^5:8 For this reason I will beseech the Lord, and to God I will set forth my speech,
^5:9 who does great and inscrutable things, and wonders without number,
^5:10 who gives rain upon the face of the earth and waters all things with waters,
^5:11 who sets the humble on high and raises up those who mourn with health,
^5:12 who scatters the thoughts of the wicked, lest their hands be able to complete what they had begun,
^5:13 who catches the wise in their own cunning and scatters the counsel of the depraved.
^5:14 By day they will run into darkness, and at midday they will grope as in the night.
^5:15 Moreover, he will save the poor man from the sword of their mouth and from the hand of the violent:
^5:16 and there will be hope for the needy, but iniquity will draw together its mouth.

98. For this reason I will beseech the Lord, etc. Because Eliphaz had proposed that all things that happen on earth have a determinate cause, and had proved this by the fact that natural things appeared to be disposed for an end, while this, namely, that natural things exist for an end, is the strongest argument for showing that the world is ruled by divine providence and that not all things are done by chance, therefore Eliphaz at once concludes from the foregoing concerning the governance of divine providence. Now it must be known that, if divine providence is removed, the fruit of prayer is taken away, as is God’s knowledge concerning human affairs; yet these must necessarily be posited by one who grants the governance of providence. And therefore Eliphaz, drawing his conclusion, says: from the fact that all things that happen on earth are for an end, it is necessary to grant the governance of providence; for this reason I will beseech the Lord, as though prayer were fruitful because God disposes human affairs, and to God I will set forth my speech, as to God who knows human deeds and words and thoughts. To confirm this he adds those things that most show divine providence.

99. Now it must be known that those who deny providence say that all things that appear in the things of the world arise from the necessity of natural causes, such as from the necessity of heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, and other things of this kind. Therefore divine providence is especially made manifest from those things whose reason cannot be given from natural principles of this kind, among which one is the determinate magnitude of the bodies of this world: for no reason can be assigned from any natural principle why the sun, or the moon, or the earth should be of such a quantity and not greater or lesser; hence it is necessary to say that this apportioning of quantities is from the ordering of some intellect, and he designates this when he says: who does great things, that is, who disposes things in a determinate magnitude.

Again, if all things arose from the necessity of natural principles, since natural principles are known to us we would have a way of investigating all things that are in this world; but there are some things in this world to the knowledge of which we cannot arrive by any investigation, such as spiritual substances, the distances of the stars, and other things of this kind. Hence it is manifest that not all things proceed from the necessity of natural principles, but that things have been established by some higher intellect, and on account of this he adds: and inscrutable things. Likewise, there are certain things that we see whose reason we can in no way assign, for instance, that the stars are arranged according to such a figure in this part of the heaven and according to another in another part. Hence it is manifest that this does not come from natural principles but from some higher intellect, and on account of this he adds: and wonders. For the inscrutable and the wonderful differ in this way: the inscrutable is that which itself lies hidden and cannot be searched out, but the wonderful is that which itself appears, but whose cause cannot be searched out.

100. It must also be known that some have posited that the disposition of things proceeds from God according to a certain order of number, as, for example, that from the first simple one there proceeds only one first effect, in which already something of composition and plurality is had, and thus from it there proceed two or three things, which are still less simple, and so, according to them, the whole multitude of things proceeds by degrees. According to this position, indeed, the whole disposition of the universe is not from the ordering of the divine intellect but from a certain necessity of nature; hence, to remove this position, he adds: without number: either because things were produced into being without the necessity of a numerical order, or because immediately from God innumerable things have been produced for us, which appears especially in the first heaven, in which there are very many stars. Thus, therefore, Eliphaz shows that the production of things is from God and not from the necessity of nature.

101. Consequently he shows that the course of the things made is also governed by divine providence. And first in natural things, from the fact that natural things seem to be tempered for the use of men and of other animals, although the natural order of the elements seems to require something else: for if someone considers heaviness and lightness in the elements, it is manifest that naturally earth underlies water, water underlies air, and air underlies fire. Yet some part of the earth is found uncovered by waters and immediately underlying air: otherwise animals that breathe could not live on earth;

and again, lest the earth uncovered by waters be rendered unfruitful and uninhabitable by its dryness, it is moistened by God in two ways:

first, indeed, through rain, by which the surface of the earth is soaked, and with respect to this he says: who gives rain upon the face of the earth;

in another way, with respect to springs, streams, and rivers, by which the earth is irrigated, whose beginning is beneath the earth, just as that of rain is on high, and with respect to this he says: and waters all things with waters.

102. Then he shows the operation of providence also in human affairs. And indeed, if human affairs ran according to what their disposition seems to demand, no or only a small trace of divine providence would appear in them; but since human affairs run in another way, fools, who do not consider higher causes, attribute this to chance and fortune,

in whose person Solomon speaks in Ecclesiastes 9:11, saying: I saw under the sun that the race is not to the swift, nor battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the learned, nor favor to the skilled, but time and chance in all things; Eliphaz, however, refers this to a higher cause, namely, to the providence of God.

And first with respect to the oppressed, who are both lifted up from the lowest place on high, and with respect to this he says: who sets the humble, that is, the downtrodden, on high, and are transferred from sorrow to joy, and with respect to this he says: and raises up those who mourn with health.

Second, with respect to the oppressors, of whom there are two kinds. For some openly oppress others by power, and with respect to these it is said: who scatters the thoughts of the wicked, lest their hands be able to complete what they had begun, because, namely, in the very pursuit of the work they are hindered by God, lest they be able to bring their wicked thought to effect. But some deceive by cunning, and with respect to these it is said: who catches the wise in their own cunning, insofar as, namely, the things they cunningly devise turn out contrary to their purpose, and scatters the counsel of the depraved, when, namely, the things that seem to have been wisely counseled by them, because certain impediments are brought in, they are unable to bring to effect. Sometimes, however, not only are things cunningly counseled hindered in their operation, but even their mind is darkened, lest in taking counsel they be able to discern the better things; hence he adds: By day they will run into darkness, because, namely, in a manifest matter they do not at all know what they are doing, and at midday they will grope as in the night, that is, in matters that are in no way doubtful they will doubt as in obscure matters.

103. And so that these things may be seen to come from divine providence, he adds the usefulness arising from the foregoing. For when the cunning of the wicked is hindered, the poor are freed from their deceptions, and this is what he adds: Moreover, he will save the poor man from the sword of their mouth: for those who are cunning in evil are accustomed to lead others astray by flattering and feigned words, and these words, in doing harm, are compared to a sword, according to that saying of the Psalm: their tongue is a sharp sword. But when the operations of the powerful wicked are hindered by God, it is manifest also that the poor are saved; hence there follows: and from the hand of the violent the poor man. And from this two things follow, one of which is that men who are powerless of themselves trust in divine power, as in God caring for human affairs; hence he adds: and there will be hope for the needy. The other is that powerful and wicked men draw themselves back, lest they become wholly malicious; hence there follows: but iniquity will draw together its mouth, namely, lest it pour itself out entirely to the destruction of others.