often say more about wealth and status than they do about a couple’s relationship, and so are not morally relevant when discussing when to have sex virtuously. Second, people often claim they can be fully committed without having made marriage vows to each other. And third, people often claim that everything marriage is supposed to signify can be had without a piece of paper that says one is married. These three objections will structure the next part.

婚姻到底是什么?

What Is Marriage Anyway?

在讨论婚姻的道德重要性时,总会出现一组论证,包括这样的说法:「我不需要礼服或盛大的派对,才知道我们的爱是真实的」;或者「钻戒、豪华轿车或礼服,更多关乎展示你有多少钱,而不是一段关系有多委身。」换言之,人们之所以否定婚姻的道德相关性,部分理由是他们拒斥许多人庆祝婚礼的方式。婚姻和婚礼有什么区别?

When discussing the moral importance of marriage, one set of arguments that always comes up includes claims such as: “I do not need a dress or big party to know that our love is real;” or “diamond rings, limousines, or tuxedos have more to do with showing how much money you have than with how committed a relationship is.” In other words, some of the reasons people dismiss the moral relevance of marriage are based on a rejection of how many people celebrate weddings. What is the difference between marriage and a wedding?

婚礼仪式是一个事件。在我们的社会里,无论一个人的宗教传统是什么,这通常都包括美丽的场地(可能在礼拜场所,也可能不在)、华丽的服装、奢华宴会厅里昂贵的餐食、精美的蛋糕和开放式酒吧。虽然当代婚礼的这些特征本身未必有什么内在错误,但合在一起,它们常常让人觉得婚礼的目的不只是庆祝婚姻誓言,而是一个展示主办者社会地位和财富的场合。这里不是判断婚礼当天究竟怎样筹划才有德的地方;已有其他作者很好地处理了这个问题。其中一位特别值得一提的是Julie Hanlon Rubio。见她优秀著作《婚姻与家庭的基督教神学》(纽约:Paulist,2003)第二章。请注意,婚礼当天奢华的问题并不只是当代美国的问题。见圣约翰·金口(Rubio书中有所讨论)对他五世纪希腊听众所作的讲道,谈基督徒在庆祝婚姻时不应忘记自己的信仰和真正重要的东西。 这里的重点是,反对婚礼当天奢华的论证(这些论证往往正中要害)并不是反对婚姻的论证。为什么不是?

A wedding ceremony is an event. In our society, no matter what one’s religious tradition, this often entails a beautiful setting (which may or may not be in a house of worship), fancy dress, expensive meals at lavish event halls, ornate cakes, and open bars. While there may be nothing inherently wrong with any of these features of contemporary weddings, taken together they often suggest that the purpose of the wedding is not simply the celebration of marriage vows, but rather an occasion to display the social status and wealth of those hosting the event. This is not the place to judge what exactly constitutes the virtuous planning of a wedding day; there are other authors who have done a fine job with that issue.One, in particular, is Julie Hanlon Rubio. See the second chapter of her excellent book, A Christian Theology of Marriage and Family (New York: Paulist, 2003). Note that the problem of wedding-day extravagance is not simply a contemporary American issue. See St. John Chrys-ostom’s homilies (discussed in Rubio) to his fifth-century Greek audiences about how Christians should not lose sight of their faith and what is really important when celebrating marriages. The point here is that arguments against wedding-day extravagance (which are often right on target) are not arguments against marriage. Why not?

婚姻是一种生活状态。它始于一个事件,也就是宣告誓言。这些誓言可以在盛大婚礼中宣告,也可以不是。但婚姻是一种活出誓言的状态:爱并尊重自己的配偶,「无论富足还是贫穷,顺境还是逆境,疾病还是健康,直到死亡将我们分开。」这些誓言的含义可以用「永久性」这个词来概括。这对男女承诺,任何事——不是贫穷,不是疾病,不是艰难时期——都不会在死亡之前结束他们的关系。使一对男女成为已婚的,不是派对,而是这些誓言的公开宣告。这可以在安静的宗教背景下完成。也可以在治安法官和两名见证人面前完成。或者也可以在华丽的环境中完成。但使一对男女成为已婚的,是他们公开的誓言或承诺:彼此相守,「直到死亡将我们分开」。所谓性只有在婚姻中才真正有其归属,意思是性只有在一对男女已经作出这种公开宣告的关系中,才是完全有德的。

Marriage is a state of life. It begins with an event, namely, the profession of vows. These vows may or may not be professed with a big wedding. But marriage is the state of living out the vows to love and honor one’s spouse “for richer or for poorer, in good times and in bad, in sickness and in health, ‘til death do us part.” The sense of these vows may be summed up in the word “permanence.” The couple promises that nothing—not poverty, not sickness, not bad times—will end their relationship before death. What makes a couple married is not the party. It is the public profession of these vows. It can be done in a quiet religious context. It could be done before a justice of the peace and two witnesses. Or it could be done in an ornate setting. But what makes a couple married is their public vow, or promise, to stay with one another “‘til death do us part.” The claim that sex is only truly at home in marriage means that it is only fully virtuous in a relationship where the couple has made this public profession.

婚姻的永久性并不只是宗教声称。事实上,上面引用的誓言(「直到死亡将我们分开」,有时是「我们一生的日子」)也用于没有宗教归属的民事婚礼。当然,不同宗教传统会提供更多资源来理解婚姻状态。在天主教传统里,婚姻是七件圣事之一,起初就已存在(创1–2),随后又经基督祝福(约2,太19)。当婚姻不仅在民事脉络中,也在圣事脉络中举行时,就会产生一种圣事性纽带,呼应基督自己的话:「神配合的,人不可分开」(太19:6)。婚姻的忠贞与永久如此重要,以至于圣保罗(承接几位旧约先知的传统)用这种生活状态来比喻神与他子民的关系,尤其是基督与教会的关系(弗5)。显然,并非所有民事结婚的人都共享对婚姻的这一整套理解,包括那些不把婚姻视为圣事的基督教传统。而这些关于婚姻意义的差异,确实会在婚姻誓言是否以及如何能够终止的问题上造成重要差异。尽管如此,不同婚姻观的共同之处在于许诺的永久性。

The permanence of marriage is not simply a religious claim. In fact, the vows cited above (‘til death do us part,” or sometimes “all the days of our lives”) are used in civil marriage services with no religious affiliation. Of course, different religious traditions offer further resources for understanding the marriage state. In the Catholic tradition, marriage is one of the seven sacraments, there in the beginning (Gen. 1–2) and then blessed by Christ (John 2, Matt. 19). When marriage is performed not only in a civil but in a sacramental context, a sacramental bond is engendered, echoing the words of Christ himself, “what God has joined together, no human being must separate” (Matt. 19:6). The faithfulness and permanence of marriage is such that St. Paul (following the tradition of several Old Testament prophets) uses this state of life as a metaphor for God’s relationship with his people, and in particular Christ’s relationship to the church (Eph. 5). Obviously, not all people who are married civilly share all of this understanding of marriage, including Christian traditions where marriage is not a sacrament. And these differences in what marriage means do result in important differences on the question of whether and how a marriage vow can be terminated. Nonetheless, what unites different visions of marriage is vowed permanence.

