明智:自信选择,勇敢生活

与 Prudence: Choose Confidently, Live Boldly 对照
Gregory Pine, O.P.
明智:自信选择,勇敢生活

5. 我整全吗?

5. Am I Whole?

上一章,我们把明智拆解开来,考察了它的不同种行动和各个部分。那里的讨论就像技师把发动机拆解成一个个零部件。本章将采取相反的进路。拆解工作已经完成,现在该开始组装了。这里的讨论将像技师从底盘、悬架、变速箱和发动机着手组装汽车。我们会把明智置于整个伦理生活的背景中,说明它如何「驱动」这一整体。这里所说的整全,是指整合或统一的状态。对人而言,整全就是为一个有意义的目的,前后一致、协调统一地生活。明智稳步引导我们走向人类生命蓬勃发展的目标,从而成就这种整全。

In the previous chapter, we took prudence apart to examine its different acts and parts. There our discussion worked like a mechanic disassembling an engine into component parts. In this chapter, we’ll take the opposite approach. With the work of breaking down behind us, it’s time for building up. Here the discussion will work like a mechanic assembling a car, starting from the chassis, suspension, transmission, and engine. We will situate prudence in the context of the whole moral life to show how it “drives” that whole. Whole, here, means something that is integrated or unified. For a human person, to be whole is to live coherently or consistently for a meaningful purpose. Prudence brings about this wholeness by conducting us steadily to the goal of human flourishing.

德行彼此联结

The Virtues Are Connected

汽车的各个零件是为了组装在一起而制造的;与此相仿,各种德行也是为了彼此配合、共同发挥作用而设立的。圣安波罗修写道:「德行彼此联系、相互联结,因此,谁拥有一种德行,看来也会拥有其他几种。」圣奥古斯丁又说:「居于人心中的各种德行,彼此之间完全不可分离。」他们的观察与我们的经验相符。只要看到一种德行,就必定还能找到更多德行。如果我看到一位同事在冲突中既友善又客观,就可以有把握地推断,她也爱好和平、乐于宽恕。偶尔固然会有例外,但有德行的人往往在各方面都有德行。事实证明,德行是彼此联结的。同样,恶习也彼此联结。西塞罗写道:「如果你承认自己不具有某一种特定德行,那么你必然一种德行也没有。」圣格列高利又说:「一种德行若没有其他德行相伴,要么毫无价值,要么极不完善。」如果我看到一个人骄傲或贪图虚荣,后来得知他容易受冒犯而且为人不诚实,我也不会惊讶。有严重伦理缺陷的人,内心往往挤满了各式各样的恶习,而且很可能滋生出更多恶习。

Not unlike the parts of a car, which are manufactured for assembly, so too, the virtues are designed to fit and work together. Saint Ambrose writes, “The virtues are connected and linked together, so that whoever has one, is seen to have several.” Saint Augustine adds, “The virtues that reside in the human mind are quite inseparable from one another.” Their observations square with our experience. Where one virtue is seen, more are sure to be found. If I see that a coworker is kind and objective in a conflict, I can safely assume that she’s also peaceable and forgiving. Every once in a while you’ll find exceptions, but virtuous people tend to be virtuous throughout. The virtues, it turns out, are connected. By the same token, the vices, too, are connected. Cicero writes, “If you confess to not having one particular virtue, it must needs be that you have none at all.” Saint Gregory adds, “One virtue without the other is either of no account whatever, or very imperfect.” If I see pride or vainglory in a man, I’m not surprised to learn later that he is easily offended and dishonest. Persons with grave moral faults often have a whole host of vices crowding around inside them, and they’re likely to breed more.

德行之间的这种联结并非偶然或杂乱无章,而是整体设计的一部分。一个有节制的人,并非只是碰巧也有明智、正义和勇毅。事实上,各种德行会彼此坚固,相互鼓励、激发,甚至促使彼此成长并蓬勃发展。本章大部分内容描述明智如何促成伦理德行。不过,伦理德行也会以另一种方式促成明智。亚里士多德用一句简明的话概括这种现象:「人是什么样,就会怎样看。」因此,一个人若是善良而有德行的,就会善于推理,并以合乎德行的方式推理。换句话说,一个人若有正义、勇毅和节制,也会有明智。因为他拥有伦理德行,受到良好塑造的欲望便会帮助他形成良好的思想。

This connection among the virtues isn’t accidental or haphazard. It’s part of the design. If one is temperate, he or she doesn’t just happen to be prudent, just, and courageous. In reality, the virtues actually reinforce each other. They encourage, inspire, or even cause each other to grow and to flourish. Most of this chapter describes how prudence causes the moral virtues. It’s also true, though, that the moral virtues cause prudence, albeit in a different way. Aristotle has a shorthand way for capturing this phenomenon. He says, “As the man is, so he sees.” So, if a man is good or virtuous, then he will reason well or virtuously. In other words, if a man is just, courageous, and temperate, then he will be prudent as well. For, if he has the moral virtues, his well-formed desires aid him to have well-formed thoughts.

亚里士多德解释了其中的原因。他指出,在实践事务中,各种伦理德行的目的都发挥着原理的作用。这里的原理类似于出发点,会激发或产生行动。正义的目的就是给予他人所应得的;勇毅的目的是难以获得的感官之善和难以克服的感官之恶;节制的目的则是简单的感官之善与恶。具体而言,这些目的可能平凡如满足饥饿(节制),也可能崇高如敬拜神(正义)。不过,无论目的高低,有德行的人都会对其培养出秩序井然的欲求,或与之建立秩序井然的关系。他学会以良好而有分寸的方式爱这些目的。这继而影响他思考这些目的的方式——有德行的人作决定时,更有可能正确地思考目的,也更容易作出明智的行动。

Aristotle describes why this is so. He explains that, in practical things, the ends of the moral virtues each work like principles. Principles here mean something like points of departure. They are what motivate or give rise to action. The end of justice is simply what is due to the other. The end of fortitude is difficult sense goods and evils. The end of temperance is simple sense goods and evils. Concretely speaking, these ends may be as humble as satisfying hunger (temperance) or as lofty as worshiping God (justice). Regardless of whether they are low or high, though, a virtuous person develops an orderly appetite for these ends or an orderly relationship to them. He learns to love them well and within bounds. This then affects how he thinks about them — a virtuous person is more likely to think about ends well when it comes to making decisions. He is better disposed to be prudent.

