^9:22 One thing is what I have spoken: he himself consumes both the innocent and the impious.
^9:23 If he scourges, let him kill once, and not laugh at the punishments of the innocent.
^9:24 The earth has been given into the hand of the impious; he covers the face of its judges. But if it is not he, who then is it?
^9:25 My days have been swifter than a runner; they have fled and have not seen good.
^9:26 They have passed by like ships carrying fruit, like an eagle flying to food.
^9:27 When I have said: By no means will I speak thus, I change my face and am tormented by sorrow.
^9:28 I feared all my works, knowing that you would not spare the one who offends.
^9:29 But if even so I am impious, why have I labored in vain?
^9:30 If I have been washed, as though with snow waters, and my hands have shone like the cleanest things,
^9:31 nevertheless you will plunge me into filth, and my garments will abominate me.
^9:32 For I will not answer a man who is like me, nor one who can be heard equally with me in judgment:
^9:33 there is no one who is able to argue with both and to place his hand upon both.
^9:34 Let him take his rod away from me, and let his dread not terrify me.
^9:35 I will speak and not fear him; for I cannot answer while afraid.

167. One thing is what I have spoken, etc. After blessed Job has shown that it is not his intention to contend with God, he sets forth that about which he had a disputation with his adversaries. For Eliphaz had said that punishments are sent by God only because of sins, against which Job had spoken in his previous response; and because Bildad had attempted to assert the judgment of Eliphaz, Job again repeats his own judgment, saying: One thing is what I have spoken: he himself consumes both the innocent and the impious, as if to say: death is sent by God not only to sinners but also to the innocent, yet this is the greatest of present punishments, and thus what you say is not true, that man is punished by God only for his own sins. Now that death is from God is said in Deuteronomy 32:39: I will kill, and I will make alive. But since death is commonly sent by God to all, one thing is what seems hard, namely, that the innocent, besides common death, endure manifold adversities in this life; and he intends to investigate the cause of this matter, and therefore he adds: If he scourges, let him kill once, as if to say: let it be granted that the scourge of death is common to all; nevertheless it would seem reasonable that he should not inflict on the innocent, who are not guilty from their own sins, any other punishment besides death, which is owed to common sin. For if, as you say, there is no other cause why punishment can justly be inflicted on someone except sin, and yet it is manifest that the innocent suffer punishment in this world, it seems to follow that they are punished without cause, as if the punishments themselves pleased God for their own sake; and therefore he adds: and not laugh at the punishments of the innocent; for we are accustomed to laugh at those things that please us in themselves.

168. But if this is unfitting, that the punishments of the innocent should please God in themselves, and yet the innocent are frequently found to be punished on earth, another unfitting consequence seems to follow, namely, that these punishments do not proceed from divine judgment but from the malice of some wicked lord who has power on earth and punishes the innocent; whence there follows: The earth has been given into the hands of the impious, as if to say: if the punishments of the innocent, who nevertheless are punished on earth, do not please God in themselves, it will be necessary to say that God has committed the rule of the earth to some impious one, from whose iniquity judgment on earth is perverted, so that the innocent are punished. And this is what he adds: he covers the face of its judges, that is, he clouds their reason either with cupidity, or hatred, or love, lest in judging they follow the truth of judgment. But if it is not he, namely, the impious one to whom the earth has been handed over, by whom, namely, the punishment of the innocent is caused, who then is it?, namely, the cause of this punishment?

For it cannot be said, as has been shown, that this is from God, on the supposition of your position that sin alone is the cause of present punishments. Now what he said, The earth has been given into the hands of the impious, is indeed true in a certain respect, insofar, namely, as earthly men are left by God under the power of the devil, according to that saying: He who commits sin is the servant of sin; but absolutely it is false: for dominion over the earth has not been granted absolutely to the devil, namely, so that he may freely do in it whatever he wishes, but whatever he is permitted to do proceeds from the divine disposition, which dispenses all things from a reasonable cause. Hence this very fact, that the innocent are punished, does not depend absolutely on the malice of the devil but on the wisdom of God permitting it. Hence, if sin is not the cause of the punishment of the innocent, it is not sufficient to reduce this to the malice of the devil, but there must further be some reasonable cause on account of which God permits it; and therefore he says pointedly: But if it is not he, who then is it? As if to say: if the malice of the devil is not a sufficient cause of the punishment of the innocent, another cause must be investigated.