但婚姻究竟有多永久?上一段已经提到婚姻誓言的终止。若无法保证绝对永久,那么许诺的永久性有什么好处?我们都熟悉当今社会离婚的普遍性。常被引用的数据是,半数婚姻以离婚告终。在这种情况下,一对男女是否公开发誓终生相守,真的重要吗?这里不是处理离婚在宗教和/或民事层面上之道德性这个极其困难(且对许多人而言痛苦)问题的地方。这里提出的简单主张是:一对相爱的男女公开许诺永久,与没有这样做之间,有重要差别;无论其中任何一种关系,或两种关系,都可能失败。事实上,前一句话本身的措辞就说明了为什么。只有一种关系可以被正确地说成失败了:婚姻。因为只有在那种关系中,才有终生相守的公开承诺。若没有任何这样的承诺,我们甚至不能说另一种关系失败了——它只是结束了。许诺的永久性的价值,将在下文探讨。这里需要指出的是,无论关系实际维持多久,只要婚姻誓言是在充分同意并完全意图活出来的情况下给出的,生活在这样一种状态(婚姻)中,与生活在一种缺少这种承诺的委身关系中,就是有区别的。后文还会给出更多理由。

But how permanent is marriage really? Already the previous paragraph mentioned the termination of a marriage vow. What good is vowed permanence if it is not definitely permanent? Everyone is familiar with the prevalence of divorce in our society. The commonly cited figure is that half of all marriages end in divorce. Given this state of affairs, does it really matter whether or not a couple has taken public vows to stay together for life? This is not the place to sort through the enormously difficult (and for many, painful) question of the morality of divorce, religiously and/or civilly. The simple claim made here is that there is an important different between the loving couple that publicly vows permanence and the one that does not, regardless of the fact that either relationship—or both—may fail. In fact, the very wording of this previous sentence indicates why. Only one relationship is rightly said to have failed:the marriage. For only in that relationship was there a public promise to stay together for life. In the absence of any such promise, we cannot even say the other relationship failed—it just ended. The value of vowed permanence is explored next. It suffices here to note that regardless of the actual longevity of the relationship, assuming marital vows are given with full consent and full intent to be lived out, there is a difference between living in such a state (marriage) and living a committed relationship where that promise is absent. Further reasons for this are given later.

永久性:何必在乎?

Permanence: Why Bother?

许多人会立刻问:为什么?承诺无论顺境逆境都与另一个人在一起,意义何在?事实上,这看起来也许像是一个人最不该想做的事。如果两个人不再彼此相爱,继续在一起有什么意义?从某种意义上说,这一点是成立的。生命中有许多关系,甚至是亲密而重要的关系,比如友谊,都会走完自己的历程。当它们如此时,我们就放手。浪漫关系也是如此。很多时候,它们走完自己的历程,我们就把它们留在身后,也许带着美好回忆,但常常也带着痛苦。所以这里真正的问题是:一开始就承诺无论顺境逆境,「我们一生的日子」都与某人在一起,到底有什么意义?如果最后确实如此,那很好。但为什么要在婚姻中提前作出这样的委身?

Many will immediately say, why? What is the point of promising to stay with another person in good times and in bad? In fact, this may seem like the last thing a person should want to do. If two people no longer love one another, what is the point of staying together? In one sense this is a valid point. There are many relationships in life, even intimate and important ones such as friendships, that run their course. When they do, we let them go. This is also true of romantic relationships. Many times they run their course and we leave them behind, perhaps with fond memories, but often with pain. So the real question here is what point is there in ever promising in the first place to be with someone in good times and in bad, “all the days of our lives”? If it ends up that way, great. But why commit to it ahead of time, in marriage?

每个人都应当问自己这个问题,尤其是在考虑婚姻时。婚姻并不是对一段好关系的橡皮图章式批准。它也不是约会、相爱并进入排他关系之后合乎逻辑的下一步。它也不是两个人希望永远彼此相爱的共同愿望。当然,对某一对男女来说,它可能是这些事情中的任何一种。但这些都不足以成为公开许诺婚姻的充分理由。婚姻是相守的委身。它是一个承诺,一个意志的行动。在我们这个时代,这个承诺通常是在浪漫之爱的感受中作出的,这些感受很好,也很美。但这些感受既不是婚姻委身的理由,也不是其未来稳固的基础。如果一个人所谓的爱,是指想要与另一个人在一起的感觉,那么承诺终生之爱实际上就毫无意义。人应当避免这种委身,并保持自由,在这些欲望消退时,或如果它们消退,就离开自己的伴侣。

Every person should ask him or herself this question, particularly in considering marriage. It is not simply a rubber-stamp approval of a good relationship. Nor is it the logical next step after dating, falling in love, and becoming exclusive. Nor is it a shared hope that two people will always love each other. It could, of course, be any of these things for a particular couple. But none of these are good enough reasons to publicly vow marriage. Marriage is a commitment to stay together. It is a promise, an act of the will. In our day and age, this promise is generally made in the context of feelings of romantic love, which are fine and beautiful. But those feelings are neither the reason for, nor a solid future foundation of, a marriage commitment. If what one means by love is feeling desire to be with another person, then it actually makes no sense to promise life-long love. One should avoid such commitments, and remain free to leave one’s partner if, or when, these desires pass.

婚姻之爱,是承诺在生命中共同分享某些美善:一种亲密友谊,其中对方的益处成为自己的益处;向可能出现的子女这一新生命开放,并共同养育这些子女;作为一个单位(夫妻或家庭)参与社群生活。它不是对一段关系或性亲密的橡皮图章式批准。它不是对一对男女所分享之爱的强度的声明,和/或保证要让这种强度保持下去。它是共同走过人生的委身。它的永久性至关重要,有两个原因。第一,这种永久性是生养孩子的最佳环境。第二,这种永久性使共同生活的某些面向成为可能,而没有它就不可能。关系的永久性意味着共同生活和共同故事。它意味着以某些方式彼此脆弱,而这些方式在缺少这种共同生活之委身时可能会被避免。它意味着在不可避免的不和时刻,委身于和好,并作为一对男女共同成长。它不是那种悲哀意义上的安全感,即不确定的人渴望确定性而追求的安全感;它是强意义上的委身,即拥有并进一步建立一种关于何为美好生活的共同愿景。

Married love is a commitment to share certain goods together in life: an intimate friendship where the good of the other becomes one’s own good, an openness to new life in possible children and the raising of those children together, and a participation in the life of a community as a unit (couple or family). It is not a rubber-stamp approval of a relationship, or of sexual intimacy. It is not a statement of the intensity of love a couple shares, and/ or a pledge to keep that intensity alive. It is a commitment to go through life together. Its permanence is crucial for two reasons. First, that permanence is the best setting to have and raise children. Second, that permanence makes possible certain facets of a shared life together that are not otherwise possible. The permanence of a relationship means a shared life together, and shared stories. It means being vulnerable to each other in ways that may be avoided outside the commitment of such shared life. It entails a commitment to reconciliation and growth as a couple in the inevitable times of discord. It is not security in the sad sense sought by those who are uncertain and crave certainty; it is commitment in the strong sense of having and building further a common vision of what it means to live a good life.