为了说明这一点,假设你正沿着街区前往当地一家小餐馆,享用期待已久的午餐。走在路上时,你想起自己欠一位朋友10美元,而碰巧身上只有10美元。恰在此时,你看到这位朋友站在餐馆门前,正与一名警察交谈。你从远处听见警察说:「你不能只开着双闪灯,必须支付10美元停车费。」你也正好知道,这位朋友眼下被各种责任压得喘不过气来,手头也很拮据。若有谁配得你的援助,那就是她。因为你有正义、勇毅和节制,所以看出这场相遇是天意的安排,而自己恰好及时赶到。这正是偿还债务、助她一臂之力的机会。你丝毫不会想到自己将因此吃不上午餐;这个念头甚至根本不会浮现。于是,你已经具备明智行动的倾向,便赶到朋友身旁,替她付了停车费,或许还邀请她这周晚些时候一起吃晚餐。由于你的欲求秩序井然,你大体上正确地看待处境,因而作出明智的行动。

To illustrate this point, say you’re headed down the block to have a much-anticipated lunch at a local diner. As you walk along, you recall that you owe $10 to a friend. As it turns out, you only have $10 on you. Then, as luck would have it, you see this friend standing in front of the diner in conversation with a police officer. From a distance, you hear the police officer say, “You can’t just leave your flashers on. You have to pay the $10 parking.” You also happen to know that your friend is overwhelmed by responsibilities right now and strapped for cash. If anyone is deserving of your aid, it’s her. Because you are just, courageous, and temperate, you see the meeting as providential and your arrival as timely. Here is an opportunity to repay a debt and lend a hand. You don’t think for a minute about how you’ll miss out on lunch. It doesn’t even occur to you. And so, disposed as you are to act prudently, you hurry over to your friend, pay the parking cost, and maybe even extend a dinner invitation for later in the week. Because you have orderly appetites, you see the situation well, more or less, and so act prudently.

亚里士多德接着说明,反过来也同样成立。如果你受错误塑造的欲求奴役,就会错误地看待事物。不义、怯懦和不节制都会使人倾向于不明智。一个沉溺于恶习生活的人,不会以应有的方式爱慕或追求伦理德行的目的;由于他的欲望扭曲,对现实的看法也随之偏斜。他只会从满足自身需要的自私角度看待一切。正义、勇毅和节制上的缺失,会使他在明智上也有所缺失。

Aristotle goes on to explain that the inverse is equally true. If you are the slave of malformed appetites, you will see poorly. Injustice, cowardice, and intemperance each dispose to imprudence. The man who is consumed by a life of vice neither loves nor pursues the ends of the moral virtues as he should; and since he desires perversely, his view of reality is skewed. He sees exclusively in the selfish terms of satisfying his needs. Failings in justice, fortitude, and temperance dispose him to failings in prudence.

让我们回到那家小餐馆,不过这次从一个有恶习之人的角度来看。你再次注意到朋友正在餐馆门前与警察交谈。但这一次,你犹豫了。一天到了这个时候,光是想到要回家做火鸡三明治,就让你觉得不堪重负。别人总要求你作出牺牲,但你偶尔也需要为自己花一点钱。况且,朋友可以用来支付停车费的10美元,也不一定非得是你这10美元。严格来说,你从未说过会在什么时候还钱。再等几天又有什么关系?想着这些,你从侧门偷偷溜进餐馆,任凭朋友面对自己的命运。考虑到你的动机,这样做并不明智,却毫不令人意外。你之所以倾向于不明智,是因为你无法承认他人所应得的(不义),不愿在厨房里费力(怯懦),又过度依恋餐馆里的食物(不节制)。这就是硬币的另一面。「人是什么样,就会怎样看。」

Return to the diner, but this time from a vicious perspective. Again, you notice your friend out front in conversation with a police officer. This time, though, you hesitate. At this point in your day, the thought of returning home and preparing a turkey sandwich is just too much to handle. People are always asking you to make sacrifices, but every now and then you need to spend a little something on yourself. After all, your $10 isn’t the only $10 that your friend could use to pay for parking. Technically, you never said when you’d pay her back. What’s another few days? With these thoughts in mind, you sneak in the side entrance to the diner and leave your friend to her fate. This is imprudent, given your motives, but it’s not surprising. You were disposed to imprudence by an inability to recognize what is due to another (injustice), an unwillingness to labor in the kitchen (cowardice), and an inordinate attachment to diner food (intemperance). Behold the flip side of the coin. “As the man is, so he sees.”

伦理德行医治并提升欲望,从而使我们的思想更加清晰,也使我们倾向于作出明智的行动。

The moral virtues heal and elevate desire, and in so doing, they clarify our thinking and dispose us to prudent action.