169. Therefore, to investigate the reason why the innocent are punished in this world, he first sets forth the defect that he had suffered in the loss of goods, showing the mutability of present prosperity from the likeness of those things that seem to be swiftest in this world. But it must be considered that different people stand in different ways toward the prosperity of this world: for some have it as their end, hoping for nothing beyond it—to which the opinion of those who placed all rewards and punishments in this life seemed to incline—but such people do not pass through the prosperity of this world; rather, the prosperity of this world flees from them when they lose it. But others, among whom Job was numbered, do not place their end in the prosperity of this world but tend toward another end, and such people themselves pass beyond the prosperity of this world rather than have it pass away from them.

Now for those tending toward some end three things are necessary:

the first is that they should fix their heart on nothing else by which they could be delayed from the end, but should hasten to attain the end; and therefore he first sets down the example of a runner, who tends toward the end of his course in such a way that he does not incur delay on the way. Hence he says: My days have been swifter than a runner, in which words he demonstrates both the instability of present fortune and his own intention tending toward something else; they have fled, as though no rest of heart had been found in the things of this world, whence there follows: and they have not seen good, namely, that toward which my intention was borne, which is the true good. Hence I do not consider myself rewarded for justice; but if you think present prosperity is the reward, then, when it was taken away, I, though innocent, was punished.

Second, it is required that one tending toward some end acquire for himself those things by which he can arrive at the end, just as one who wishes to be healed must acquire the medicines by which he may be healed; likewise, one who wishes to arrive at the true good must acquire the virtues by which he can attain it. Hence he adds: they have passed by like ships carrying fruit, in which he also demonstrates two things: both the instability of present fortune, because ships carrying fruit for sale hasten lest the fruit rot through delay, and the zeal for tending toward the end, as if to say: my days did not pass by empty, but I gathered virtues with which I tend toward attaining the end.

The third thing that remains is the attainment of the end; whence he says: like an eagle flying to food, in which the two things mentioned above are also designated: for an eagle is swift in flight, especially when driven by hunger, and it has food as the end by which it is refreshed.

170. Therefore, because in these words he had, as it were, hinted that he was just and innocent, which was regarded as presumptuous by his adversaries, he begins to discuss his innocence with God, who alone is the judge of conscience; whence he adds: When I have said, namely, in my heart: By no means will I speak thus, namely, that I am just and innocent, I change my face, namely, from the confidence that I had conceived about my innocence to a certain solicitude for investigating sins, and am tormented by sorrow, in the examination of my own conscience, thinking again lest perhaps I am being punished thus for some sin. And he adds the cause of the sorrow, saying: I feared all my works: for it is a great cause of sorrow for someone when he has great solicitude about some matter and yet falls into the very thing he was striving to avoid. But he himself applied great solicitude to all his works, fearing lest in anything he should turn aside from justice, and this is what he says: I feared all my works. And the reason why he feared thus in every work of his was fear of the severity of divine judgment, whence there is added: knowing that you would not spare the one who offends, unless, namely, he be converted, because, as is said in the Psalm: Unless you are converted, he will brandish his sword. But if, after such great zeal for innocence, even so I am impious, so that I have deserved to be punished by God with such grave punishments, why have I labored in vain in such great solicitude to preserve innocence? For one is said to labor in vain who by his labor tends toward an end that he does not reach.