如此看来,婚姻其实是一件激进的事。人一生都会改变。你结婚时的你,并不完全等同于十年、二十年或无论多少年后的你。你的配偶也是如此。我们周围的世界变化至少同样迅速。婚姻就是承诺相守,在这一切变化中彼此相爱。它基于这样一个假定:这样做有某种带来生命、并且真实的东西。作为一种委身,由于困难处境或我们自己的软弱,它常常可能感觉像一种义务。但从幸福道德的角度来看,正如德行生活本身一样,正确理解的婚姻是真正幸福的来源。

As such, marriage is actually a radical thing. People change over their lives. Who you are when you marry is not the same exact person you are ten, twenty, or however many years later. The same is true of your spouse. And the world around us changes at least as rapidly. Marriage is the pledge to stay together, to love one another through all of this. It is based on the assumption that there is something life-giving and true about doing so. As a commitment, it may often feel like an obligation, due to difficult situations or our own weaknesses. But from a morality-of-happiness perspective, like the life of virtue itself, marriage properly understood is a source of true happiness.

上面对许诺的永久性中可得的美善的讨论,刻意保持一般性,以适用于所有作出这种誓言的婚姻——无论是宗教婚姻还是民事婚姻。在天主教传统里,还有更多资源可帮助人理解并活出这种委身。圣经中用来描述神与他子民关系的最常见比喻之一——即使不是最常见的那个——就是婚姻。神是那位忠贞者,即使配偶,即他的子民,在不忠的时候,他也始终爱并赦免。如果圣经告诉我们关于神对我们的爱有什么,那就是神永远信实。因此,天主教徒在以弗所书5章的指引下,一直把圣事婚姻看作神与他子民关系的标记。再加上基督自己关于婚姻永久性的教导,这使天主教徒把婚姻理解为在重要意义上是永久的,是神忠贞、持久之爱的真实模范。当然,鉴于前几章讨论了自我奉献之爱是整个基督信仰故事的要点(例如神是谁、创造的要点,以及我们作为人蒙召去做什么),一对男女为什么许诺永久性就更清楚了;这是一个契机,使他们进入一种生活状态,而这种生活状态的要点就是对另一个人的自我奉献之爱与服事。基督徒相信,在活出这种生命时,他们借着神恩典的帮助,真正活出了自己作为imago Dei的受造身份。

This discussion of the goods available in vowed permanence has been purposely general so as to apply to all marriages—religious and civil—where such a vow is made. In the Catholic tradition, there are further resources to understand and live out that commitment. One of—if not the—most frequent metaphors in the scriptures used to describe God’s relationship with his people is that of marriage. God is the faithful one who always loves and forgives the spouse, his people, even in their times of infidelity. If the scriptures tell us anything about God’s love for us, it is that God is faithful forever. Thus Catholics, guided by Ephesians 5, have always seen sacramental marriage as a sign of God’s relationship with his people. Combined with Christ’s own teaching on the permanence of marriage, this has led Catholics to understand marriage as importantly permanent, a very modeling of God’s faithful, enduring love. Of course, given earlier chapters’ discussion of self-giving love as the very point of the Christian story (as in who God is, the point of creation, and what we as persons are called to do), it is more clear as to why a couple vows permanence; it is an occasion to embark on a state of life whose very point is the self-giving love of, and service to, another person. In living that life, Christians believe they truly live out, with the help of God’s grace, their creation as imago Dei.

这就是为什么夫妇决定——或者应当是为什么他们决定——许诺终生相守。确实可能有些夫妇结婚本不应该,也许是被压力推入婚姻,把它当作下一步,或是为了获得社会认可,好同居或发生性关系。又或许他们确实彼此相爱,并把婚姻当作宣告或维系这种爱的方式。即使夫妇确实把婚姻理解为一种委身,也肯定几乎所有夫妇在结婚时,都没有完全理解婚姻委身的重大性和意义。这里的主张并不是说,一对男女应当完全理解婚姻中等待他们的一切;任何结婚多年的夫妇都会告诉你,这是不可能的。但一对男女应当理解,他们正在作出一个承诺,一项委身;随着他们共同成长,他们将尽一切努力活入其中。

This is why couples decide—or should be why they decide—to pledge to stay with each other for life. It may be the case that some couples marry who should not, perhaps pressured into marriage as the next step, or seeking societal approval to live together or have sex. Or perhaps they really love each other and seek marriage as a way to proclaim or keep alive that love. Even when couples do understand marriage as a commitment, it is certainly the case that nearly all couples do not fully understand the magnitude and meaning of the marriage commitment when they marry. The claim here is not that a couple should understand fully what lies in store for them in marriage; any long-time married couple will tell you that is impossible. But a couple should understand that they are making a promise, a commitment, that they will make every effort to live into as they grow together.

没有那张纸,我就不能拥有这一切吗?

Can’t I Have All That without the Piece of Paper?

也许有人可以同意这些主张,承认以上所述与某人承诺相守的美丽和重要性。事实上,许多伴侣都把自己描述为完全委身,并活出反映这种委身的实践(同居、生儿育女、共同银行账户、参与彼此的家庭生活等)。然而,这些伴侣仍可能质疑,为什么必须结婚才算完全委身。这里对这一挑战给出两个回应。

Perhaps someone can agree with these claims based on the beauty and importance of committing to stay with someone in the manner described above. Indeed, many couples describe themselves as fully committed, and live out practices reflective of that commitment (living together, having children, shared bank accounts, participation in each other’s family lives, etc.). Yet still these couples may question why getting married is necessary to be fully committed. Two responses to this challenge are offered here.