从这个例子可以清楚看出,我们需要伦理德行,才能真正拥有明智。没有伦理德行,我们就会步履维艰。从一个角度看,这可能令人沮丧,尤其考虑到我们伦理上的软弱。但从另一个角度看,这也能鼓舞人心。伦理德行可以使成长的效果倍增:在伦理德行中成长,意味着在明智中成长,也意味着整个伦理生活都得到成长。伦理德行医治并提升欲望,从而使我们的思想更加清晰,也使我们倾向于作出明智的行动。我们变得越好,看得也越清楚。我们在伦理德行中成长,也会在明智中成长。不过,伦理德行固然促成明智,明智也会以自己的方式促成伦理德行。现在,我们就来探讨这个方面。

From this illustration, it’s evident that we need the moral virtues to be truly prudent. Without them, we flounder. From one vantage, this can be dispiriting, especially given our moral weakness. Seen from another perspective, though, it can be encouraging. Moral virtue is a force multiplier: Growth in moral virtue means growth in prudence, growth in one’s whole moral life. The moral virtues heal and elevate desire, and in so doing, they clarify our thinking and dispose us to prudent action. As we become better, we see better. As we grow in moral virtue, we grow in prudence. But while the moral virtues cause prudence, prudence also causes the moral virtues in its own way. It’s to this aspect that we now turn.

德行的驭手

The Charioteer of the Virtues

圣伯尔纳铎谈到四枢德时,把明智称为「德行的驭手」。按照这幅图景,驭手(明智)心怀一个目的启程,那就是赢得比赛。为此,他驾驭自己的马匹(正义、勇毅和节制),视需要鞭策或勒住它们。驭手若要出色地参赛,就必须了解自己的马匹,知道怎样对待它们最为合宜。他还必须知道它们如何彼此配合,才能协调其行动。实际上,驭手负责整合并统一自己的马队,引导它们追求胜利。

When describing the cardinal virtues, St. Bernard of Clairvaux refers to prudence as the “charioteer of the virtues.” According to the image, the charioteer (prudence) sets out with a purpose in mind, namely, winning the race. To that end, he drives his horses (justice, fortitude, and temperance), spurring them on and reining them in, as need be. If he is to compete well, the charioteer must know his horses and how best to treat them. He must also know how they interact with each other so he can coordinate their movements. Effectively, the charioteer is responsible for integrating and unifying his team in pursuit of victory.

从这幅图景中,我们基本可以理解明智如何引导伦理德行,从而使人达到整全。首先,明智监督每一种德行的活动。每种德行都有自己特定的目的和倾向:正义关乎他人所应得的;勇毅关乎难以获得的感官之善;节制关乎简单的感官之善。明智就像熟悉马匹的驭手,会认识这些不同的倾向,并确定实现其目的的最佳途径。明智带领每一种较低层次的德行充分发挥潜力,在奔向胜利的过程中,交替地鞭策和约束它们。

From this image, we get a basic understanding of how prudence directs the moral virtues and so makes the human person whole. First, prudence oversees the movements of the individual virtues. Each virtue has its own particular end and inclination: Justice concerns what is due to the other; fortitude concerns difficult sense goods; temperance concerns simple sense goods. Prudence, like a charioteer who knows his horses, gets to know these different inclinations and identifies the best ways to achieve them. Prudence drives each of the lower virtues to its fullest potential by alternately spurring them on and reining them in as it presses on toward victory.

其次,明智能够综观整个人生,因而把各种伦理德行的活动汇聚起来,引导它们朝向自己统摄全局的目的。实际上,明智把伦理德行训练成一支队伍。驭手可能把强壮而冲动的马安排在前面,把沉稳而经验丰富的马置于队伍中间;同样,明智协调各种伦理德行,使每一种德行都能发挥最大作用。在此过程中,它也把这些德行提升到更崇高的追求。马匹若无人驾驭,不会梦想赢得比赛;怀有这种壮志的是驭手。不过,一旦成功,驭手和马匹就会共享同一场胜利。同样,正义、勇毅和节制本身不会从整个人生的角度思考,明智却会替它们思考。明智始终牢记目标,鞭策伦理德行奔向胜利,使人的生命在信心与理性的统领下整全、统一地蓬勃发展,并由圣灵的感动推动。为了更深入地理解明智如何促成伦理德行,让我们仔细考察它成就整全之工作的这两个主要特征。

Second, since it has the power to see the whole of life, prudence draws together the movements of the moral virtues and drives them to its own overarching end. In effect, prudence trains the moral virtues into a team. Like the charioteer who might place the strong, impetuous horse in the front and the calm, veteran horse mid-pack, prudence coordinates the moral virtues so as to get the most out of each. In the process, it also raises them to a higher pursuit. Left to themselves, horses don’t dream of winning a race. It’s the charioteer who dreams of such feats. If they succeed, though, both charioteer and horses share in the same victory. Likewise, justice, fortitude, and temperance don’t think in terms of the whole of life. Prudence, though, thinks for them. Prudence holds the goal in mind as it spurs the moral virtues on toward the victory of integral and unified human flourishing under the rule of faith and reason, carried on by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. To appreciate better how prudence causes the moral virtues, let’s look closer at these two main features of prudence’s whole-making work.

倾向与自然法

Inclinations and the Natural Law

明智成就整全之工作的第一个层面,是帮助每一种伦理德行实现其目的。明智这位驭手照料伦理德行的马厩,衡量它们各自不同的追求,并确定实现这些追求的最佳途径。在这项工作中,明智处理各种伦理德行的不同倾向。倾向描述我们趋向不同目的的各种方式,无论这些目的是食物、饮品、家庭生活还是对神的敬拜。伦理德行训练并成全这些倾向。事实上,伦理德行实际上就是一种经过医治与提升、朝向某个人类目的的倾向。明智在这些不同倾向中建立秩序,借此帮助伦理德行。倾向对于理解这个概念十分根本,因此我们要花一点时间,更深入地了解其意义。

The first dimension of prudence’s whole-making work is to help the individual moral virtues achieve their ends. Prudence, the charioteer, tends the stable of the moral virtues by sizing up their different pursuits and identifying the best ways to go about them. In this work, prudence deals with the different inclinations of each of the moral virtues. Inclinations describe the different ways we tend toward different ends, whether those be food, drink, family life, or divine worship. The moral virtues train and perfect these inclinations. In fact, a moral virtue is effectively a healed and elevated inclination for some human end. Prudence helps the moral virtues along by establishing order in these different inclinations. Since inclinations are so foundational for grasping this concept, we will spend a moment trying to better understand their significance.

