Literal Exposition on Job

Saint Thomas Aquinas
Literal Exposition on JobChapter 11: Law and Divine Transcendence

Lecture 1: The Infinite Magnificence of God

11:1 But Zophar the Naamathite, answering, said:
11:2 Shall not he who speaks many things also hear? Or will a verbose man be justified?
11:3 Will men be silent for you alone, and when you have mocked others, will you be refuted by no one?
11:4 For you have said: My speech is pure, and I am clean in your sight.
11:5 And would that God might speak with you and open his lips to you!
11:6 That he might show you the secrets of wisdom and that his law is manifold, and that you might understand that much less is exacted of you by him than your iniquity deserves.
11:7 Will you perhaps comprehend the footsteps of God and discover the Almighty unto perfection?
11:8 He is higher than heaven, and what will you do? Deeper than Hell, and how will you know?
11:9 His measure is longer than the earth and broader than the sea.
11:10 If he overturns all things or confines them into one, who will contradict him?

191. But Zophar the Naamathite, answering, said, etc. Above, among the other evils that he was suffering, Job had said that he was wondrously tormented by his friends, who rose up against him as though witnesses for God; touched by this word, Zophar answered, whence it is said: But Zophar the Naamathite, answering, said: Shall not he who speaks many things also hear? As if to say: you have spoken many things in a disordered way, whence it is not marvelous if you have been reproved by your friends; because if a man who speaks many things were not reproved, this unfitting consequence would follow, that men would be regarded as just from the very fact that they are talkative, whence there follows: Or will a verbose man be justified?, that is, will he be regarded as just? And because Job could say that deference ought to be shown to him because of his dignity, he excludes this, adding: Will men be silent for you alone, and when you have mocked others, will you be refuted by no one? For he understood that the others also had been mocked in this, that he had called them witnesses of God, and in this, that above he had said: Why have you detracted from the words of truth? And therefore he says that it is not to be wondered at if others also speak against him. But perhaps he could say that they had nothing to say against him or against his words; and to exclude this he adds: For you have said: My speech is pure. He takes this from what Job had said above: You will not find iniquity on my tongue, nor will foolishness resound in my throat; and I am clean in your sight. Job had not expressly said this, but Zophar wished to gather it from his words, because he had argued that he was not punished for sin, or from the fact that he had said: You know that I have done nothing impious, or from what he said above: Have I not dissembled? Have I not kept silent?

192. Now it must be considered that, since sin is a turning aside from the law of God, sin or the quantity of it cannot be fully known unless the law of God is known: for the straight is the judge both of itself and of the crooked. Therefore, that Job said he was free from sin or had not sinned so gravely as he was being punished, Zophar considered this to happen because Job did not know the law of God perfectly, and therefore he says: And would that God might speak with you and open his lips to you! He seems to say this by way of reproach against Job, because Job had said: Show me why you judge me thus. And it can be said that God speaks to man simply when he inspires something of his wisdom into his heart, according to that saying of the Psalm: I will hear what the Lord God speaks within me; but he opens his lips when through certain effects he reveals something to men: for by lips voices are formed outwardly, by which we express the interior concepts of the heart.

193. But it must be considered that we fall short of the understanding of divine things for a twofold reason:

first, indeed, because, since we cannot know the invisible things of God except through the things that have been made, and since the things that have been made fall far short of the power of the maker, many things must remain to be considered in the maker that are hidden from us; and these are called the secrets of the wisdom of God, concerning which he says: That he might show you the secrets of wisdom.

Second, because we cannot fully comprehend even the order of creatures themselves according as it is dispensed by divine providence. For it is one way in human governance and another way in divine governance: for among men, the higher someone is in governing, the more his ordering extends only to more universal matters, while he leaves particular matters to be dispensed by lower rulers, and thus the law of governance of a higher ruler is universal and simple; but the higher God is in governing, the more his ordering extends even to the least things. Hence the law of his governance is not only secret, if we look to the loftiness of the ruler exceeding every proportion of the creature, but is also manifold, dispensing all things, even singular and least things, under a certain order; and therefore he added: and that his law is manifold.