首先,如果这确实是他们的意图,那么一对男女能够清楚说明他们是在承诺彼此永久相守,这一点就很重要。这样做能确保双方对自己的关系处在同一页上,并且清楚说明那一页究竟是什么!如果没有任何决定性事件来表示这对男女如何理解他们的关系,就会缺少这种清晰性。他们很可能对在一起意味着什么有相似理解;毕竟,正是这种理解维系着他们的关系。但即使存在美丽的自我奉献之爱,若没有永久性的承诺,就不清楚双方是否都以这种方式理解这段关系,即把它理解为双方都委身于在顺境逆境、疾病健康等等情形中维系的关系。此外,即使双方对完全而相互的委身有共同理解,他们也可能只是模糊地知道完全委身意味着什么。毕竟,「委身」这个词需要一个对象:委身于什么?委身于对对方保持爱的感觉?即使考虑到本书(第四章)关于我们可以习惯化自己情绪的主张,承诺拥有某些感觉仍是一件奇怪的事。委身于非常努力地让事情运作下去?这更接近婚姻承诺,但请注意,它并不等同于委身于彼此相爱直到死亡。宣告婚姻誓言不仅有助于确保这对男女中的每个人处在同一页上,也有助于澄清他们共同委身的究竟是什么。

First, if that is indeed their intention, it matters that a couple be able to state clearly that they are promising to stay with each other permanently. Doing so ensures that both persons are on the same page about their relationship, and make clear exactly what that page is! Without any decisive event signifying how the couple understands their relationship, that clarity is lacking. The couple likely shares a similar understanding of what it means to be together which, after all, sustains them in their relationship. But even in the presence of beautiful self-giving love, absent a promise of permanence it is not clear that each person has this understanding of the relationship, namely, as something both are committed to sustaining in good times and in bad, in sickness and in health, and so on. Furthermore, even with a shared understanding of full and mutual commitment, there may be only a vague sense of what full commitment means. After all, “commitment” is a word that requires an object: committed to what? Commitment to feel love for the other person? Even given this book’s (chapter 4) claims about the possibility of habituating our emotions, it is an odd thing to commit to have certain feelings. Commit to try real hard to make things work? This is closer to a marriage promise, but note it is not the same as committing to love one another until death. Stating marriage vows not only helps ensure each person in the couple is on the same page, it also helps clarify what it is that they commit to together.

在此,有人常提出反驳说:一对男女也许确实已经完全委身,却因为还在读大学或研究生、背负学生贷款或有其他经济不稳定因素、服兵役等原因,无法作出婚姻誓言。所有这些看似阻碍婚姻的因素,其共同点在于,有某种社会强加的限制,成为作出永久委身、彼此相守的障碍。这类论证的一个例子,是主张如果存在这类外在强加的障碍,婚外性行为就是可允许的;见Phillip Keane,「The Dilemma of Committed Premarital Intercourse」,载其《性道德:天主教视角》(纽约:Paulist,1997),105–10。 这些事情确实都可能阻碍一对男女结婚。但处在这种境况中的人,应当牢记两点。

At this point a common objection raised is that a couple may indeed be fully committed but unable to make marriage vows due to being in college or graduate school, student loans or other sources of financial insecurity, military service, and the like. What unites all of these seeming impediments to marriage is that there is some societally imposed constraint that is an obstacle to making a permanent commitment to be together.For an example of this type of argument, saying that sex outside marriage is permissible if such externally imposed obstacles are present, see Phillip Keane, “The Dilemma of Committed Premarital Intercourse,” in his Sexual Morality: A Catholic Perspective (New York: Paulist, 1997), 105–10. It is indeed true that all of these things can impede a couple from getting married. But two things should be kept in mind for those in such a position.

首先,要小心区分婚礼和已婚。结婚本身其实花费很少(通常是一些州许可证和验血的费用,如果仪式在教堂举行,也许还会给教会一笔奉献)。当然,花费不少的是我们许多人在婚姻誓言之际所想象的盛大婚礼。盛大婚礼及其费用可能很好,也很美,但并不是成为已婚的必要条件。当然,社会压力(尤其来自父母的压力)要求一对男女在这样的场合结婚,可能是真实存在的,也确实可能给这对男女带来困难。这当然是需要勇毅的时刻。这对男女必须忍受困难,继续做他们凭良心认为最重要的事(如果那就是他们的婚姻),即使没有盛大婚礼也如此;或者先宣告誓言,把婚姻庆祝延后到某个时候。或者他们可以决定,举行盛大的家庭婚礼确实重要,因此再等一段时间才发生性关系。

First, be careful to distinguish the wedding from being married. Getting married actually costs very little (usually some fees for a state license and blood tests, and perhaps a contribution to a church, if the ceremony is held there). Of course what does not cost little is the big wedding that so many of us envision on the occasion of our marriage vows. The big wedding and its costs may be fine and good, but are not necessary to be married. Of course, societal pressure (especially from parents) on a couple to get married in such a setting may be real, and that may indeed impose hardship on the couple. This is certainly an occasion for fortitude. The couple must endure the difficulty of going ahead with what they, in good conscience, deem most important (if it is their marriage) even without the big wedding, or with the celebration of the marriage delayed to some point after the vows. Or they can decide that it is indeed important to do the big family wedding, and therefore wait to have sex a little longer.

在这类情形中的第二点观察是,通常这些婚姻的障碍并不真正是社会强加的,而是反映了这样一个事实:由于这对男女的年龄和/或人生阶段,两个人还没有准备好许诺永久之爱,即使这种生活状态确实是他们的希望和渴望。年轻伴侣也许会说,「我们已经完全委身于彼此,但还不能结婚」,因为他们还在读大学或研究生,因为他们需要先获得经济稳定,或需要让事业走上正轨。这些确实可能是推迟婚姻的好理由。但这样一来,即使存在真正自我奉献而委身的爱,也还不是完全委身。完全委身意味着一起完成学业,或者一起建立经济或工作上的稳定。这里的主张并不是所有伴侣都应当这样做。而是说,如果他们还没有准备好这样做,那也可以,也很好,但他们就还不是完全委身。当这类挑战是在婚姻中而不是婚前出现时,已婚伴侣承诺会解决处境并相守(无论富足还是贫穷,疾病还是健康,等等)。如果一对男女在婚前不愿许诺永久性,直到那个挑战解决,这实际上意味着他们的委身虽然强烈,却并不完全。它以那个挑战的解决为条件。这也许确实是这对男女明智的判断(也可能是不明智地害怕委身),但无论如何,它都不是许诺之永久性的完全委身。

The second observation in situations like this is that often such impediments to marriage are not truly societally imposed, but rather reflections of the fact that due to the age and/or stage in life of the couple, the two people are simply not readily to promise permanent love, even if that state of life is indeed their hope and desire. Young couples may say things like, “we are fully committed to each other but cannot get married” because they are in college or graduate school, because they need to get financially secure, or need to get our careers on track. These may indeed be good reasons to postpone marriage. But then even in the presence of truly self-giving and committed love, there is not full commitment. Full commitment would mean finishing school while together, or establishing financial or job security together. The claim here is not that all couples should do this. It is rather that if they are not ready to, fine and good, but then they are not fully committed. When such challenges come up during marriage rather than before it, the married couple promises to work out the situation and stay together (richer or poorer, sickness and in health, etc.). If a couple before marriage is not willing to promise permanence until the resolution of the challenge, it in effect means their commitment, while strong, is not full. It is conditional upon the resolution of that challenge. That may indeed be a prudent judgment on the part of the couple (or may be an imprudent fear of commitment), but, regardless, it is not the full commitment of promised permanence.