粗略观察受造界,我们就能看到,每一种受造物都会自然趋向使自己整全的事物。植物向外伸展根系,吸收水分和养分,又把叶片转向阳光。动物逃避捕食者并照料幼崽,使自己的鸟群、兽群或畜群繁衍壮大。人类种植庄稼、饲养牲畜、建造城市,并寻求认识最高层次的真理。每一种受造物都以自己最「熟知」的方式,寻求实现其本性。

From a cursory look at creation, we can see that every creature gravitates spontaneously toward what makes it whole. Plants send out roots to collect both water and nutrients and turn their leaves toward the sun’s rays. Animals flee from predators and care for their young in order to fill out their flock, pack, or herd. Human beings plant crops, husband animals, build cities, and seek to know truths of the highest order. Each creature seeks the fulfillment of its nature in the way it “knows” best.

就我们自身的人性而言,有一些基本倾向界定了我们是谁,以及我们应当如何生活。第一,我们想要继续存在。因此,我们自然倾向于维持自己的生存。第二,我们想要确保人类繁衍不息。因此,我们自然倾向于家庭生活。第三,我们想要培养有意义的关系。因此,我们自然倾向于认识关于神的真理,并在社会中和平共处。

In the case of our own human nature, there are certain basic inclinations that define who we are and how we are meant to be. First, we want to keep on being. And so, we are naturally inclined to stay in existence. Second, we want to ensure the survival of our species. And so, we are naturally inclined to family life. Third, we want to cultivate meaningful relationships. And so, we are naturally inclined to know the truth about God and to live peaceably in society.

这些倾向(以及其他倾向)并不是后来才附加在人性上的东西,而是我们何以为人的核心。它们如此深刻地铭刻在我们的本性中,以至于我们称之为一种法律——自然法。说这些倾向是一种法律,意味着我们若要使生命蓬勃发展,就必须遵循它们。但这并不表示我们可以完全任由这些倾向摆布。我们的倾向,尤其是对食物、饮品和性行为最基本的倾向,往往处于失序状态。这并不令人意外,因为它们出自堕落本性中已经堕落的官能。正如我们先前看到的,我们的理智有无知,意志有恶意,情绪则兼有软弱与私欲。因此,我们自然且良善的倾向并不总能可靠地持续追随真正的善。即使我们认识到,较高的善(例如参加主日弥撒敬拜神)应当优先于较低的善(例如熬夜后睡足八小时),但较低的善极具吸引力时,选择较高的善仍可能十分困难。那么,我们如何医治并提升这些不同的倾向?如何遵循自然法?答案是在伦理德行中成长。伦理德行为我们阐明自然法,并使我们有能力将其付诸实行。它们释放我们,使我们追求卓越,并引导我们走向幸福。

These inclinations (among others) aren’t just something tacked onto our nature as an afterthought. They are at the heart of what it means for us to be human, so deeply impressed in our natures that we refer to them as a law — the natural law. To say that the inclinations are a law means that, if we are to flourish, we must follow them. That doesn’t suggest that we can just abandon ourselves to them. Our inclinations, especially those most basic inclinations to food, drink, and sexual intercourse, are often disorderly. This comes as no surprise since they flow from fallen powers of a fallen nature. As we saw earlier, we experience ignorance in the intellect, malice in the will, and a combination of weakness and concupiscence in the passions. As a result, our natural and good inclinations cannot always be relied upon to track consistently with the true good. Even though we may recognize that a higher good (like the worship of God offered at Sunday Mass) should be preferred to a lower good (like eight hours of sleep after a late night), it may still be hard to choose the higher good when the lower good is very attractive. How, then, do we heal and elevate these different inclinations? How do we follow the natural law? By growth in moral virtue. The moral virtues clarify the natural law for us and empower us to carry it out. They free us for excellence and direct us toward happiness.

目的与途径

Ends and Means

在医治并提升这些倾向的工作中,明智占据特殊地位。它衡量伦理德行的目的,并确定实现这些目的的最佳途径,借此发挥一种领导作用。明智这位驭手训练每一种伦理德行,使其胜任比赛中要发挥的作用,并驱策它们达到真正的人性卓越。

In the work of healing and elevating these inclinations, prudence occupies a special place. It exercises a kind of leadership by forming an estimation of the ends of the moral virtues and identifying the best means to those ends. Prudence, the charioteer, trains each of the moral virtues for the roles they are to play in the race and drives them on to the attainment of true human excellence.

人面对着各种需要加以排序的良善目的。有些较高,有些较低;选择其中一个,可能会排除另一个。明智之人一眼便能把握所有这些善,理解它们,并把每一个安置在适当位置。明智能够做到这一点,因为它可以综观人类一切追求的全貌,不受限于某一种善,而会考虑一切真正合乎人性的事物。

The human person is presented with a variety of good ends in need of ordering. Some rank higher while others rank lower, and a choice of one may exclude the choice of another. At a glance, the prudent person is able to take in all these goods, comprehend them, and fix each in its place. Prudence is able to do so because it can survey the whole landscape of human pursuits. It’s not limited to just this or that good. It accounts for everything that is properly human.