194. And this is to be considered not only in natural things, insofar as they are subject to divine governance, but also in human affairs. For human laws, because their framers could not take into account all singular cases, look to certain universal matters that happen in most cases; but how human universal statutes are to be applied to singular deeds is left to the prudence of the one acting. Hence in many things man can fall short of rectitude, in which nevertheless he does not act contrary to a humanly established law; but the divine law, according as it is in the wisdom of God, extends to all particular and least things, and so it cannot happen that man should disagree with rectitude in anything and not be contrary to the divine law. Therefore, because man cannot attain to seeing the divine law itself as it is in the secret of the wisdom of God, and consequently cannot recognize its manifoldness, it happens that sometimes he does not think he is acting against the law of God when nevertheless he is acting against it, or that he thinks he offends little when he offends much. Hence he adds: and that you might understand, namely, if the secrets of wisdom and the manifoldness of God’s law were shown to you, that much less is exacted of you by him, namely, in enduring punishments, than your iniquity deserves, which either you do not know or you judge to be small. And in this he seems to rebuke what Job had said above: Would that my sins, by which I have deserved wrath, and the calamity that I suffer were weighed in a balance. Like the sand of the sea, this would appear heavier.

195. And because he had supposed that in divine wisdom there is some secret that had not yet been shown to Job, lest this could be denied, he confirms it by what follows, saying: Will you perhaps comprehend the footsteps of God? Footsteps are signs of one proceeding along a way; but the works of God are called his ways, and the production of creatures by God is understood as a certain procession of God into creatures, insofar as divine goodness, from him in whom it exists simply and supremely, proceeds by being derived gradually to effects, while higher things are found to be better than lower things. Therefore the footsteps of God are certain signs found in creatures, from which, through them, God can in some measure be known. But since the human mind cannot know creatures themselves totally and perfectly, much less can it have perfect knowledge of the Creator himself; and therefore, by questioning, he adds: and discover the Almighty unto perfection? As if to say: if you cannot know creatures perfectly, much less can you know the Creator; and he says discover pointedly because, by a certain inquiry, reason proceeds from effects to the cause, and when it knows that cause through effects, we are said to discover it.

196. Nor is it marvelous if, when creatures are not perfectly known, the Creator is not perfectly known, because even if creatures were perfectly known, the Creator would still not be perfectly known: for then a cause can be known perfectly through effects when the effects equal the power of the cause, which cannot be said of God. And therefore he adds: He is higher than heaven, and what will you do? Deeper than Hell, and how will you know? His measure is longer than the earth and broader than the sea. These things are said under a metaphor: for it should not be understood that God, who is incorporeal, is extended by bodily dimensions, but he describes the greatness of his power under the likeness of bodily greatness, because however great bodily quantities seem to be, whether in height or depth or length or breadth, they nevertheless fall short of the greatness of God’s power, which could make greater things; and therefore he pointedly named God Almighty before. From this, therefore, he shows that God cannot be found perfectly in creatures, because even if all creatures were known perfectly, from them there could not be known a power equal to him. What means, then, can be taken for knowing the power of God according as it exceeds every creature? And this he signifies when he says: what will you do? and how will you know?

197. But divine power exceeds every creature not only in producing but also in preserving: for the preservation of a creature is only from God, nor is there any power in a creature that could resist the divine will if he did not wish to preserve the creature any further. And therefore he adds: If he overturns all things, by reducing them to nothing, namely, by withdrawing being from them, or confines them into one, by bringing in confusion through the removal of the order by which he distinguishes things, who will contradict him? That is, what power of a creature will be able to be contrary, preserving either itself or other things in being against his will? But lest someone say that, although nothing could be preserved in being except through him, nevertheless he preserves things in being as though from a debt, to exclude this he adds: Or who can say to him: Why do you act thus? As though demanding from him a reason concerning a neglected debt.