现在来看第二种回应。如果一对男女愿意彼此许诺永久性呢?他们愿意口头向彼此说明,甚至愿意向可能询问的别人(比如家人)说明,他们委身于在顺境逆境、疾病健康等等情形中彼此相守。那么在这种情况下,他们确实彼此清楚这段关系处在什么位置;它不只是非常委身,而是永久委身,并且他们确实彼此作了许诺。反驳会继续说:「为什么我们需要一张纸(来自国家或教会的结婚证)来使我们的婚姻合法?我们知道并且甚至已经彼此许诺了我们的爱,这对我们来说就够了!」这个情形与前一个情形的区别在于,这里确实有许诺的永久性。然而,这个情形与婚姻的区别在于,这个誓言是私下的,而不是公开的(在别人面前,并由国家、也许还有教会正式承认)。如果婚姻和这里所描述的关系之间并没有重要差异,那么性似乎在这种并非婚姻的关系中也是完全有德的。所以问题是,如果有什么的话,是什么使这种关系与婚姻有重要差异?

Now to the second response. What if a couple is willing to promise permanence to each other? They are willing to verbally state to one another, and even to others who might ask (like their family members), that they are committed to staying with each other in good times and bad, in sickness and health, and so on. So in this case, they are indeed clear to each about where the relationship stands, and it is not simply really committed, but permanently committed, and indeed promised, to each other. The objection continues, “why do we need a piece of paper (a marriage license from the state or church) to make our marriage legitimate? We know and have even promised our love to each other, and that’s enough for us!” What distinguishes this case from the prior one is that there is indeed promised permanence. Yet what distinguishes this case from marriage is the fact that the vow is private rather than public (before others and officially recognized by state and perhaps church). If there is nothing importantly different between marriage and the relationship described in this case, it would seem that sex is fully virtuous in this relationship, which is not marriage. So the question is, what, if anything, makes this relationship importantly different from marriage?

请注意,这里所描述的非婚关系,可能是一种美丽而自我奉献的爱的关系。这里的主张并不是说这种关系只是看起来好,实际上却是恶意或欺骗性的。这里的主张只是说,它缺少婚姻所具有的某些重要东西,而性只有在婚姻所具有的所有要素都在场时才是完全有德的。此外,这样一种关系也确实可能顺利发展。事实上,我们大多数人大概都认识处在这种关系中的人,他们是慷慨而相爱的伴侣,也确实相守,甚至可能比我们认识的某些已婚伴侣相守更久(并且更有爱)。这一点无可否认!然而,这里主张的是,这样的伴侣能够顺利发展,不是因为他们缺少婚姻誓言的公开宣告,而是尽管缺少这一点。

Note that the non-marital relationship, as described here, may be a beautiful and self-giving loving relationship. The claim here is not that this relationship only seems good, but is actually malicious or deceptive. The claim is simply that it lacks something important that marriage has, and that sex is fully virtuous only where all elements that marriage has are present. Furthermore, such a relationship may indeed work out. In fact, most of us likely know people in such relationships who are generous, loving couples, who do indeed stay together, perhaps even longer than (and in a more loving way) than certain married couples we know. No denying that! Yet it is claimed that such couples work out not because of, but in spite of, their lack of public profession of marriage vows.

这里所描述的这对男女与已婚伴侣的区别在于,他们彼此的承诺或誓言是私下的。这似乎说得通。毕竟,还有什么比一个人的浪漫关系和性生活更个人、因而看起来更私密呢?如果两个人知道他们彼此相爱,并承诺永远如此,公开宣告这个承诺还能得到什么?事实上,对许多人来说,这种公开宣告似乎是一根拐杖,是那些也许暗中担心自己撑不下去的伴侣所使用的辅助工具;因此他们公开把自己放在一起,好让已婚者身上的公共压力和期待帮助他们度过艰难时期。如果他们的爱更强或更纯粹(也就是说,没有这种公共干预),那会更好。事实上,许多人以为,正是婚姻关系的公共维度常常导致它们走向破裂!

What distinguishes the couple described here from the married couple is that their promises, or vows, to one another are private. This seems to make sense. After all, what is more personal, and thus seemingly more private, than one’s romantic relationship and sex life? If two people know they love one another, and promise that love forever, what could be gained by publicly professing that promise? In fact, to many such a public profession seems to be a crutch, an aid employed by couples who perhaps secretly fear they may not make it, and thus place themselves together publicly so that the public pressures and expectations on married people may help them through tough times. If their love were stronger or pure (i.e., without this public interference), it would be better. In fact, many people assume that it is precisely the public dimension of married relationships that so often leads to their demise!

这里实际上有几种不同看法。有些人认为公开宣告誓言毫无意义。另一些人认为它实际上表示关系较弱。还有一些人认为它实际上会导致问题,因为它招致外部干预。所有这些看法的共同点是:一对男女可以拥有同样好、甚至更好的关系,其中永久性被这对男女明确理解为关系的目标,却从未被公开宣告。这里并不否认群体对一对男女的影响可能是一种干扰,也不否认有些伴侣可能把结婚当作拐杖,帮助他们在其实不确定自己能否或是否真想这样做时仍然相守。然而,这里主张的是,公开宣告誓言会给关系增添某些东西,某种能够有力支持已婚者,并且确实进一步表示他们彼此委身的东西。

There are actually several different views here. Some think public profession of vows means nothing. Others think it actually signifies a weaker relationship. Still others think it actually leads to problems since it invites outside interference. What all these have in common is that one can have just as good, if not a better, relationship where permanence is explicitly understood by the couple as the goal of the relationship, and yet never publicly professed. It is not contested here that communal influence on a couple can be an interference, or that some couples may get married as a crutch to help them stay together when they are actually not sure they can or really want to do so. Yet it is claimed here that public profession of vows adds something to the relationship, something that can be a powerful support for married people and indeed a further sign of their commitment to each other.