要精通一门语言,就不能只专注于语法、词汇、听力或口语,而排除其他方面。必须把这一切结合起来,才能真正熟练掌握。明智帮助你精通整个人类生活的语言,是使人能娴熟生活的德行。亚里士多德写道,明智的人「能够妥善审议什么对自己是善的、有益的;这并不是就某个特定方面而言,例如什么有益于健康或力量,而是就什么有益于整体上的美好生活而言」。其他德行各自针对人类活动的某个特定领域,明智关注的却是人的整全。从这个角度看,明智之人会按照各种善在真正的人类生命蓬勃发展中发挥的作用,给予它们恰如其分的重视。

To master a language, you can’t just focus on grammar or vocabulary or listening or speaking to the exclusion of other dimensions. It all has to be taken together to become truly proficient. Prudence helps you to master the language of the whole of human life. It’s the virtue of human fluency. Aristotle writes that the prudent man is “able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some particular respect, e.g. about what sorts of things conduce to health or to strength, but about what sorts of things conduce to the good life in general.” While other virtues are determined to some specific domain of human activity, prudence is focused on human totality. From this standpoint, the prudent person esteems different goods as they ought to be esteemed — according to the role they play in genuine human flourishing.

明智拥有统摄全局的视角,因而能够帮助伦理德行衡量各自的目的、确定实现目的的途径,并在此过程中成全人的倾向。每种伦理德行都有自身特有的卓越。正义医治并提升意志,把他人所应得的给予他,从而纠正人与人的关系。勇毅医治并提升情绪,使人在困难面前刚强坚定——时而推动人直面困难,时而警告人不可鲁莽。节制医治并提升人对食物、饮品和性行为(在婚姻生活中)的情绪,鼓励人享受这些善,同时保持心灵清醒。这些德行本身能够感知各自特有的卓越,却未必知道该如何选择实现这些目的的途径。这正是明智的任务,因为唯有受到法律与恩典塑造的明智,才知道在具体处境中怎样行动才合乎理性。

Because of the overarching perspective that prudence enjoys, it can help the moral virtues to size up their ends, to identify means, and to perfect inclinations along the way. Each moral virtue has its own proper excellence. The virtue of justice heals and elevates the will, rectifying one’s relationships by rendering to the other what is due. The virtue of fortitude heals and elevates the passions by steeling one against difficulties — alternately urging on to confrontation and cautioning from recklessness. The virtue of temperance heals and elevates the passions for food and drink and sexual intercourse (in the setting of married life) by heartening one to enjoy these goods while retaining sobriety of spirit. Left to themselves, these virtues have a sense for their proper excellence, but they don’t necessarily know how to go about selecting means to those ends. This is the task of prudence, because only prudence, informed by law and grace, knows what acting reasonably looks like in the circumstances.

我们已经看到,伦理德行的目的就是自然法的一部分。人受造便会渴望维持生存、建立家庭生活,并享有真正的共融。伦理德行无需发现自己的目的,因为人性已经赋予了这些目的。然而,实现这些目的的途径必须由理性来分辨,而伦理德行本身并不属于理性。伦理德行存在于欲求能力——意志和情绪——之中,并不存在于理智之中。因此,它们需要一种理性的德行——明智——来帮助自己理清实现这些天赋目的的途径。

The ends of the moral virtues, we have seen, are just part of the natural law. The human person is built to desire preservation of existence, family life, and genuine communion. The moral virtues don’t have to discover their ends. They are provided by human nature. However, the means to those ends have to be discerned by reason, and the moral virtues are not, of themselves, reasonable. The moral virtues live in the appetites — the will and the passions. They don’t live in the intellect. Thus, they need a reasonable virtue — prudence — to help them sort out the means to their naturally-given ends.

明智负责确定如何行动:如何实行正义,如何展现勇毅,以及如何保持节制。

Prudence is responsible for determining how: how to be just, how to be courageous, and how to be temperate.

明智负责确定如何行动:如何实行正义,如何展现勇毅,以及如何保持节制。就正义而言,明智根据公共利益来把握何时应当惩罚,何时应当宽恕。就勇毅而言,明智根据相关人物的具体情况,分辨应该战斗、逃避还是忍耐。就节制而言,明智会按照具体的时间和地点,判断怎样算太多或太少。伦理德行塑造欲求能力,使人正确地渴望;明智则运用理性,使人正确地思考。明智在不同欲望之间作出选择,指导人具体决定该由公司报销还是个人承担费用,该急停跳投还是突破上篮,该喝两杯还是三杯鸡尾酒。明智衡量其中涉及的各种善,然后选出实现目的的最佳途径。

Prudence is responsible for determining how: how to be just, how to be courageous, and how to be temperate. In the case of justice, prudence grasps when to punish or to pardon in light of the common good. In the case of fortitude, prudence discerns concretely whether to fight, to flee, or to endure, given the persons involved. In the case of temperance, prudence supplies the particular insight into what’s too much or too little given the time and the place. The moral virtues form the appetites to desire well, while prudence applies the reason to think well. Prudence chooses among different desires, directing one in the concrete choice between a corporate reimbursement or a personal expenditure, between a pull-up jump shot or a drive to the hoop, between two cocktails or three. Prudence sizes up the different goods at stake and then selects the best means for achieving the ends.

协调各种德行

Coordinating the Virtues

明智成就整全之工作的第二个层面,与第一个层面密切相关。明智这位驭手协调各种伦理德行的活动,驱策它们共同奔向自己的目标。明智把整支队伍集合起来,套上挽具,塑造一种整合而统一、专注于人类生命蓬勃发展的生活。

The second dimension of prudence’s whole-making work is intimately associated with the first dimension. Prudence, the charioteer, coordinates the movements of the moral virtues and drives them together toward its goal. Prudence assembles and harnesses its team to fashion an integrated and unified life bent on human flourishing.