171. But because the purity of man, however great it may be, is found deficient when referred to divine examination, he consequently shows that, when he calls himself pure and innocent, he understands himself to be pure and innocent as a man, not as one in no way at all departing from the rectitude of divine justice. Now it must be known that there is a twofold purity: one, indeed, of the innocent man, the other of the penitent; but both are imperfect in man if compared with the perfect rectitude of the divine rule. Therefore, with regard to the purity of the penitent, he says: If I have been washed, that is, if I have striven to purify myself from my sins, as though with snow waters, which are said to wash well; but with regard to the purity of the innocent man, he adds: and my hands have shone as if most clean, that is, if in my works, which are designated by the hands, no uncleanness is found, but the brightness of justice shines in them—

but he says as if most clean to suggest that perfect cleanness cannot exist in man; if, he says, I have been clean in this way, nevertheless you will plunge me into filth, that is, I will be shown to be filthy when compared with your justice and convicted by your wisdom. For in human works some defect is always found: sometimes from ignorance, because of the weakness of reason; sometimes from negligence, because of the infirmity of the flesh; and sometimes some infection of an earthly affection is admixed even in good works, because of the fickleness of the human heart, which does not remain fixed in the same thing. Hence in human works there is always found something that falls short of the purity of divine justice. But when someone is unclean and yet outwardly has some display of justice, the signs of justice that appear outwardly concerning him do not befit him, and therefore he adds: and my garments will abominate me: for by garments are designated exterior works, by which man is, as it were, covered, according to Matthew 7:15: They come to you in sheep’s clothing. Therefore someone’s garments abominate him when the exterior things of a man, which make a pretense of justice, do not agree with his interior things.

172. But why, however pure he may be, he cannot defend himself from being convicted by God as impure, he consequently shows from two things in which God excels men, namely, from the purity of justice and from the authority of majesty.

With regard to the first, therefore, he says: For I will not answer a man who is like me, as if to say: if some man wished to convict me as impure, I could resist him if he objected to me things that he himself would recognize cannot be preserved in man concerning the perfect purity of justice; but in this way I cannot answer God, in whom no defect is found.

With regard to the second he says: nor one who can be heard equally with me in judgment: for when two men contend with one another, they can have a judge who examines the statements of both; but this cannot exist between God and man for a twofold reason:

one reason is that in a judge there must be a higher wisdom, which is, as it were, the rule according to which the statements of both parties are examined. But it is manifest that divine wisdom is the first rule according to which the truth of all things is examined, and on account of this he adds: there is no one who is able to argue with both, as if to say: there is no one else superior to God, by whose greater wisdom divine wisdom could be corrected.

The other reason is that in a judge there must be a greater power, by which he can restrain both parties; and he excludes this, saying: and to place his hand upon both, that is, to coerce both. For this is excluded by the immensity of divine power, which he showed above.

173. And because, as has been said, he intends to search out by what reason the innocent are punished in this world, he consequently shows what could hinder him from this investigation and with what intention he wishes to search this out. Now he could be hindered from this investigation by two things,

first, indeed, by the affliction that he was suffering: for men whose mind is occupied by sadness cannot search subtly; and with regard to this he says: Let him take his rod away from me;

second, from the reverence that he had toward God: for men sometimes, out of a certain reverence that they have toward God, omit searching into the things of God, and with regard to this he says: and let his dread not terrify me, as if to say: let him grant my spirit to rest from the affliction that I suffer, and let it not be imputed to me as irreverence that I dispute about divine things; and thus I will be able to search into them, whence there follows: I will speak and not fear him, that is, as if I did not fear him; for I cannot answer while afraid, that is, while from reverence for him I am called back from searching. Now it must be known that the fear of God sometimes does not call those who fear God back from searching into divine things, namely, when they search into divine things from the desire of knowing the truth, not so that they may comprehend things incomprehensible, but always with such moderation that they subject their intellect to divine truth. But they are called back by the fear of God from searching into divine things in such a way as though they wished to comprehend them and did not regulate their intellect by divine truth. Thus, therefore, by these words Job intends to show that he searches into those things that pertain to divine providence with such moderation that he subjects his intellect to divine truth, not that he attacks divine truth, which would be contrary to the reverence of the fear of God.