正如一对男女之间的口头承诺会向彼此澄清他们关系的意图,向更广泛社群作公开宣告也是如此。在这种情况下,这对男女向别人——家人、朋友、国家,以及其他可能以正式或非正式方式与他们互动的人——清楚表明,他们是一个单位,是两个长期结合在一起的人。为什么要费心这样做呢?毕竟,可以说,这段关系中的关键人物就是男人和女人自己。虽然构成这对伴侣的确实是这两个人,但正如第七章在正义脉络中所解释的,我们人是社会性受造物。并不只是说我们总是与其他人在一起。我们的身份本身就是由我们与他人的关系塑造的。因此,如果一个人处在婚姻这样重要的关系中,而这种关系由于其许诺的永久性,将成为此人余生中的首要关系(这是即使深厚友谊也没有正式具有的东西),那么与我们有关系的其他人知道这样一种核心关系,就是合宜的。公开宣告婚姻誓言正是做到这一点。

In the same way that verbal promises between the couple clarify the intent of their relationship to each other, the same is true of a public profession with the broader community. In this case the couple makes it clear to others—family, friends, the state, others who may interact with them in formal or informal ways—that they are a unit, two people bound together for the long haul. Why bother doing this, when the key players, so to speak, in the relationship are the man and woman themselves? Though it is indeed the two people that constitute the couple, as explained in the context of justice in chapter 7 we human persons are social creatures. It is not simply that we are always around other people. Our very identities are shaped by our relations with others. Therefore, if a person is in a relationship as important as marriage, which will be the primary relationship for that person for the rest of his or her life due to its promised permanence (something that even strong friendships do not formally have), it is only fitting for others who are in relationship with us to be aware of such a central relationship. Public profession of marriage vows does that.

有人可能会反驳:你生命中关心你的人,难道不知道你处在这样一种关系中吗?其实,不知道。首先,有些关系并不那么私人(与国家、保险公司、孩子的学校等),在这些关系中,这一点可能并不为人所知,而让人知道它很重要。其次,即使一对男女亲近的人知道他们处在一段真正认真的关系中,也许这段关系中二人深爱彼此并同居,这对男女所爱的人也不知道他们是否打算使这段关系成为永久关系。因此,他们不知道在某些场合该如何对待这对男女。例如,我未婚朋友的伴侣,是否应被包括在我也许只会邀请朋友,或朋友及其配偶的活动中?如果我未婚的朋友在关系出现问题时来找我,我该如何知道我是否应支持他努力让这段关系维持下去,因为他和他的伴侣并没有公开承诺他们发誓要让它维持下去?缺少公开誓言时,别人实际上并没有被邀请把这两个人当作一对伴侣来对待。既然婚姻关系在一个人生命中具有首要性,而我们与周围他人的互动也很重要,那么这就是一个真实的缺失。

Someone may object, don’t the people you care about in your life know that you are in such a relationship? Actually, no. First of all, there are relationships that are not so personal (with the state, insurance companies, a child’s school, etc.), where this may not be known, and it is important that it is. Second, even when those close to a couple know they are in a real serious relationship, perhaps one where the couple loves each other deeply and lives together, the couple’s loved ones do not know whether or not the couple intends to make that relationship permanent. And thus they do not know how to treat the couple on certain occasions. For instance, should my unmarried friend’s partner be included in things I might only invite friends to, or friends with their spouses? If my unmarried friend comes to me while having problems in his relationship, how am I to know if I should support him to try and make the relationship work out, when he and his partner have not publicly promised that they vow to make it work? In the absence of public vows, others have not, in effect, been invited to treat the two people as a couple. Assuming both the primacy of the marital relationship in one’s life and the importance of our interactions with others around us, this is a real deficiency.

除了这些考量之外,还有另一个原因说明,已婚与同居有重要不同,即使同居包含永久性的承诺也是如此。婚姻帮助人们相守。我们不只是提供清楚统计数据,说明已婚伴侣比同居伴侣更长久,关于这一问题的社会学数据概览,可见Adrian Thatcher的《同居与基督教伦理》(剑桥:Cambridge University Press,2002)。 不如考虑为什么这些统计数据是真的。一位当代作者描述了婚姻所带有的分量。见Jo McGowen,「Marriage Versus Living Together」,载Kieran Scott与Michael Warren编,《婚姻视角》(纽约:Oxford University Press,2001),125–29。 虽然一对男女可能把他们的关系理解为他们自己的事,但一旦他们公开许诺结婚,他们就进入了一种在他们之前很久就已经存在、在他们之后也会长期存在的生活状态。已婚会带来社会责任和期待,而这对男女承担起这些历经数百年的期待所具有的力量,以帮助塑造他们的关系,并使之保持永久。这当然并不意味着他们没有能力塑造自己的关系,或者他们必须以完全由别人规定的方式结婚。但这确实意味着,他们实际上是在说,他们的关系关乎的不只是他们自己;他们正在进入一种并不只是由他们自己建构的生活状态。这样做时,他们是在邀请自己社群中其他人的支持和参与。

In addition to these considerations, there is another reason why being married is importantly different than living together, even when living together involves a promise of permanence. Marriage helps people stay together. Rather than simply offering the clear statistics about the increased longevity of couples who are married versus those who live together,For a helpful overview of sociological data on this question, see Adrian Thatcher’s Living Together and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). let us consider why these statistics are true. One contemporary author describes the weightiness that marriage carries.See Jo McGowen, “Marriage Versus Living Together,” in Perspectives on Marriage, ed. Kieran Scott and Michael Warren (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 125–29. Though a couple may understand their relationship as their own, once they publicly vow to be married they enter into a state of life that has existed long before them, and will exist long afterwards. There are social responsibilities and expectations that come along with being married, and the couple takes on the power of those centuries-old expectations to help shape their relationship and keep it permanent. This does not, of course, mean that they have no ability to shape their own relationship, or that they must be married in a manner dictated solely by others. But it does mean that they are in effect saying that their relationship is about more than themselves; they are entering into a state of life that is not simply of their own construction. In doing so they are inviting the support and involvement of others in their community.

当然,问题也在这里。许多选择不结婚的伴侣之所以作出这种选择,是因为婚姻的分量被体验为负担,而不是支持。也许他们自己的父母已婚,却有一段可怕的关系,给孩子造成了痛苦。也许这对男女在家庭中经历过痛苦的离婚,因此拒绝结婚看起来是一种显然的方式,可以避免将来他们遇到困难时出现这种创伤。鉴于这些经验,人们为什么希望避免婚姻是可以理解的。然而,这里需要问的问题是:他们所反应的那些问题,是婚姻本身固有的(因而可以通过不结婚而同居来避免),还是某一对具体夫妇特有的?要做到这一点,必须比较的是好的婚姻与好的非婚关系,以便看出这两种形式之间有哪些差异并不能简单归因于某一对男女的特征。

Of course, here lies the problem too. The reason why many couples who choose not to marry make that choice is because the weightiness of marriage is experienced as a burden rather than a support. Perhaps their own parents were married and had a horrible relationship which inflicted pain on the children. Perhaps the couple has experienced painful divorce in their families, and the refusal to be married appears an obvious way to avoid such trauma, should hard times arise for them in the future. Given these experiences, it is understandable why people wish to avoid marriage. Yet the question that needs to be asked here is whether the problems against which they react are inherent to marriage (and thus can be avoided by living together without marriage), or whether they are particular to a specific couple. To do so, what must be compared are good marriages and good non-married relationships, to see what differences between the two forms are not simply attributable to characteristics of a particular couple.