让我们简要回到关于倾向的讨论。各种伦理德行都倾向于各自的目的:正义倾向于给予他人所应得的;勇毅倾向于难以获得的感官之善和难以克服的感官之恶;节制则倾向于简单的感官之善与恶。不过,并非只有伦理德行才有倾向。明智也有自己的倾向;这不是欲求的倾向,而是思想的倾向。亚里士多德写道:「所有人按本性都渴望求知。」正如我们所说,求知有时是为了求知本身,有时则是为了行动。明智引导后一种倾向,使之朝向实践真理,推动我们为使生命蓬勃发展而作出良好选择。实际上,明智医治并提升实践理性的倾向,也就是理性对应该做什么的追求;而且这不仅针对某个具体处境,更针对整个人生。

Let’s return briefly to the discussion of inclinations. The moral virtues each have inclinations to their respective ends: Justice is inclined to what is due to the other, fortitude to difficult sense goods and evils, and temperance to simple sense goods and evils. It’s not only the moral virtues that have inclinations, though. Prudence has its own inclination as well, an inclination not of appetite but of thought. Aristotle writes, “All men, by nature, desire to know.” As we have said, sometimes that knowledge is for knowing’s sake, and sometimes it is for doing’s sake. Prudence guides this latter inclination to the practical truth, moving us to choose well for what makes us flourish. In effect, prudence heals and elevates the inclination of practical reason — the reason’s pursuit of what is to be done, and not just in this or that setting, but for the whole of life.

明智把这一真理存于心中,同时调用正义、勇毅和节制的伦理力量,以实现唯有它才能理解的目的。在此过程中,各种伦理德行因成全整体而获得最卓越的表达。在明智的驱策下,正义的严正、勇毅的无畏和节制的适度,全都达到最高的实现。这在具体生活中如何展开?假设你天生非常焦虑,十分注重细节。你的头脑常被实际事务占据,尤其是在这些事显得紧迫的时候。你一直设法控制这种倾向,却收效有限。毫不意外,这种性情使你难以祷告。每天早晨,你会尝试默想三十分钟,但思绪总会飘向实际事务。每当发生这种情况,你就把祷告放到一边,列出待办事项。你暗自思量,也许这正是主希望你祷告的内容。不过,坦白说,你其实并不相信这套自我辩解。因为反复盘算当天的任务虽然带来片刻放松,你很快却会因自己如此轻易地偏离祷告而感到失望。

While it holds this truth in mind, prudence calls upon the moral force of justice, fortitude, and temperance for achieving the end that it alone is able to understand. In the process, the moral virtues come to their most excellent expression in the fulfillment of the whole. With prudence driving them onward, the rigor of justice, the audacity of fortitude, and the moderation of temperance all assume their highest realization. How does this play out in the concrete? Let’s say that you are, by temperament, a very anxious and detail-oriented person. Often, your mind is consumed with practical things, especially when those things seem urgent. You are trying to manage it but only with limited success. Unsurprisingly, this disposition makes it hard for you to pray. You try to meditate for thirty minutes each morning, but your mind wanders toward practical things. When this happens, you set aside your prayer in order to list your action items. You muse to yourself that, perhaps, this is what the Lord wanted you to pray about. If you’re honest, though, you don’t really believe the rationalization. For, although momentarily relieved by rehearsing the day’s duties, you soon feel disappointed that you were so easily deflected from your prayer.

然而,近来你取得了一些进展。有几次,你成功抵挡住那股冲动,坚持继续默想。每当如此,你不再焦虑地专注于主,心里很快便安静下来。随着你在德行中成长,明智把这些成功的经验内化于心,并在类似情况再次出现时调用相关德行来帮助你。当脑中的待办事项开始增加,明智便点燃正义,使你想起自己敬拜神的承诺比这些琐碎任务更加重要。此外,明智还命令勇毅平息你的恐惧,不再认定没有立刻写下来的事就必然会被遗忘。明智也会在前一晚给节制分派任务,确保你睡个好觉;若非如此,这段祷告时间从一开始就不可能实现。在这个简单的行动中,正义、勇毅和节制都在明智的协调下被带入敬拜。每一种伦理德行都分享祷告的胜利;在这一行动中,你的伦理生活汇聚起来,共同追求一个整全的人性目的。

As of late, however, you have had some successes. On a couple of occasions, you were able to resist the urge and persevere in your meditation. When that happened, your mind was soon quieted as you attended to the Lord less anxiously. As you have grown in virtue, prudence interiorizes the experience of these successes and calls upon the pertinent virtues to aid you when the occasion next arises. As the mental list begins to populate, prudence kindles justice to recall that your commitment to the worship of God is more important than these little tasks. Further, prudence commands fortitude to quell the fear that what is not immediately written down will necessarily be forgotten. It also tasks temperance the night before to ensure a good night’s sleep, apart from which this prayer time wouldn’t have been possible in the first place. In this one simple act, justice, fortitude, and temperance are all drawn into worship through the coordination of prudence. Each of the moral virtues participate in the victory of prayer, and, in the act, your moral life comes together in the pursuit of a wholly human end.

圣托马斯教导说,明智就像伦理德行的护理。正如神的护理在精心安排的计划中,以温和而有力的方式配置各种受造物,明智也把伦理德行纳入自身的理性安排。明智能够充分顾及我们人类生命的整个历程。伦理德行低头注目、向前耕耘,明智却昂首站立,环顾全局,同时着手开展其智慧的工作。明智顾及人类生活的整体,因而让正义、勇毅和节制得到充分发挥;它越过这些德行各自有限的视野,以自身圆满的眼光综观一切。

Prudence, Saint Thomas teaches, is like the providence of the moral virtues. Just as providence disposes creatures sweetly and strongly within a well-orchestrated divine plan, so prudence draws the moral virtues into its own rational designs. Prudence is able to account well for the whole course of our human lives. Whereas the moral virtues lower their eyes and plow ahead, prudence stands upright and surveys the scene as it sets about its wise work. By taking into account the whole of the human affair, prudence gives full scope to justice, fortitude, and temperance, looking beyond their blinders into its own plenary vision.