公开宣告婚姻誓言的假定之一,就是维持婚姻确实很困难。事实上,在更艰难的时候,夫妇们会说,他们也许只是因为已婚而相守。现在,这不是相守的良好长期理由。前文已经讨论过为什么一种永久关系是好事。承认这一点,婚姻誓言就能在人们不想已婚、而是把自己的委身体会为负担的时候,带他们度过艰难时期。在这样的时刻,婚姻誓言是对这对男女自由的支持,因为他们已经决定(他们的誓言证明了这一点)永久相守确实是对他们最好的。婚姻承诺不仅能在艰难时期维系这对男女,也盼望能成为一种推动力,不只是让他们在艰难中忍耐,也让他们共同努力,处理困难的根源,好再次在彼此关系中活得圆满。让人想起第二章关于追求卓越的自由的讨论,在这种情况下,规则(已婚时相守)可能被体验为负担。但按照这些规则生活,确实构成真正的幸福。

One of the assumptions of a public profession of marriage vows is that it is indeed difficult to stay married. In fact, in more difficult times couples report they may stay together simply because they are married. Now this is not a good long-term reason to stay together. The reasons why a permanent relationship is a good thing were discussed previously. Granting that, marriage vows can get people through tough times when they do not feel like being married, but experience their commitment as a burden. In such times marriage vows are a support of the couple’s freedom, since they have decided (as evidenced by their vows) that staying together permanently is indeed what is best for them. Marriage promises not only can sustain the couple in times of hardship, but also hopefully act as an impetus not just to endure in hardship, but to work together and address the sources of the difficulty so as to live again in fulfilling relationship with each other. Reminiscent of the second chapter’s discussion of freedom for excellence, in this situation the rules (staying together when married) may be experienced as a burden. But living in accordance with them indeed constitutes true happiness.

正是出于这些原因,婚姻帮助一对男女相守。当然,这里的假定是,出于已经描述过的理由,这是好事。也许有些场合并非如此(可怕的配偶虐待情形会立刻进入脑海)。在这类情况下,分开也许确实是对这对男女最好的。但本节的问题是,如何最好地实现一对男女永久相守的委身。如果一对男女避免婚姻,就必须问,永久性是否真是他们的目标。为什么不利用可得的社群支持和期待来达到这个目标?如果他们不想要这种支持,而是更想拥有某种纯粹关系,仅仅由这对男女当前的欲望维系在一起,那么就必须问,永久性在多大程度上真正是目标。关于纯粹关系这一概念的更多内容,见David McCarthy,《家中的性与爱》(伦敦:SCM Press,2004)。 如果永久性确实是目标,而一对男女觉得婚姻实际上会妨碍这个目标,这里的论证是:事实并非如此。由于这对男女过去的痛苦经验,婚姻可能被体验为障碍。但这让人想起第一章的论证:对破坏性权威所造成伤害的补救办法,并不是完全避开权威,而是寻求真正带来生命的权威;同样,对破坏性婚姻经验的最佳回应,并不是避开一种实际上最能服务于既定永久性目标的生活状态,而是寻找并依靠这种状态中更能带来生命的模式和经验。总之,已婚与在私下许诺永久性的情况下同居,有重要不同。

It is for these reasons that marriage helps a couple stay together. The assumption here, of course, is that this is a good thing, for reasons already described. There may be occasions where this is not so (horrible situations of spousal abuse come immediately to mind). And in such cases separating may indeed be what is best for the couple. But the question for this section is how to best effectuate a couple’s commitment to stay together permanently. If a couple avoids marriage, it must be asked if permanence is really their goal. Why not avail themselves of available communal support and expectations to reach that goal? And if such support is not desired in favor of having some sort of pure relationship that is kept together solely by the present desires of the couple, it must be asked to what extent permanence is truly the goal.For more on the concept of pure relationship, see David McCarthy, Sex and Love in the Home (London: SCM Press, 2004). If permanence is indeed the goal, and a couple feels marriage is actually an impediment to that goal, the argument here is this is not true. Marriage may be experienced as an impediment due to painful experiences in the couple’s past. But reminiscent of the first chapter’s argument that the remedy to harm inflicted by destructive authorities is not to avoid them altogether but rather to seek genuinely life-giving ones, the best response to destructive experiences of marriage is not to avoid a state of life that actually best serves a stated goal of permanence, but rather to seek out and rely on more life-giving models and experiences of that state. In sum, being married is importantly different than living together in privately promised permanence.

结语

Concluding Thoughts

本章大部分篇幅都用来讨论一个具体问题,把它作为进入更广泛讨论「何时发生性关系才有德」的切入点。所处理的具体问题是:已婚是否是有德之性的必要条件(即使不是充分条件)。这里支持的答案是肯定的,主要基于这样一个论点(与本书对意向性的关注一致):婚姻和性的目标或意义相互吻合,因此,没有婚姻而发生性关系,就显明这段关系缺少婚姻所表示的某种东西,而那东西是有德之性所必需的。本章处理了许多论证,但所有论证都关乎两点之一:性是否真的具有类似婚姻的意义,或者婚姻是否是唯一能够充分追求并活出这些目标的关系状态。鉴于前一章关于灌注枢德存在的论证,本章偶尔讨论某些基督徒大方向信念如何塑造发生性关系和已婚这类人类活动的意义。基督徒可能做出与贞洁的非基督徒相同的行动,但前者不仅依靠神的恩典来有德地生活,也以不同方式理解有德之性的意义。既然性是一种内在于世的活动,可由未经援助的人类理性触及(即一种自然法活动),本章的大部分讨论都停留在这个层面上。希望这一讨论,正如下章关于临终决策的讨论一样,显明一个主题如何既可以是自然法问题,又可以受到一个人信仰的塑造。

The bulk of this chapter has been spent discussing one specific question as an entry point into the far broader discussion of when it is virtuous to have sex. The particular question addressed has been whether or not being married is a necessary (even if not sufficient) condition of having virtuous sex. The answer supported here is yes, based mainly on the contention (consistent with this book’s focus on intentionality) that the goals or meanings of marriage and sex coincide, such that having sex without marriage reveals that the relationship lacks something signified in marriage necessary to have virtuous sex. A host of arguments have been addressed, but all concern one of two points: whether sex really has a meaning akin to marriage, or whether marriage is the only state of relationship where these goals can be fully sought and lived out. Given the previous chapter’s arguments about the existence of infused cardinal virtues, the chapter contains occasional discussion of how certain big-picture Christian beliefs shape the meaning of human activities like having sex and being married. The Christian may do the same acts as a chaste non-Christian, but the former person not only relies of God’s grace to live virtuously, but also understands the meaning of virtuous sexuality differently. Since sex is an innerworldly activity accessible to unaided human reasoning (i.e., a natural law activity), much of this chapter’s discussion remained at that level. It is hoped this discussion, like the one in the next chapter on end-of-life decision-making, reveals how a topic can be both a natural law issue, and yet also be shaped by one’s faith.