这又把我们带回明智作为德行驭手的图景。我们已经看到,明智特别适合帮助各种伦理德行实现各自的追求,并把它们纳入整全的人性工作。离开明智,它们或许能表现出某种卓越,或实现某些善,却永远无法充分发挥潜力。没有明智的伦理德行就像未经训练的马匹。它们纵情狂奔或抗拒驯马人的鞭子时,或许令人振奋,却也令人恐惧——远看美丽,近看可怕。然而,一旦受过训练,这些马匹便会参与人的工作,既能用于劳作,也能用于休闲,投身于真正属于人的追求。战马、赛马以及名垂青史的骏马,都是从它们中间产生的。在驯马师、骑兵和骑师的教导下,这些马匹能够成就非凡之事。伦理德行也是如此。在德行驭手明智的照管下,各种伦理德行受到驱策,实现各自的目的,并在人类生命蓬勃发展的工作中彼此协调。

Which leads us back to the image of prudence as charioteer of the virtues. Prudence, we have seen, is uniquely suited to assist the moral virtues in their respective pursuits and draw them into a wholly human work. Apart from prudence, they may exhibit some excellence or achieve certain goods, but they will never reach their full potential. The moral virtues without prudence are like untrained horses. When they’re running wild or resisting the breaker’s whip, they may be inspiring, but they’re also terrifying — beautiful at a distance, but scary up close. Once trained though, these horses become part of a human work — employable for labor and leisure alike, called into genuine human pursuits. It’s from among their ranks that you have your war horses and race horses, the great horses of memory. Under the tutelage of the trainer, the cavalryman, and the jockey, these horses do something special. So too with the moral virtues. Under the care of prudence, the charioteer of the virtues, the moral virtues are driven to the realization of their ends and coordinated in the work of human flourishing.

灌注理性

Infusing Reason

提炼驭手图景中的洞见后,我们可以把明智视为有德欲求的理性。明智与意志和情绪互动时,可以说是把理性灌注到人类生活的每个方面。明智对实践真理的洞见满溢出理智的边界,进入欲求能力,激发合乎德行的行动,并相应地塑造欲求能力。这主要体现在两个方面。

By distilling the insights taken from the charioteer images, we can think of prudence as the reason of the virtuous appetites. Prudence, in its interaction with the will and passions, can be said to infuse reason into every aspect of human life. From beyond the bounds of the intellect, prudence’s insight into the practical truth overflows into the appetites, inspiring virtuous action and shaping the appetites accordingly. This can be seen in two main ways.

第一,明智把对合理生活的习惯性渴望灌注于欲求能力。亚里士多德写道,伦理德行把欲求能力引向某种中道,使其避开过度与不足。例如,勇毅之人在鲁莽(过度)与怯懦(不足)之间前行,有节制的人则在放纵(过度)与麻木(不足)之间把握方向。这种中道由明智确定,而这种确定实际上会渗入欲求能力本身。举一个日常生活中的例子,想想你对待儿童菜单的方式。到了某个时候,我们都会停止从儿童菜单点餐。最初放弃儿童菜单时,或许是有意识地决定舍弃孩子气的事物;但到了一定阶段,我们便彻底越过它,不再回头。想象一下现在重新点儿童餐,我们很可能已经不再喜欢那些食物。我们的欲求已经改变,想要更加实在、真正的食物。食物如此,善整体而言也是如此。明智经年累月地把理性灌注于我们的欲求能力,我们终会渴望人类生活中更加实在、更加真实的事物。

First, prudence infuses the appetites with a habitual desire for a reasonable life. Aristotle writes that the moral virtues direct the appetites to a kind of mean, maneuvering them between excess or defect. The courageous man, for instance, wends his way between rashness (excess) and cowardice (defect) and the temperate man navigates between overindulgence (excess) and insensibility (defect). This mean is determined by prudence, but the determination actually spills into the very appetite itself. To give an everyday example, think of your approach to the kids’ menu. At a certain point, we all stop ordering from it. That first departure may be a conscious decision to set aside childish things, but at a certain point, we just move on from it entirely. Imagine going back to the kids’ menu now. Chances are that we no longer even enjoy those meals. Our appetites have changed. We want food that is more substantial and real. What is true of food is also true of the good more generally. As prudence infuses reason into our appetites over the years, we come in time to desire what is more substantial and real in human life.

第二,各种欲求能力本身开始以更合乎理性的方式互动。原罪创伤的后果之一,就是我们来到世上时便处于不合理的状态。每一种欲求都追逐自己的目的,很少顾及应当如何与其他欲求协调。每一种欲求都像一个闹脾气的孩子,不停地重复:「我的!」堕落以前,人能够轻易而有序地追求各种人类之善;如今,这变得极其困难。然而,明智把理性灌注于欲求能力,便开始按照它们原初和谐的模式加以整理。每一种欲求都能与其他欲求进行富有成果且合乎理性的互动,因为它们全都被纳入理性整全而统一的工作。一个人的整个生活由此带上理性的印记。

Second, the appetites themselves come to interact more reasonably. One of the effects of the wounds of original sin is that we enter the world in an unreasonable state. Each of our appetites seeks its end with little concern for how it ought to coordinate with the others. Each appetite acts like a pouty child endlessly repeating “Mine!” Before the fall, man would have found it easy to pursue a variety of human goods in orderly fashion. Now, it is exceedingly difficult. By infusing reason into the appetites, though, prudence begins to order the appetites according to the pattern of their original harmony. Each appetite is empowered to interact fruitfully and reasonably with the others, because each has been made part of reason’s integral and unified work. The whole of one’s life has been made to bear the mark of reason.

灌注理性的这两个方面都涉及伦理德行。伦理德行使欲求能力成熟,并帮助各种欲求彼此协调,形成合乎理性的和谐。圣托马斯阿奎那写道:「伦理德行是伴随正确理性的习性,而这正确理性当然就是明智。」伦理德行作为明智的同盟,与理性共同工作,使人重新得到整合与统一。因此,伦理德行也分享明智尊严中的高贵,并在某种程度上经历明智的护理。为了说明这一点,让我们以节制为例。

Both of these aspects of infusing reason involve the moral virtues. Moral virtues mature the appetites and help to coordinate a reasonable harmony among them. St. Thomas Aquinas writes that “Moral virtue is a habit accompanied by right reason, which, of course, is prudence.” The moral virtues, as the allies of prudence, work with reason to reintegrate and unify the human person. As a result, the moral virtues come to share in the nobility of prudence’s dignity. The moral virtues experience something of prudence’s providence. To illustrate this, take the example of temperance.

若只凭自身,节制仅仅关乎食物、饮品和性行为。它的活动本身并没有什么独具人性的地方,因为我们与牛和袋鼠都有这些倾向。然而,节制一旦被纳入明智,便会远远超越动物界。正如约瑟夫·皮珀所写:「唯有借着这种已得到成全、能作出良好选择的能力[明智],趋向善的本能倾向[欲求]才会被提升,进入人作出决定的属灵核心;真正属于人的行动正是从这里产生。」与明智联合以后,节制便更充分地被纳入理性生活。在这种背景下,无论一个人是在为晚宴选择菜单,还是决定每逢星期三和星期五禁食,其选择都会呈现出新的面貌。情绪依然参与其中,却已被理性的判断浸透。

Left to itself, temperance just concerns food, drink, and sexual intercourse. There’s nothing about its activity, though, that is distinctively human. We share its inclinations with cows and kangaroos. But, when taken up by prudence, temperance goes well beyond the animal kingdom. As Josef Pieper writes: “Only by means of this perfected ability to make good choices [prudence] are instinctive inclinations toward goodness [appetites] exalted into the spiritual core of man’s decisions, from which truly human acts arise.” In alliance with prudence, temperance is drawn more fully into the life of reason. In this setting, whether one is selecting the menu for a dinner party or deciding to fast on Wednesdays and Fridays, the choice takes on a new aspect. The passions are still engaged, but as suffused with reason’s judgment.

这里的节制不只是放慢脚步和说「不」。明智把它纳入一个更加丰富的人性故事,而唯有明智能够讲述这个故事。对有节制的女子来说,只说「我倾向于家庭生活,所以我要嫁给身旁这个男人,开始组织家庭」并不足够。这未必是最佳选择,尤其当她所考虑的男子还十分年轻,即将因工作轮调而离开这个国家,或蒙召度修会生活时。归根结底,人朝向的是整全的一生,是一种完整而统一的生活;伦理德行在其中发挥重要作用,而明智这种德行则成全并协调这一切。

Temperance, here, isn’t just a matter of slowing down and saying no. Prudence draws it into a richer human story, one that prudence alone is able to tell. For the temperate woman, it is not enough to say, “I am inclined to family life, therefore I will marry this man standing next to me and begin.” That might not be the best choice, especially if the particular man under consideration is very young or is about to leave the country for a work rotation or is called to a religious vocation. In the end, the human person is ordered to a whole life, a life of integrity and unity, one in which the moral virtues play an important role — one perfected and coordinated by the virtue of prudence.

明智把理性灌注于生活,堪称首屈一指的人性卓越。它是一种能力,能理清人生的不同方面,并把它们汇聚起来,共同追求幸福。正是在这个意义上,沙漠教父称明智为「德行之母、守护者和引导者」。明智汇聚较低层次德行的力量,按照自身清晰的眼光鞭策它们前进,并引导每一种德行各安其位。明智确保整个人得到成全,因为整合、统一,并最终以合乎理性的卓越浸透整个人类生活,正是明智的职责。

Prudence, with its infusion of reason, is simply the human excellence par excellence. It’s the competence that sorts out the different aspects of one’s life and brings them together in the pursuit of happiness. It’s in this spirit that the Desert Fathers refer to prudence as “the mother, the guardian, and the director of the virtues.” Prudence gathers the power of the lower virtues, spurs them on according to its clear-sighted vision, and guides each in its proper place. Prudence sees to the perfection of a whole person, for it is the place of prudence to integrate, to unify, and ultimately to infuse the whole of human life with its reasonable excellence.

反思

Reflect

你是否觉得自己尤其需要培养某些德行?在这些德行中成长,可以怎样帮助你在明智中成长?

Are there particular virtues you feel like you need to work on? How might growth in those virtues help with growth in prudence?

为了建立更具明智的祷告生活,你可以采取哪些实际步骤?

What are some practical steps you can take toward establishing a more prudent prayer life?

想想一天中你被某种欲望压倒的时刻,无论是想吃零食、看手机,还是想做其他事。通常在这些时候,你有意识的思考会发挥什么作用?明智如何能把理性灌注于这些时刻?

Think of some moments in your day where you feel overwhelmed by desire, whether to eat a snack or look at your phone or something else. What role does your conscious thought ordinarily play at those times? How can prudence infuse reason into those moments?