在结尾回到开头是合宜的,尤其是回到本章前面关于判断与论断人的部分。本章的重点,正如整本书一样,是努力确定如何最有德地生活;这被理解为通过拥护并朝向那些会使我们真正幸福的事物而行动,来活出最圆满的生命。这对我们大多数人来说都很困难。我们所有人很可能都未能在涉及自己之性的问题上活出这一挑战,无论是在行为上还是在欲望上。但为了确定我们自己如何能够以最圆满的方式生活,并以爱支持别人这样生活,我们有必要阐明哪些规则最能服务于这一目标,即使这些规则难以理解和活出。这里尤其明显需要明智和勇毅,也需要节制和正义。盼望本章能成为一个契机,使我们在性生活方面发展这些德行。

It is fitting to end where we started, especially by returning to the early part of the chapter on judgment and judgmentalism. The point in this chapter, as in the entire book, is to try and determine how to live most virtuously, understood as living the most fulfilling life by espousing and acting toward what will make us genuinely happy. This is difficult for most of us. All of us have likely failed to live up to this challenge as it concerns our sexuality, whether it be in deed or desire. But in order to determine how we ourselves can live, and lovingly support other to live, in a most fulfilling manner, articulating what rules best serve this goal is necessary, even if challenging to understand and live. The need for prudence and fortitude, as well as temperance and justice, is particularly evident here. It is hoped that this chapter can be an occasion for the development of those virtues as it concerns our sex lives.

研读问题

Study Questions

  1. 说明为什么「性是否只属于婚姻」这个问题并不只对基督徒才有意义,或为什么有人会认为它只对基督徒有意义。

  2. 阐述两种不同层次的分歧,人们在讨论性与婚姻关系的问题上可能分歧于哪两个方面。

  3. 区分作出判断与论断人。一个人能否讨论如何有德地发生性关系,同时又不论断人?

  4. 性与婚姻的哪些特质使得有人主张「性唯有在婚姻中才是完全有德的」?

  5. 当我们问「性意味着什么」时,「意味着」这个概念具体指的是什么?

  6. 性有什么意义?请把自己放在一段发展中关系的连续谱上的某个位置,并说明为什么性在那个阶段是合宜的。

  7. 婚姻的本质是什么?它和婚礼有何不同?

  8. 为什么有伴侣会承诺永久相伴?

  9. 如果一段相爱的关系中,双方已经告诉彼此他们想永远在一起,那么公开结婚是否为他们的关系增添了什么?为什么,或为什么不?

  1. Explain why or why not the question of whether sex belongs in marriage only makes sense for Christians.

  2. Describe two different levels on which people could disagree about the question of the relationship between sex and marriage.

  3. Distinguish judging from being judgmental. Can one discuss how to have sex virtuously and not be judgmental?

  4. What about sex and marriage leads some people to say that sex is only fully virtuous in marriage?

  5. What does it “mean” to ask what sex means?

  6. What does sex mean? Place yourself somewhere on the continuum of a developing relationship, and say why sex is appropriate at that stage.

  7. What is the essence of marriage? How is this different from a wedding?

  8. Why would a couple promise to stay together permanently?

  9. Does being publicly married add anything to a loving relationship where the partners tell each other they want to be together forever? Why or why not?

需掌握的术语

Terms to Know

贞洁(chastity)、情欲(lust)、判断与论断人(judgment vs. judgmentalism)、性作为语言的比喻(sex as language metaphor)、性的合一意义(unitive meaning of sex)、性的生育性意义(procreative meaning of sex)、婚礼与婚姻(wedding vs. marriage)、作为公开之事的婚姻(marriage as public)

chastity, lust, judgment vs. judgmentalism, sex as language metaphor, unitive meaning of sex, procreative meaning of sex, wedding vs. marriage, marriage as public

进一步思考的问题

Questions for Further Reflection

  1. 我们要如何判断自己是否已从出于爱的判断,越界到论断人呢?

  2. 本章的一个目标,是使某种性观对人们来说可以理解。有哪些社会、家庭和教会力量在发挥作用,阻碍人们接受这种看法?换言之,在这个问题上,良心是如何被糟糕地(以及恰当地)塑造的?

  3. 当代高离婚率对人们在此问题上的思考会带来何种影响?

  4. 性的生育性意义到底有多核心?这里阐明的立场能否解释不育伴侣的情况?一个人对性的生育性意义所持的立场,会对同性恋、婚姻和避孕等问题产生哪些后果?

  5. 从基督徒视角之外来看,永久性作为婚姻的一项美善仍然说得通吗?

  1. How can we determine whether one has crossed the line from loving judgment to judgmentalism?

  2. One goal of this chapter has been to make a certain vision of sex understandable to people. What societal, familial, and church forces are at work that inhibit the reception of this vision? In other words, how are consciences being poorly (as well as properly) formed on this issue?

  3. What impact does the high divorce rate have today on people’s reflection on this question?

  4. How central is the procreative meaning of sex? Can the position articulated here account for the case of sterile couples? What are the ramifications of one’s position on the procreative meaning of sex for questions such as homosexuality, marriage, and contraception?

  5. Does permanence makes sense as a good of marriage outside of a Christian perspective?

延伸阅读

Further Reading

有关性与道德的一般文献,尤其是关于性与婚姻关系的文献,相当庞大。在天主教会官方文件中,我发现最有助于教学的是爱尔兰主教们的牧函《爱是为了生命》。David Cloutier的《爱、理性与神的故事》是性伦理的杰出导论。另见David McCarthy的《家中的性与爱》、Julie Hanlon Rubio的《婚姻与家庭的基督教神学》,以及Richard Gaillardetz的《大胆的承诺:基督教婚姻灵修》。若想阅读对本章所持立场更通俗的呈现,可见Lauren Winner的《真实的性:关于贞洁的赤裸真相》。

There is an enormous literature on sex and morality in general, and the relationship between sex and marriage in particular. The official Catholic church document I have found most helpful for teaching is the Irish Bishops’ Pastoral Letter Love is for Life. David Cloutier’s Love, Reason, and God’s Story is an outstanding introduction to sexual ethics. See also David McCarthy’s Sex and Love in the Home, Julie Hanlon Rubio’s A Christian Theology of Marriage and Family, and Richard Gaillardetz’s A Daring Promise: A Spiritually of Christian Marriage. For a more popular presentation of the position taken in this chapter see Lauren Winner’s Real Sex: The Naked Truth about Chastity.